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Abstract
From Photoshop® to photoshop:
Knowing How and When to Protect your Brand Name

Joseph M. Dery
Chair of Supervisory Committee:
Dominique M. Haughton, Professor of Mathematical Sciences
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Bentley University

Forbes Magazine’s 2018 publication of “the World’s Most Valuable Brands” illustrates a
dramatic statistic: of their 100 top ranked brands, each had an estimated brand value of over $7B!
In the US, however, the very legislation that protects brands from dilution also contains language
on how to cancel a trademark that has become generic. This phenomenon is known as Brand
Genericide. To best equip marketers with the ability to strategically influence this phenomenon, I
offer an explanation as to “why” it exists, a detailed a methodology for tracing it, a series of
strategic interventions for influencing it, and a discussion on how to design a mnemonic device to
impede it.
Relying on causal origin theory, cognitive psychology, and referential governance, I focus
on a parallel event to lexical genericization: the naming ceremony of a product class. Driven by
this ceremony, a failure of buffered counterfactual dependence in the original brand-name-usingpractice opens the door to a potential dubbing of a homonymous referring term that instead
references the product class. If the generic-brand-naming-using practice takes hold in the
community, it then primes the trademark for potential revocation. By looking at how referential
governance is both destroyed & reestablished, I offer a three-phase model of the Brand
Genericide process.
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To operationalize the three-phase model, I demonstrate a detailed methodology for
extracting indicators of Brand Genericide from social media, tagging the relevant communicative
exchanges with part-of-speech, assessing which phase of Brand Genericide is likely active, and
providing strategic interventions to enhance, impede, or maintain the social learning process.
Finally, by looking at a specific instrument, the jingle, I discuss how the diffusion of
knowledge of a brand name’s reference/referent relationship has the potential to impede Brand
Genericide. However, with a gap in the marketing and music analysis literatures on what features
make a jingle “successful”, I detail a research agenda aimed at uncovering the recipe for increasing
the familiarity of a brand’s reference after limited exposure. To accomplish this, I define & execute
a novel methodology for clustering jingles to create profiles that can be contrasted in a future
experimental design.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background: Brand Names, Trademarks, & Trademark Law
Onesie®. Photoshop®. Xerox®. Band-Aid®. Through the tenants of brand equity, perceived
quality, and brand loyalty, at this very moment, value is associated with each of these
trademarked brand names (Aaker 1996). As consumers, this association is possible because we
have knowledge of what each of these names uniquely identifies, serving as a cue and anchor for
the emotions, experiences, and opinions we form about a particular product. Forbes Magazine’s
2018 publication of “the World’s Most Valuable Brands” highlights the kind of value a brand name
can drive: Apple® ended up taking the top ranked spot with an estimated brand value of $182.8B,
and Google® came in as the runner-up with a modest estimated brand value of $132.1B
(<https://www.forbes.com/powerful-brands>). In fact, among the top 100 ranked brands, all have
estimated brand values of over $7B! Needless to say, brands are a significant part of a company’s
portfolio and serve as a figurative sun in the center of a company’s marketing strategy universe.
To help to defend these brands, the US – among other countries – introduced Federal Law
to both identify and to protect these near priceless company assets using trademarks. These
registered marks “serve as source-identifiers” and help to “reduce consumer search costs” (Bone
2006). In this way, trademark owners have a mark that they can use to specifically identify their
product from all others that exist. When designing these brand names, Butters (2010) describes
four forms that brand names can take: fanciful, arbitrary, suggestive, and descriptive. Fanciful
marks are whimsical, imaginary, and often are “made up”. As an example, Butters offers Kodak®,
which has no prior meaning in English. Arbitrary marks, on the other hand, are real words that
exist in our language, but fail to have a “meaningful relationship” to the product or service they
reference. Here, Butters offers the example of Apple®, which is also clearly a fruit, but had no
previous relationship to computers. Suggestive marks imply the product or service they reference,
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such as the trademark Jaguar®, which indicates a notion of fast – similar to the animal. Finally,
descriptive marks are as simple as they sound: they “merely denote some major aspect of the
product or service being offered” (2010). Butters provides the example of CarMax®, which literally
contains the descriptor “car” in the mark. There is also a fifth form that a brand name can assume;
however, it is not something that can be registered under trademark law. This form is called
“generic” and can be used to describe the entirety of the product class instead of one specific
product from one specific source.
In the US, however, the very legislation that provides owners with peace-of-mind knowing
that the Law protects their brand from dilution, also contains language on how to cancel a
trademark that has become generic, i.e. source-less. This cancelation is written into the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946 (enacted July 5, 1946) and is meant to protect consumers from increased
search costs and to restrict unfair competitive advantage. For example, prior to 1921, aspirin was
actually a registered trademark owned by the company, Bayer. This brand name referenced the
specific acetyl salicylic acid-based drug made by Bayer. In the 1921 case of Bayer Co., Inc. v. United
Drug Co., Bayer lost their rights to the trademark given the name aspirin was determined to be
generic in public perception (Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)). If the
trademark remained protected, only Bayer would have been able to refer to their product as
“Aspirin”, while all competitors continued to use the descriptive name of acetyl salicylic acidbased drug, a clearly unfair competitive advantage. This assumes, of course, that consumers really
perceived any similar drug, regardless of source, to be aspirin. On the other hand, if aspirin was
seen by the public to reference the product category, then Bayer would most likely have a
challenging time building equity, trust, and loyalty on this generic name, likely resulting in the
dilution of Bayer’s Aspirin trademark.
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Looking back at the Lanham Trademark Act, according to Diggins (1946), this legislation
provides Congress with the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce with regards to
trademarks. In its original interpretation, the Act attempts to protect trademark owners with a
form of protection from unfair competition by providing the right to the access of Federal courts,
which its predecessor legislation, the Trademark Act of 1905, did not guarantee. The 1905 Act
never “conclusively establish[ed] either ownership of the mark or its validity” (1946). In essence,
the 1905 Act didn’t really provide any incentives for a company to register their mark.
Prior to 1905, trademarks were dealt with under Common Law, where the right to
exclusively use a brand name was driven by the order of use – i.e. whoever first used the mark
had the right to exclusively use it (Diggins 1946). Given there was no “official” registration under
Common Law, e.g. writing the name down to document it with a date, companies wishing to use
a specific mark for their product or service had to, more or less, gamble on the assumption that
they were the first to use it in commerce. With the amount of effort and capital needed in building
a brand, this risk was not something companies were lining up for. So, to account for this gap in
Common Law, in 1946, the Lanham Trademark Act offered additional language that created more
of an incentive for companies to begin registering their marks.
The Lanham Trademark Act served to “…simplify trade-mark practice, to secure trademark owners the goodwill which they have built up, and to protect the public from imposition by
the use of counterfeit and imitated marks and false trade descriptions” with the power to
supersede state trademark laws (Diggins 1946). To do this, section 2 of the 1946 Act set in place
a way to register trademarks – an official record of first use. In this record, the trademark owner
must list both the date the mark was first used and the date the mark was first used in commerce.
It also defined in section 2a trademarks that cannot be registered: i.e. anything immoral,
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scandalous, deceptive, or any marks that "consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a
mark registered in the Patent Office or a mark or trade-name previously used in the United States
by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to the goods of the applicant, to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers…" (Lanham Trademark Act, article 2d as cited
in Diggins 1946). Based on these criteria, it is in the best interest of a company to register their as
soon as possible – or in other words, before a competitor beats them to it.
With particular importance to brand names that become generic, section 14 and 15 of
the Lanham Trademark Act detail cancellation and incontestability of registrations (Diggins 1946).
To cancel a trademark registration, anyone has the right to file a petition to cancel at any time.
Typically, the main drivers include: 1) the trademark “becomes a common descriptive name of an
article of substance on which the patent has expired”, 2) the trademark has been abandoned by
the owner, 3) the original registration application was submitted fraudulently, or 4) the trademark
is immoral, deceptive, or scandalous (1946). Notably, the person or entity that files the petition
to cancel has the burden of proving that there is cause to rescind the registration (section 33a of
the Lanham Trademark Act). Boiling this down, as Cova notes, this part of the Lanham Trademark
Act allows for a once valid registration to be “abolished” if there is enough evidence of generic
usage by consumers (2014). Given the billions of dollars tied to brand name value (thank you,
Forbes), it is easy to understand why companies with trademarked brand names take notice when
it comes to possible cancelation.
In the legal context, a registered trademark has become generic when it “refers, or has
come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular product is a species”
(Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.1976) as cited in Frito-Lay, Inc. v.
Bachman Co., 704 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). Additionally, in Stix Products, Inc. v. United
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Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc. (295 F. Supp. 479, 490 (S.D.N.Y.1968)), there is also precedent
that “the standard to be applied in determining whether a term is generic is not whether it has
some significance to the public as an indication of the nature or class of the article, but whether
that is its principal significance” (as cited in Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
In the case of Frito-Lay Inc. v. Bachman Co., 1989, Frito-Lay sued Bachman Co. over their
use of their registered trademark, Ruffles®, in their new brand name: “Bachman’s Golden Ridges”.
Bachman responded with a countersuit affirming that “Ruffles” was a generic mark and should
therefore be canceled (Walsh 2013). Here, the burden of proof fell on Bachman to prove that
“Ruffles” was a generic term:
As evidence that Ruffles is a generic term for ridged potato chips, Bachman offers FritoLay consumer surveys in which respondents referred to ridged chips as "ruffled"; surveys
conducted for Frito-Lay in which the consultants concluded that Ruffles may be generic
for the consuming public; letters to Frito-Lay from purchasers of its products, which refer
to "ruffled" chips; advertising, media, and trade use of the term "ruffled" to describe
ridged potato chips; affidavits from Bachman's expert witnesses that Ruffles and "ruffled"
are generic terms for ridged potato chips; other isolated food-related uses; the fact that
Ruffles was originally marketed as "Potato Ruffles"; and dictionary and thesaurus entries
which recognize "ruffled" as synonymous with "rippled" and "ridged." (Frito-Lay, Inc. v.
Bachman Co., 704 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989))
Frito-Lay defended their registration with their own series of consumer surveys. They also
provided evidence of “vigorous” policing efforts, as evident by the original suit. Bachman’s
complaint was ultimately denied. So, even with what seemed to be a mountain of evidence,
“Bachman [could] offer no evidence of widespread industry use” (Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
Tying this back to the 4 types of trademarks that are eligible for trademark, fanciful, arbitrary, and
suggestive marks are said to be the strongest forms of reference with regards to difficulty in
cancelling.
When it comes to canceling a mark due to genericness, current legal precedent looks for
a variety of evidence, from qualitative to quantitative, to show primary significance. Walsh
18

summarizes the types of evidence as follows: 1) lack of policing by the mark’s owner, widespread
unauthorized generic use of the mark; 2) the fact that the trademark owner is using it generically;
3) dictionary definitions that define the name as generic; 4) published works that use the name
generically; and 5) consumer surveys regarding the perception of the name. Walsh goes on to
explain that all or most of these forms of evidence have been presented in trials, but none of them
exclusively have proven to be enough to show primary significance (2013). Summarizing the
process for canceling the mark, Walsh points to the case of Glover v. Ampak Inc., 1996 (Glover v.
Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1996)), which identified three elements that need to be
established to achieve trademark revocation: 1) one must identify the product/class that the
name generically represents; 2) one must identify who buys the product/service and who may be
confused by the mark; and 3) one must prove, with evidence, primary significance (2013).
To close out this introduction to Trademark Law, it is important to note revisions to the
Trademark Law that were passed in 1983, 1988, 1996, and 2006. The first, the Trademark
Clarification Act,
Amends the Lanham Trademark Act to state that a registered trademark has not become
a generic (common descriptive name) and therefore cancellable solely because such mark
is also used as a name of or to identify a unique product or service. Makes the primary
significance of the mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation the test
for whether the mark has become a generic. Includes under trademark and service mark
protection those marks which indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is
unknown. Prohibits the use of purchaser motivation as a test for determining whether a
mark has been abandoned (Reported to Senate from the Committee on the Judiciary with
amendment, S. Rept. 98-627, 9/20/1984).
The key to this amendment is that it shifts the reason for revoking a trademark due to genericness
to be based on the primary significance of the relevant public versus purchaser motivation. The
second revision, the Trademark Revision Act of 1988, appended the original law to allow
“domestic applicants to seek registration of a trademark prior to use” (Synder 1990, emphasis
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added) – whereas before, the mark needed to be in use at the time of registration. In doing so,
the revision allows for registrations based on “intent to use” (1990). From here, the next revision
came in 1996 with the Trademark Dilution Act, which was also revised in 2006. The Trademark
Dilution Act was the first Federal law attributed to the dilution, or weakening, of a brand name
due to adverse use by an unauthorized entity, intentional or unintentional.
The Trademark Dilution Act of 1996 defined “dilution” at the Federal level: “the term
‘dilution’ means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods
or services, regardless of the presence or absence of – (1) competition between the owner of the
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception” (the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act as cited in McCarthy 2004). According to McCarthy, by the end of 2003,
there were over 400 legal suits claiming trademark dilution under this act (2004). However, the
most notable is the 2003 Supreme Court case of Moseley versus the Victoria’s Secret Catalogue
(Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. (2003)). In a small Kentucky town, Cathy and Victor
Moseley used the mark, “Victor’s Little Secret”, to name an adult toy, video, and lingerie shop.
Victoria’s Secret sued on the basis of trademark dilution, claiming that the use of the mark
damaged the Victoria’s Secret brand. In the original suit, the District Court ruled that while there
was no evidence of dilution, it was likely that the unauthorized usage tarnished the Victoria’s
Secret brand name. On appeal, the Supreme Court decided to hear the case. They ended up
sending the case back to the District level with the guidance that actual dilution needs to be
proven, regardless of tarnishment, versus the likelihood of dilution.
In the Trademark Dilution Act of 2006 (an expansion of the 1996 Federal Trademark
Dilution Act), two additional provisions are made to deal with likelihood: 1) liability can be
established even if the trademark owner cannot prove “actual dilution” and 2) it includes
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language for tarnishment (Bone 2006). When it comes to dilution, Bone discusses two types:
dilution by tarnishment and dilution by blurring (2006). Dilution by tarnishment encompasses
cases where a mark is used in such a way that it conflicts with the imagery of the original mark.
Bone provides the example of the use of “Tiffany” in relation to an adult entertainment club. Next,
dilution by blurring includes cases where the usage of the mark weakens the “distinctiveness” of
a registered trademark. Bone offers the example of using “Tiffany” in relation to a luxury car,
which may cause consumer confusion due to the overlap in the luxury category (2006) i.e. it is not
hard to imagine that Tiffany would sell a luxury car. In both cases, the revisions made to
Trademark Law in 2006 offers legal language that protects the registered trademark from both
dilution and tarnishment. These laws also constitute a shift from the original Lanham Trademark
Act, which sought to protect consumers from being confused, not trademark owners from dilution
(McCarthy 2004). After all, the Law states consumer confusion is not a requirement in identifying
dilution.
Interestingly, across Federal Trademark Law, whether in the context of dilution or
tarnishment, there seems to be little (or no) legal language on using a mark as a verb to represent
some action. The majority of the language described here focuses on the unauthorized usage of
a mark in describing another product or service. Given the hefty policing done by Google to
discourage the generic verb use of “Google” and Adobe to discourage the generic verb use of
“Photoshop”, it’d seem that these trademark owners are hoping that consumers assume the law
provides this protection versus the reality of what’s in the legal text. In fact, from the legal cases
summarized in McCarthy (2004), all the examples look at dilution through the lens of using a mark
to represent another product from a different source:
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-

Barcardi & Co. v Bacardi Mfg. Jewelers Co. (1973) Æ Barcardi rum (trademark) vs. Barcardi
Jewelry
K2 Co. v. Philip Morris Inc. (1976) Æ K2 skis (trademark) vs. K2 cigarettes
Corp. of Lloyd’s v. Louis D’Or of France, Inc. (1981) Æ Lloyd’s of London cologne (trademark)
vs. Lloyd’s of London insurance services
Gen. Mills Fun Group, Inc. v. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. (1981) Æ Monopoly board game
(trademark) vs. Monopoly apparel
Tiffany & Co. v. Classic Motor Carriages, Inc. (1989) Æ Tiffany jewelry (trademark) vs. Tiffany
automobile

It seems that the next logical step would be a legal suit that argues that the verb usage of a
trademarked brand name is likely to cause damage to the famous mark it derives from. However,
given the verb usage indicates an action versus, at face value, naming a product or product class,
this enters new conceptual waters, which need to be explored to understand the marketing and
legal ramifications.
Given the value of brand names, the fact Trademark Law was written to protect both
consumers and trademark owners – and the very real reality that marks can be diluted or canceled
(Google was in Court just last year defending their non-genericness; see Elliott et al. v. Google,
Inc. 2017) – there is a great deal of motivation to better understand how and when companies
can intervene to protect their brand names – assuming that’s what they want to do.
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1.2 Towards an Understanding and Influence of Brand Genericide
Since the 1980s, an ominous term has floated around marketing, legal, and linguistic journal – a
term that suggests the death of a brand. This term is Brand Genericide.

Figure 1: Conceptual Map of Brand Genericide
Brand Genericide, an expression born out of legal reviews, highlights the shift of a brand name
that represents a unique product from a specific source to a name that, instead, references the
product class. This, in turn, positions the trademark for cancelation under the Lanham Trademark
Act. Linguists also have a name for the phenomenon: brand genericization (Clankie 1999).
Linguists, such as Clankie, focus on the semantic change that occurs when brand names become
generic: a transition from a Proper Adjective or Proper Noun to a common noun or verb that
represents the entire semantic class of the product. From this perspective, linguists seem to
position that this linguistic change ultimately drives the result of Brand Genericide.
Given the inherent notion of death and cancelation, as well as marketing articles that
callout the “heartbreak of genericide”, it would seem that Brand Genericide is something to be
avoided; however, there are also contrasting views that instead rally around the phenomenon
with support crying, “long live genericization” (Cova 2014). In Cova’s argument, “…brand
genericization is considered first and foremost a positive… [given that it is] the first sign of a strong
23

brand” – a brand that becomes synonymous with the product market (2014). In this instance, the
argument is grounded in the reality that if consumers are starting to use a brand name generically,
it means that the brand is most likely “… very well-known [and] highly successful” (2014). Cova
then goes on to offer a matrix that attempts to balance both an active genericization agenda and
protecting one’s brand from genericization, which may appear counterintuitive to some given that
the Courts look for evidence of incorrect usage by the owner when deciding on trademark
cancelation.
In the end, regardless of whether a marketer wishes to promote or protect against Brand
Genericide, there should be a strategy in place that strategically informs a trademark owner of
how and when to either impede, enhance, or maintain the Genericide process. However, to-date,
there are meaningful gaps in the Brand Genericide and brand genericization research that prevent
such a strategic map from being offered. First, there is a limited understanding of why Genericide
occurs. The linguistic theory of brand genericization attempts to answer this question and seems
to fall short, instead providing brand features that increase the likelihood of genericization as a
warning to marketers. With regards to Law reviews, the content primarily focuses on strategies
to resist Genericide – i.e. positioning the brand name as a Proper Adjective and policing incorrect
usage (In 2002). Therefore, this Thesis puts forth three subsequent chapters that attempt to not
only shed light on why Brand Genericide occurs, but also to define the process in which is occurs,
and how & when companies can act to strategically influence it. By looking at these marketing
business problems from an interdisciplinary perspective driven by analytics, my goal is to provide
value to both academia and practitioners by illustrating that with an understanding of “why” these
problems exist, we can use data and mathematics to influence strategy: a strategy to protect a
brand’s reference and a strategy to propagate consumer knowledge of a brand reference
effectively and efficiently.
24

1.3 Research Map
In the marketing, legal, and linguistic literatures, the notion of becoming generic emerges
as either Brand Genericide or brand genericization. Famous victims include (but are not limited
to) aspirin, heroin, escalator, thermos, yo-yo, and elevator. To emphasize the importance of
understanding this phenomenon, consider the example of Coca-Cola v. Overland in 1982 (CocaCola, Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1982)). In this case, Topaz Lodge and Casino
(owned by Overland, Inc.) was sued by Coca-Cola over their alleged practice of serving customers
“Pepsi-Cola” branded products when consumers verbally ordered “Coca-Cola” or "Coke".
According to Coca-Cola, Co., it was the responsibility of Overland, Inc. to inform the consumer
that they only had Pepsi-Cola branded products and not Coca-Cola branded products. So, when
Coca-Cola, Co. observed Overland, Inc. employees failing to make their consumers aware of the
product they were consuming when serving them Pepsi as a direct replacement for Coke, they
sued on the premise of dilution. In this case, Coca-Cola, Co. won the suit because Overland, Inc.
could not prove that the trademarks owned by Coca-Cola, Co. (“Coca-Cola” and “Coke”) had
become generic in public perception (Coca-Cola, Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir.
1982)). To rephrase, Overland could not prove that Coke® and Coca-Cola® were perceived by the
public as the representation of the product class of cola-flavored beverages instead of a product
made by the Coca-Cola Company. However, what if Overland won? What if either “Coca-Cola” or
“Coke” were deemed generic? Well, to start, anyone and any competitor (such as Pepsi) would
have the right to refer to any cola-flavored beverage as, say, “Coca-Cola”, regardless of the source.
This could then dilute the perceived quality of the original product because the brand equity that
Coca-Cola built over many years would diffuse over all products in the class. Coca-Cola, Co. would
likely then need to re-brand itself to distinguish its products once again in the eyes of the
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consumer, allowing them to start repointing their once highly valued brand equity to a new
anchor (which is valued in the Forbes “Most Valuable Brands” list at $57.3B in 2018).
Keeping in mind this Coca-Cola® example, when exploring the literature on this marketing
business problem, the results range from a linguistic process of semantic expansion, to a legal
dilemma that must be avoided at all costs, and finally, to a hidden desire of all marketers,
emphasizing the “great success” of becoming a household name – something Coca-Cola was
clearly trying to avoid in their 1982 suit. Regardless of whether marketers wish to promote or
protect against it, there still needs to be a strategy in place to either impede, enhance, or maintain
the process as reference begins to shift. Given this need, I address several research gaps,
including: 1) a limited theoretical explanation of “why” Brand Genericide exists; 2) lack of a
detailed a methodology for tracing indications of Brand Genericide over time; 3) unclear
mechanisms needed to strategically influence Brand Genericide during its lifecycle; and 4) a need
for a clearer understanding of how reference can influence how we build and maintain brand
value. After all, if reference wasn’t critical here, then losing a brand name to Genericide wouldn’t
be a big deal. This Thesis, therefore, attempts to expand on how theories of reference can enable
researchers and practitioners to break down brand-related marketing business problems so that
analytics can be leveraged to drive strategic action on the “right” problems. The following
subsections cover the contributions of the three subsequent chapters.
1.3.1 The Destruction of Original Referential Governance: A Closer Look at the “Side Effect” of
Brand Genericide
Chapter 2 uses a general method of theory-building to investigate Brand Genericide
through the lens of theories of reference to formulate a new theory on why Brand Genericide
occurs. In doing so, I offer a three-phase model, with an activation qualifier, of the Brand
Genericide phenomenon that is later used to operationalize a strategy of strategic influence in
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chapter 3 of this Thesis. While reference does emerge in Brand Genericide definitions, a
reference-based view of this phenomenon is a clear gap in the existing linguistic, marketing, and
legal literatures. This chapter presents a theory for how a trademarked brand name, a name with
a rigid designation, shifts its reference from a specific product to a generalized product category.
By stepping back from brand names and using a discussion of causal origin, cognitive psychology,
and referential governance, a parallel event to genericization becomes visible: the naming
ceremony of a product class. Through a failure of buffered counterfactual dependence in the
original brand-name-using-practice, Brand Genericide emerges as a side-effect of the product
category’s naming ceremony, destroying the original governance model that was produced by
those that know the specific product from the specific source as the brand name. In summary,
this chapter contributes to the literature by: 1) providing a theory as to why Brand Genericide
exists and 2) providing a mapping of the Brand Genericide process that parallels the existing
theories of linguistic conversion. Strategic interventions are then applied in chapter 3.
1.3.2 Protecting Your Brand from Genericide – an Analytical Approach to Knowing How and
When to Strategically Act
Chapter 3 operationalizes the Brand Genericide theory and accompanying phases that are
presented in chapter 2. I rely on quantitative methods to 1) extract indicators of Brand Genericide
from social media (e.g. Twitter), 2) tag the relevant Tweets with their part-of-speech, 3) assign
the indicators to the different phases of Brand Genericide, and 4) provide strategic interventions
at each stage to enhance, impede, or maintain the social learning process. To begin the discussion,
I start with a review of the literature on labeling newly created product categories to present why
a marketer may intentionally choose to reference their product category with a description vs a
newly coined name. In labeling the category in this way, it ultimately puts all brands in the given
category at risk of Brand Genericide – a discussion point made in chapter 2. So, if a marketer
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decides that the risk is worth it, a corresponding, urgent need pops up to counteract the potential
future effects of the decision. This requires knowing if, when, and how to act – three challenges I
take on in this chapter.
To determine “when” to act, I offer a methodology for tracing Brand Genericide over time.
To illustrate the methodology, I provide two real examples in which I leverage over 250,000
cleaned, historical Tweets sampled from a 9-year horizon (2010-2018) using a targeted key-word
search on Twitter for he brands Onesie® and Photoshop®. With this sample data, I examine partof-speech trends, recording the ratio of Proper-to-common usage across 17 sample periods in the
series. Leveraging these ratios, I detect symptoms of the three Brand Genericide phases
(described in chapter 2), indicating where the brand name may have been in the process at
different points in time. This assignment provides the “if” – allowing the marketer to know if Brand
Genericide has begun. Finally, by relying on theories of information diffusion and social learning,
I provide the “how” to practitioners by presenting a series of strategic interventions to impede,
enhance, or maintain the Brand Genericide process. I also include strategic suggestions on my
Onesie® and Photoshop® findings. In summary, this chapter contributes to the literature by: 1)
offering a methodology to extract indictors of Brand Genericide from social media and 2) offering
practitioners a menu of strategic interventions that may influence the naming ceremony of a
product class (for better or for worse).
1.3.3 Towards Strategic “Jingle” Success: Profiling Jingles in an Effort to Effectively &
Efficiently Build Knowledge of a Brand’s Reference
Chapter 4 continues to expand on the general method of theory-building by exploring an
instrument that can be used to strategically impede Brand Genericide: the jingle. There are two
potential uses for marketing jingles: 1) to diffuse knowledge of a brand name’s reference to a
target audience (impeding Brand Genericide) and 2) to create associations between the known
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brand and a set of features. By exploring the literatures on brand choice and familiarity, the
importance of repetition and learning curves emerge front-an-center, highlighting the reality that
knowledge in the community is built up over time through multiple exposures. However, the
marketing literature also emphasizes that what is learned does not need to be true. This is a critical
point for practitioners, enforcing a need to be both careful and deliberate in any efforts to build
and deploy knowledge campaigns while still trying to speed up the consumer learning curve. After
all, for every minute consumers don’t have knowledge of a brand/product relationship (or any
product associations), it is a missed opportunity for the brand to be considered in a purchasing
decision, and it is also a minute lost in protecting against Brand Genericide.
To provide marketers with a way to shorten the consumer learning curve, a practitioner
may choose to leverage a memory-enhancing device, such as the jingle. However, what makes a
jingle successful as a memory enhancing device is a gap in both the marketing and music;
therefore, this chapter positions a research agenda to aid in uncovering the features that are most
highly associated, specifically, with increased familiarity of a brand’s reference after limited
exposure. To accomplish this, I propose a novel methodology for clustering jingles across three
dimensions (semantic, phonetic, and musical) to create profiles that can be compared and
contrasted in a future experiment. Leveraging this quantitative methodology, I collect a sample
of 80 jingles and extract just under 60 phonetic, semantic, and musical features to form my
vectors. I then explore different similarity measures to compute a distance matrix on the feature
vectors given there has been no research on this to-date for jingles (to the best of my knowledge).
After assessing several options, I compute a distance matrix based on cosine angle similarity and
utilize the K-Medoids non-hierarchical clustering method to uncover clusters from the sample
jingle population. In summary, this chapter offers the following contributions: 1) it establishes a
methodology for clustering jingles; 2) it profiles jingles across three dimensions (phonetic,
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semantic, and musical); and 3) it highlights the need (and resulting research agenda) to study
which features drive familiarity after limited jingle exposure.
Chapter 2: The Destruction of Original Referential Governance: A Closer Look at the “Side
Effect” of Brand Genericide
2.1 Introduction
“You can’t Xerox a Xerox on a Xerox”. In this one short sentence seen in an ad from the
1992 ABA Journal, the trademarked brand name, Xerox®, is used as a proper verb (to Xerox), as a
common noun (“xerox”) referring to a document that’s been produced through replication on a
copier, and as a proper noun (Xerox®) referring to the specific copier owned & sold by the
company Xerox. Though witty, this advertisement tries to make the point that the brand name,
Xerox®, should be used only in the way intended by the trademark. Stepping back, consider the
alternative: what if “xerox” was more than just a reference to the specific copier made by the
company, Xerox – what if, instead, the public did know its primary significance to be the generic
name for a copier? How would this be possible?
Depending on the discipline, the phenomenon that starts out with a trademarked brand
name and ends with a generic common name for the product category is known as either Brand
Genericide (to lawyers & marketers) or brand genericization (to linguists). Though legal scholars
spend much of their time looking at how to prevent the cancelation of a trademark – i.e. the
unfortunate result of becoming generic – linguists have attempted to explain genericization
through a study of linguistic change, a view that focuses on the shift from a Proper Adjective or
Proper Noun to that of a common noun. While I don’t disagree that lexical change occurs during
Brand Genericide, this linguistic explanation falls short by focusing on what can be seen versus
double-clicking on why or how Brand Genericide exists in the first place – as well as what
mechanism or trigger enables the referential shift to begin.
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In this chapter, I explore the issue of trademarked brand names being used in incorrect,
often unauthorized, ways that subject the mark to legal repercussions as outlined in the Lanham
Trademark Act. The current literature on Brand Genericide reveals three gaps that need to be
filled to both understand and influence the phenomenon: 1) there is a limited theoretical
explanation of “why” & “how” Brand Genericide occurs; 2) the literature lacks a detailed
methodology for analytically tracing indications of Brand Genericide over time; and 3) the
mechanisms needed to strategically influence Brand Genericide during its lifecycle have not yet
been published.
While my ultimate intention is to offer a methodology for longitudinally tracing Brand
Genericide with accompanying prescriptions for strategic influence in each of its phases, this
chapter offers an explanation as to “how” it happens and “why” the brand name reference shifts.
I accomplish this by offering a revised theory that looks beyond the brand name in question,
leveraging theories of reference to propel forward a new idea: Brand Genericide is an ancillary
reaction to the naming ceremony of an inefficiently referenced product class, which is made
possible by failed buffered counterfactual dependence that enables the destruction of the brand
name’s original referential governance. With this understanding of the “why”, I offer a series of
ordinal phases of Brand Genericide, providing the “how” needed for measuring and influencing
the referential shift in the third chapter of this Thesis.
2.2 Theoretical Development
To offer a revised theory of Brand Genericide, I leverage a general method of theorybuilding as illustrated by Lynham (2000; 2002). Given the publicly visible generic mark resulting
from Brand Genericide, it is fitting that Lynham’s general method is built around the idea that
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“every time we encounter a new issue, we first experience it, and then we try to observe how
that issue presents itself and works” (2002). Her method of theory-building relies on five stages:
1. Conceptual development. Generate initial ideas based on the “most informed
understanding and explanation of the phenomenon”. This includes: formulating key
elements of the theory, an effort to explore how the elements interrelate, and
assessing the potential limitation and conditions needed for the theory to work.
2. Operationalization phase. Connect the initial theory to practice and confirm it
functions as expected.
3. Application of the theory. Take the theory and apply it to practice – an effort that
may require “further study, inquiry, and understating of the theory in action” (2002).
4. Confirmation or disconfirmation. Plan and design a research agenda to confirm or
disconfirm the theory.
5. Continual refinement and development. Refine the theory.
In this chapter, I adopt Lynham’s method with a focus on conceptual development and
operationalization.
2.3 Literature Review & Initial Discussion
2.3.1 The Linguistic Theory of Genericization
Walt Whitman once said, “Simplicity is the glory of expression”. However, Whitman’s
work didn’t focus on how an expression lends itself to trademarks. Thankfully for us, when it
comes to the genericization of a brand name, academic contributions are present in linguistics,
marketing, and in numerous legal notes. To build a revised theory of Brand Genericide that
attempts to get at the “why” and “how” elements of the phenomenon, it is important to first
understand the perspective of each discipline and the lens that each was built through.
Linguistics look at the genericization of a brand name as a part of language development.
The first indirect reference of the genericization of a company name appeared in a 1950 article by
Partridge on how names become words. Clark & Clark later reference Partridge by mentioning
how company names can become instrumental verbs. In fact, they even went as far as to
specifically mention Xerox – a prime example of a brand name that underwent Brand Genericide
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and came out in one piece. However, in these original articles, the genericization of brand names
was not the focus – but rather, it was an example used in their larger arguments.
Stepping back, let us unpack a few of the foundational building blocks of linguistics to get
a sense for what’s being argued. In linguistics, a word – whether it be a brand, a name, or a part
of speech – is often referred to as a “naming unit” (Lipka, Handl, & Falkner 1994; Hansen 2003;
Lipka 2006). Naming units can then be broken down into four types as described by Mathesius: 1)
simple/descriptive, 2) non-compound words, 3) compound words, and 4) shortening of
words/coining of new naming units (1975). Within these four categories, all naming units exist.
Once categorized, these naming units can then be used as three types of extralinguistic objects:
simple/complex, expressions, and proper names, which in turn serves as a reference to some
content of thought (Lipka, Handl, & Falkner 1994).
Clark & Clark also discuss innovation, which produces naming units that are contextual.
They note that in some cases, the origins of these “contextual expressions” may “have been
completely lost” (1979). These expressions need a fixed sense and denotation. Here, sense is
described in a way where an “unmarried man” is the sense of the noun “bachelor”. Denotation is
viewed as “the relationship that a term has to objects, states, events, and processes in any real or
imaginary world” (1979). The difference in type of expression depends on whether there is a fixed
or shifting reference. Clark & Clark make use of the example, “He”, to illustrate that the noun has
the fixed sense of “male person”, but can reference many males, alive or deceased, in the real or
imaginary world (1978). This therefore would have a shifting reference when used in
communicative exchanges.
It is also important to note that Clark & Clark view “reference” as a relationship that
“‘holds between an expression and what the expression stands for on particular occasions of its
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utterance’” (Lyons 1977 as cited in Clark & Clark 1979). In cases where the expression has a
shifting reference, there needs to be cooperation between the communicator and the audience
(1979). For the expression to ultimately be understood, the speaker must confirm the sense and
denotation, which requires additional effort on the part of the audience.
When it comes to Proper Nouns, Clark & Clark go on to illustrate that they are “virtually
complete idioms” that have reference, but no sense, meaning that “the name rigidly designates
him – picks him out in all possible worlds” (1979). On the other hand, when denominal expressions
emerge from these Proper Nouns, sense is often present. For example, “I used photoshop to add
in a sunset,” which, with context, implies the sense of “a tool that enables photo-editing”. Given
the many senses that could accompany a denominal word, Clark & Clark would likely describe its
meaning as contextually specified. The above expression requires mutual knowledge of a specific
fact to be interpreted as the speaker intends: photoshop is a photo-editing software that would
allow a user to add in a sunset where one previously did not exist. To be interpreted as the speaker
intends, Clark & Clark highlight the need for the “kind of situation” to be denoted, for the speaker
to be ready to process the expression, and for the expression to reference uniquely based on “their
mutual knowledge” (1979). Without knowledge that is relative to the context or expression,
interpretation is difficult.
From a linguistics lens, Clark & Clark also look at why speakers invent denominal
expressions. In short, they argue that speakers will gravitate towards lower-cost references when
available rather than using a reference with “unnecessary prolixity” – i.e. wordiness (1979). This
idea is known as economy of expression. Speakers essentially attempt to “pack into a word what
would have taken many words to express” – especially when dealing with situations that occur
frequently in day-to-day life (1979). The reduced complexity and innovation drives precision,
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vividness, and in some scenarios, surprise. Precision and vividness are sourced by using the
expression to pack meaning into the language, whereas surprise comes from the initial exposure
to the innovation. The theory of economy of expression relies on the assumption that the speaker
will reject a costlier reference to a specific content of thought if a less costly reference is presented
as an alternative. However, if the less costly reference requires too much effort to interpret, then
the assumption is that the speaker will reject it (1979). In summary, the argument boils down to
a continuum of currency, “… from ‘cheaper’ to computationally and manually more expensive
usage” (Wacholder, Ravin, & Choi 1997).
This shift from one part-of-speech to another to gain efficiency is also echoed in the works
of other linguists, such as Hansen (2003) and Harley (2006). According to Harley, who also
provides examples of company names converting to common nouns or verbs, the process of
linguistic conversion by nonce formation completes when the converted naming unit is viewed as
independent from the original name from which it was formed – i.e. the Proper Noun is viewed as
independent from the common noun. Harley proposes that as a collection of speakers use this
converted expression on a regular basis, it “will gain common currency in that group” (2006). And
as Clark & Clark pointed out, with mutual knowledge comes the understanding of an expression.
When linguistic conversion is underway to facilitate economy of expression, linguistics
seem to agree that preemption by synonymy can keep the conversion from completing (Clark &
Clark 1979). Under this theory, Clark & Clark explain that if a naming unit is positioned as a
contextual expression, it will be rejected by the speaker’s audience if there already exists a fixed,
economical expression for the content of thought (1979). When confronted with this conflict,
confusion prevents the audience from completing the conversion as they try to figure out why
the speaker didn’t just use the economically efficient way of describing the entity in the first place.
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Accordingly, if there is no gain in efficiency by using the innovative naming unit, then the audience
will consider it unacceptable and reject its usage. The only exception mentioned in this theory is
if the speaker has a specific reason for selecting the newly converted naming unit over the wellestablished reference – which will require very specific contextual clues to aid the audience in
understanding why the selection was made (1979). Still, the cue validity of the exception will
remain low unless the audience finds the usage particularly cost-worthy.
This linguistic theory of pre-emption also extends to a second group of situations where
innovative expression is already well-established with an unrelated meaning that does not relate
directly to the context in question (Clark & Clark 1979). Again, this goes back to the notion of
interpretability. For this reason, if the speaker uses a naming unit that is already a well-established
reference of a different content of thought, then the audience will be likely to reject the usage
unless there is a notable gain in efficiency from it.
Before transitioning to the more detailed works associated with brand genericization, it
is also important to review the six stages of innovation illustrated by Clark & Clark (1978) with
regards to linguistic change. The first stage, complete innovation, encompasses lexical changes
that are based on a shifting reference. The second stage, near-innovation, highlights the transition
to a state with some denotation – primarily seen through a community of speakers starting to
build cue validity around the naming unit. The third stage, half-assimilated transparent idioms,
sees the innovation becoming “transparent” in meaning to one group, but having not yet
assimilated to the full population of speakers. The fourth stage, assimilated transparent idioms,
“are fully assimilated into English” in their lexical form with fully transparent meanings (1978).
The fifth stage, partly specialized idioms, deals with naming units that lose some of their recent
transparency because they have “become partly specialized” (1978). To better illustrate this
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stage, Clark & Clark use the example of the denominal verb, to land. In its original innovation, it
was used as an expression to quickly refer to disembark from a ship to land. With the advent of
airplanes that eventually could land on water (i.e. seaplanes), “the idiomatization was apparently
so complete that it didn’t seem off to “land” on water (1978). The sixth and final stage, opaque
idioms, is classified when the larger population does not know the denominal origins of the
naming unit is original form. In other words, the original source of the expression or name is lost
to time. These naming units are viewed as “pure and simple” (1978) with the Proper
Noun/common noun or noun/verb relationships being unknown. While there are six stages
outlines here, Clark & Clark do note that not all innovations touch on every stage or make it to
the end of the series (1978).
Though this is not a literature review of the field of linguistics, nor is it intended to be, it
is a review of linguistics as related to Proper Names that spawn common nouns, a phenomenon
that emerges as meaningful in linguistic accounts of Brand Genericide. In this review, Partridge
(1950) and Clark & Clark (1979) provide the theoretical underpinning of the linguistic view.
Building on these grounds, the concept of naming units helps to provide background to the larger
linguistic building blocks at play (Mathesius 1975; Lipka, Handl, & Falkner 1994; Hansen 2003;
Lipka 2006). These naming units act as one of three extralinguistic objects: simple/complex,
expressions, and Proper Names (1994). By then circling back to Clark & Clark, we can see that
extralinguistic objects can act in a way that potentially relates to Brand Genericide, as seen
through Clark & Clark’s discussion on innovations (1979). Ultimately, Clark & Clark’s discussion of
the role of contextual expressions helps to emphasize the need for meaning when a speaker
attempts to convert an existing Proper Noun to something else, such as an innovative common
noun. When the converted naming unit is first used, unless there is mutual knowledge between
the speaker and his/her audience, some (or a lot of) context is needed to ensure the audience can
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interpret the immature extralinguistic object. Then, to assimilate into the language of a greater
population, the “right lexical conditions” are needed to ensure that the lexical change is worth
the cost of mental processing (1979). Given the prominence of lexical change, Hansen (2003) and
Harley (2006) help illustrate the process of linguistic change through nonce formation. As a
notable callout from this stream of research, an audience may reject a lexical change if the
efficiency gained by using it isn’t worth the cost. This is also represented in Clark & Clark’s
discussion of economy of expression (1979). Building on this, the warning of preemption by
synonymy provides an example of a condition that if not met, will typically result in a rejection of
the innovation unless very specific context is provided that makes the added mental processing
worth it. The audience may also reject the newly formed naming unit if there is already a wellestablished naming unit with an unrelated meaning in the language, which may cause
unwarranted confusion. In both cases, there are underlying forces at play that stop the nonce
formation process from completing, blocking the lexical change from assimilating beyond the
initial speaker/audience interaction. Finally, Clark & Clark’s six stages of innovation provide a clear
process of how language solidifies (1979). Together, this brief linguistic literature review allows
for a deep-dive into linguistic accounts that go beyond just mentioning “company name” in their
discourses; it opens the door for a review of brand genericization.
The first detailed account of linguistic change, specific to brands, is presented by Clankie
in his 1999 Dissertation. In his Thesis, Clankie writes: “genericization is concerned with the process
by which a brand name, specific in reference, undergoes a series of grammatical and semantic
changes to become a common class-noun representative of the entire semantic class to which
that product belongs” (1999). He also went on to describe brand genericization in a 2013 follow
up as: “the process by which a brand name moves from being specific in reference and
representative of the company or product line to generic and representative of the entire
38

semantic class for which the product belongs (e.g. google, xerox, etc.)” – again emphasizing the
role of language and the idea of semantic broadening (2013). Through his work, Clankie sought to
offer “triggers of generic change”, which would potentially allow for the prediction of future cases
of brand genericization: what he refers to as an “actuation problem” (1999). To achieve this, four
hypotheses are presented and defended that “contribute to the occurrence of genericization”, a
phenomenon he depicts as a subcategory of semantic broadening (a concept also echoed in
Butters & Westerhaus 2004):
1. “… genericization will occur in novel semantic classes”
2. “… the shorter the brand name in relation to the class-noun, the greater the likelihood for
genericization to occur”
3. “… genericization is a regular hierarchical process”
4. “… for a brand name to become generic there must be an association to a single product”
(1999)
For his Thesis, Clankie collected a corpus of 100 generic brand names in an attempt to validate
each hypothesis. The corpus was compiled through a two-token test for genericness. His work
also explored extensions for the Japanese language.
In his first hypothesis, Clankie explores novelty. He tries to understand whether or not
brands that become generic come from novel – or rather, innovative – products. His argument
centers on a scenario where there is “no known semantic category… [allowing] the association of
that item with its name… [to become] become synonymous, resulting in the brand name as both
a product name and name of the class to which it belongs” (2013). To illustrate his argument,
Clankie cites two examples – Rollerblades and Walkman – where he emphasizes that if you have
product name “A” and no class name, then product name “A” will become the semantic class
name to fill the gap (2000). For Clankie, this shows innovation in language – which ties back to
Clark & Clark (1979). Based on Clark & Clark’s seminal work, the product name “A”, a Proper Noun,
will innovate to a common noun, “a”, to provide a level of economy of expression when a speaker
39

needs to denote a product class. This assumes there is no pre-emption (an extension that is not
clearly detailed Clankie’s second hypothesis). Based on audience acceptance and cue-validity, the
innovation either assimilates through the six stages of innovation or fails. In section 2.4 of this
Thesis, I’ll return to this idea of an inefficient or missing product class name.
For hypothesis two, Clankie focuses on length and predominance. In his assessment,
Clankie looks at whether the name of the given semantic class (a noun phrase) is longer (lengthwise) than the name of the predominant brand name in the class (2000) – such as the market
leader. If the predominant brand name is shorter (and the articulation of the brand name is easy
– a footnoted condition), Clankie writes that “that brand name will become the generic for the
entire semantic class” (2013): a bold statement. Clankie uses the example of “Velcro” vs. “hook
and loop fasteners”, which highlights an example of a trademark brand name that many
consumers use to generically name the entire semantic class (2000). Butters & Westerhaus (2004)
refer to this as “… a kind of linguistic shorthand”.
Whether it was intention or not, this hypothesis draws from the theory of economic
efficiency. Assuming the brand name in question is 1) lexically shorter than the semantic class
name, 2) easy to pronounce, and 3) is well-known by the public (i.e. the predominant brand), it is
likely to have a low lexical cost, allowing audiences to interpret the innovation with a low enough
level of effort that they deem the tradeoff worthwhile in accepting the innovation.
Hypothesis three, which is arguably the most meaningful with regards to Brand
Genericide, looks to answer whether genericization is a regular process that is both
“straightforward and uniform” (2013). According to Clankie, prior to his dissertation,
genericization was viewed as a fairly random occurrence: “it happened in some cases, but not in
others” (2013). In fact, in the preface if his 2002 paper, the editor of Names: A Journal of
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Onomastics writes, “All of these examples (and there are hundreds in English) were presented as
individual examples of the process of genericization, but there was no known system or pattern
underlying it...” (2013). This is also echoed in Butters & Westerhaus (2004) with their discussion
of the genericization of a brand name as being “atypical of lexiosemantic change”. However, there
seems to be a gap in how the work of Clark & Clark (noting that, in 1979, they did not specifically
mention the process of genericization of brand names and whether that process was regular),
contributes to this literature given they include a process for innovation in linguistics that impacts
company names. Needless to say, there is consistency in this field around this regular process.
To answer his third hypothesis, Clankie connects the genericization of brand names to the
genericization of written forms and the genericization of speech (1999, 2013):
Written Forms:
1. A Proper Adjective accompanied by a common noun becomes a Proper Noun after an
ellipsis.
2. Through the loss of the capitalized first letter (called “majuscule loss”), the Proper Noun
becomes a common noun and/or a common adjective.
3. The final phase positions the common noun and/or adjective to become a generic verb
(Clankie 1999).
Spoken Forms:
1. A Proper Adjective accompanied by a common noun becomes a Proper Noun after an
ellipsis.
2. After a change in context, the Proper Noun becomes a common noun and/or a common
adjective. The notable difference here is that capitalization is not seen in speech.
3. The final phase positions the common noun and/or adjective to become a generic verb
(Clankie 1999).
Breaking this down, for both written forms and speech, both regular processes begin with the
brand name in the form: Proper Adjective (Specific) + Common Noun. Clankie presents this as the
legal requirement of a brand name: “By law, a brand name must be a proper adjective followed
by a common noun or noun phrase representative of the semantic class to which the product
belongs” (2013). Technically, US law, 15 U.S.C. § 1127, states: “A trademark is any word, name,
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symbol, or design, or any combination thereof, used in commerce to identify and distinguish the
goods of one manufacturer or seller from those of another and to indicate the source of the
goods.” Upon my review, it seems that in the 74 pages of the US Trademark Law and subsequent
Federal Statues that the words “adjective” and “noun” never emerge. Having said that, Clankie is
right in saying that this is what a brand name should be in order to clearly denote the brand as
the name of the product and not the product class, which can potentially lead to the dilution of
said brand.
Assuming the brand name begins as a Proper Adjective, Clankie then indicates an ellipsis,
which results in the Proper Adjective forming a Proper Noun (2013), such as the Xerox copy
machine becoming Xerox, the Proper Noun. The ellipsis here represents compression – which ties
to Clark & Clark’s description: “pack into a word what would have taken many words to express”
(1979). In this case, the meaning packed into the Proper Noun is that of the combination of the
Proper Adjective and the common name.
The next phase that Clankie highlights includes majuscule loss, which is the transition from
a capitalized Proper Noun to a common noun or adjective, with a lower-case first letter (2013). In
English, the use of capitalization disambiguates proper usage from common – except for words
used at the beginning of sentences or in title-case font, which are capitalized regardless of the
type of naming unit (Wacholder, Ravin, & Choi 1997). This is also dependent on speakers/writers
using the grammatical rules of English correctly. So, assuming there is correct usage and the
naming unit is not at the beginning of a written statement or in a title, majuscule loss is a
meaningful change to the underlying lexical form when observed. From the perspective of speech,
whether the naming unit has an uppercase first letter is irrelevant. Accordingly, Clankie highlights
that from this point on, there is a separate process for written forms and speech with regards to
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genericization. For the speech-oriented process, through context, the naming unit can become a
common noun or common adjective (2013). This again aligns to Clark & Clark’s depiction of
contextual expressions (1979). Using his sample corpus on 100 brand names that are known to
have become generic, Clankie suggests that 99 of the 100 followed the above outlined
genericization process, though there is a limited quantitative analysis provided.
Clankie goes on to show that the process of genericization can end with a generic verb
once the original naming unit has gone through ellipsis, loss of capitalization, and context change.
This can occur, according to Clankie, only when the brand is representative of an action (2013).
However, what about instrument verbs (Clark & Clark 1979)? It seems that noun-to-verb
transitions can occur without losing its proper name orientation. For example, the verb “Google”
meaning “to search the internet on the Google search engine”, does not seem to interfere with
the Proper Name of “Google” when used as a Proper Name in this example. This begs the question
as to whether Clankie’s illustrative, regular process is complete, suggesting that the idea of
homonymous terms is potentially missing. After all, the most recent attempt to dethrone Google’s
trademark hit a hiccup when the Court ruled that even if the verb, “google”, is used generically, it
does not automatically mean that those consumers recognize Google as a product class (Elliott et
al. v. Google, Inc., No. 15Ǧcv-15809, 2017 US App. LEXIS 8583 (9th Cir. May 16, 2017)).
To better understand how noun-to-verb usage plays into this process, it is critical to
consider instrument verbs and gerunds – nouns that form from verbs. Given the courts have ruled
here that the verb form of a trademark is not sufficient to justify generic use, it raises the question:
is there a parallel, potentially independent process to Clankie’s proposed brand genericization that
instrument verbs can pass through on their path to genericness? If so, this could explain, and
potentially justify, theoretically why the 9th Circuit Court ruled as they did in the case of Elliott et
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al. v. Google, Incorporated. While I am not arguing that the genericization of brand names is not
regular, I do wonder how the emergence of generic verbs plays into this process. This question is
reviewed in section 4.6.1 of this Thesis as a topic for Future Research.
Clankie’s final hypothesis, single association, sets out to answer the question as to why
some brands become generic and other brands do not (1999, 2013). He theorizes that the
mechanism at play is a “… psychological association between the brand name and a single product
or use”, noting that of the 100 brands in his corpus, an overwhelming number of generic brand
names carried a single association” (2013). Clankie uses this as a warning: when a brand name
emphasizes a single association, it is more likely to undergo the genericization process. This leads
to the resulting recommendation: use your brand name to span multiple products or services and
avoid becoming generic! In many ways, this again plays into Clark & Clark’s 1979 argument around
conceptual complexity in interpretation of the naming unit. If the brand has many senses, the
interpretation cost may be too high for audience acceptance when used generically.
Later in 2013, Clankie emphasizes that a dominant market position and easy phonetic
articulation also serve as key risk factors for genericization. Finally, it is also noteworthy to
mention that Clankie briefly suggests that looking at when a brand name is first trademarked
provides a starting point for any genericization analysis; however, there is no proposed method
for doing so outside of mentioning potential data sources: the internet and Brigham Young’s
Corpus of American Literature.
After reviewing the linguistic contributions in this subsection, I’m left wondering “why”
and “how” the semantic broadening of the brand name is happening in the first place. While
Clankie’s process clearly outlines the genericization of written forms & speech, he is illustrating
“what” happens when the lexical form of the brand name becomes generic, not what causes it.
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Clankie does, however, give us a clue on where to look for the answer: he writes that “… when
the brand is perceived in the mind of the speaker to be a class term for a group of similar items…
grammatical changes… occur” due to the semantic broadening of the term (Clankie 1999; 2002).
From this clue, the key seems to be in whatever is causing the brand to be perceived differently
in a speaker’s mind, meaning that uncovering the root & conditions of this change will be the first
steps towards truly understanding Brand Genericide.
In summary, while the linguistic theories, to-date, provide a foundation to build on, there
is still a gap around “why” and “how” brand genericization exists. Along this line, Clark & Clark do
offer the discussion point that there is a natural impulse to syntactically reduce naming units to
be more economically efficient; but, is this what causes the phenomenon, especially given the
literature’s seemingly apparent acceptance that Brand Genericide doesn’t follow typical linguistic
norms? For linguists, it seems the problem is derived, as Evans writes, by a foundational question:
“what makes it the case that symbol has the property of representing, or referring to, a particular
individual [?]” (1982). Nonetheless, before this is further explored, let us consider the legal
implications that comes along with the phenomenon.
2.3.2 From “Genericization” to “Genericide”: a Legal Perspective
With Clankie’s linguistic-view of the genericization of a brand name on the table (as well
as Clark & Clark’s work on linguistic conversion), the next step is to bridge genericization to
Genericide by providing a legal viewpoint. In the US, where the term “Brand Genericide” first
emerged is debated. Based on my research of the literature, I can trace the phenomenon back to
sometime in the 1980s with a notable call out in Graham & Peroff’s 1987 article, The Legal Side of
Branding, which discussed the death of a trademark – as well as a notable callout in the legal case
of G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Incorporate (1987), where the Court used the
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term “genericide”. Regardless of where it was coined, Genericide represents the legal
phenomenon that allows for trademark revocation in the particular country, whereas
genericization represents the linguistic phenomenon of semantic broadening: e.g. “genericide is a
legal doctrine seeking to combat the loss of legal protections of brands characterized by a high
degree of genericness” (Cova 2014). Cova offers the viewpoint that the legal phenomenon,
Genericide, emerged for two reasons: 1) there is now an established jurisprudence around the
phenomenon and 2) because lawyers must protect their clients, so, by naming this phenomenon,
lawyers must provide clients with the “potential risks of genericide and protect brand capital by
all possible legal means” (2014). Accordingly, this creates a “great market for legal advice” that
drives trademark owners to police and enforce unauthorized uses of their marks, even if the
speaker’s intention is not averse to the brand itself (Walsh 2013; Cova 2014).
From a legal perspective, the original test for “genericness” goes back to the 1920s with
the case of Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co. (Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y.
1921)), which offered us the test of public perception. The Court ruled on whether the trademark
of “Aspirin” (owned by Bayer) had become generic on the subjective question of what consumers
perceived the trademark in question to be – i.e. do consumers associate the trademark with the
product/service class or do they associate the trademark with a product/service of the
trademark’s source (Ingram 2004). To answer this question, the 1989 case of Frito-Lay, Inc. v.
Bachman Co., 704 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)) provides further detail: “the standard to be
applied in determining whether a term is generic is not whether it has some significance to the
public as an indication of the nature or class of the article, but whether that is its principal
significance” (as cited in Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). In the US legal system, the burden of proof
falls on those claiming the mark is generic.
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2.3.3 Brand Genericide & Marketing Professionals – where’s the Literature?
As Cova notes, “… despite becoming a topic of great interest to legal scholars [and
linguists]… genericide never seemed very important to marketing specialists, who have produced
little research in this field…” (2014). In the marketing and communications literature, the
definition of Brand Genericide is often looked at as a combination of the legal and linguistics
views: “Genericide happens when a court finds that a brand name has lost its source-identifying
power and has become just another word in the language, a term identifying not a single
producer’s products but the product class to which they belong (hence, ‘generic’)” (Moore 2003).
However, outside of using your brand name as a Proper Adjective in combination with a common
noun, the limited literature out there seems to suggest that the “protection of trademarks and
brand names, of course, is a duty that falls to legal departments, not creatives” (2003). If this is
true, it implies that marketers are at the will of their legal teams as they design brand names and
campaigns in a vacuum. Right or wrong, this could explain the gap in research.
From what can be found, it seems marketing research is mainly focused on “fending off a
claim of genericness” (Walsh 2013). In fact, Walsh goes as far as to say that “‘Genericide usually
occurs as a result of a trademark owner’s failure to police the mark, resulting in widespread usage
by competitors’’ (2013). Walsh offers the following marketing strategies to subvert Genericide:
1.
2.
3.
4.

“… select a distinctive, non-generic name when introducing the product”
“… monitor employees’ and advertisers’ use of the trademark”
“… keep track of how competitors and others use the trademark”
“… think carefully before licensing use of the trademark to others” (2013).

While I don’t contest these strategies, they don’t help the marketer to understand why Genericide
happens or what can be done if your brand becomes infected by it.
On the other side of the spectrum, there are marketers that believe the Brand Genericide
is something that shouldn’t be prevented, but rather, it is something that should be embraced
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(Barnwell & Shanahan 2016; Cova 2014). Cova even professes: “long live genericization”. Barnwell
& Shanahan take a less theatrical approach and instead argue that there is “… value created by
brand genericization… [because] this phenomenon offers… insight into customer co-creation”.
Barnwell & Shanahan also dedicate a detailed discussion to “brand-as-verb”, which is
worthy of a call out in this review (2016). In particular, they are look at what comes after a brand
name is genericized from an adjective to a noun and then becomes a verb, citing the examples of
“… Xeroxing, Googling, Fedexing, Photoshopping, Rollerblading …” (2016). Their paper, which
offers areas for future research, raises three questions:
1. Is there more value in resisting “brand-as-verb” or in embracing it?
2. Why do brands transition to verbs?
3. Does trademark law need to change to reflect “the nature of living languages”? (2016)
Given these three questions, I don’t believe that either the value of embracing “brand-as-verb”
or changes to the law can happen without a better understanding of how and why brand names
transition in the first place – an extension of Clankie’s theory.
There is also a lack of marketing strategy around strategically intervening in the process
of Brand Genericide. Cova (2014) offers the first semi-detailed proposal of strategy by providing
a “genericide/genericization matrix” that offers guidance in weighing decisions to support
marketing action or legal action. In his matrix, Cova focuses on two axes: brand iconicity and
market dynamism. The first driver, brand iconicity, parallels the notion of being a famous brand:
the brands are “prominent and enduring cultural symbols” which advocates that there will be
consumer co-creation of value (2014). Cova suggests that with increased iconicity, the risk of
genericide reduces. Interestingly, this directly conflicts with Clankie’s hypothesis that suggests
that being a market leader is a key ingredient of genericization (1999). Needless to say, there’s an
interesting contrast of opinion here that is likely trying to explain the same phenomenon. The
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second driver, market dynamism, focuses on the speed of the competitive market: slow or fast
moving. Cova hypothesizes that a fast-paced, competitive environment will put brands at a higher
risk of genericide: i.e. when a brand is in the fast-paced environment, “the greater the need for
genericization” (2014).
Cova’s matrix highlights the binary divides between each of these constructs, forming a
1x1 structure. With a fast-paced, competitive market and strong brand iconicity, Cova suggests
that Genericization becomes the brand strategy – suggesting that the iconic status of the brand
will keep the phenomenon from progressing too far. Cova theorizes that this is Google’s strategy;
however, given Google is in active police mode around their brand name’s usage, I disagree with
this assessment. Additionally, many brand names that are generic today were once market
leaders (i.e. aspirin, escalator, elevator…), which implies this particular strategy potentially comes
with risk.
In the top-left corner of Cova’s matrix, there is a less competitive, slower-paced market
with strong brand iconicity. Cova suggests prioritizing Genericization here while also taking steps
to seek protection. After some thought, this seems counterintuitive given courts look for, as part
of the needed evidence of genericness, examples of the trademark owner using the brand name
incorrectly as a key determinant in revoking a trademark. So, to pursue Genericization and protect
against it at the same time may be a double-edged sword.
In the bottom right corner, Cova describes a fast-paced, competitive market with weaker
brand iconicity. In this scenario, the strategy is to prioritize protection from Genericide while still
pursing it to a lesser extent. Again, after contemplating this, I see this as a counter-intuitive
strategy given the precedent in the US legal system.
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Finally, in the bottom left corner, there is a less competitive, slower-paced market with
weaker brand iconicity. Cova suggests that in this scenario, the company should focus on
protection from Genericide. In summary, Cova’s matrix offers four potential marketing strategies
that attempt to position either legal action or investment in Genericide as the priority. However,
referring to Clankie, as a matrix this doesn’t 1) consider that Brand Genericide is a process that
occurs over time with interim steps and 2) doesn’t consider that the Law will use the example of
incorrect usage against the company’s continued registration of the trademark. Moreover, it’d
also be useful for the strategies to offer alternatives along the process, highlighting all possible
actions that a marketer can take with the potential outcomes. This serves as the secondary
motivation of this chapter and is later developed in chapter 3 of this Thesis.
2.3.4 Theories of Reference – An Alternative View on Genericide & genericization
So far, three lenses have been presented and reviewed: the linguistic theory of
genericization, the legal perspective of Brand Genericide, and the marketing perspective, which
draws a bit from both. Throughout my review, the notion of a reference has emerged in arguments
and examples – however, “reference”, itself, has not yet been used as a primary lens in any of the
disciplines. For example, Mathesius (1975) and Lipka (2006) mention that naming units will
reference some content of thought. Clark & Clark (1979) also use the notion of reference when
discussing how expressions have either fixed or shifting reference, which causes those that are
shifting to require context to be understood. Clark & Clark even go as far as to define what they
mean by reference in their footnotes: reference is viewed as a relationship that “‘holds between
an expression and what the expression stands for on particular occasions of its utterance’” (Lyons
1977 as cited in Clark & Clark 1979). Finally, Clankie uses reference in his definition of the
genericization of a brand name: “Genericization is concerned with the process by which a brand
name, specific in reference, undergoes a series of grammatical and semantic changes to become
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a common class-noun representative of the entire semantic class to which that product belongs”
(1999); he later expands on this in 2013: “the process by which a brand name moves from being
specific in reference and representative of the company or product line to generic and
representative of the entire semantic class for which the product belongs (e.g. google, xerox,
etc.)” (2013). In summary, reference seems to have a place here; although, it is not the primary
lens of any theories to date on the topic.
Stepping back, consider these commonalities that emerge across the existing literature:
1. A naming unit references a content of thought (Mathesius 1975; Lipka 2006), which
implies a connection between reference and thought.
2. Reference can shift (Clark & Clark 1979).
3. Brand names start as being specific in reference and then, through a series of linguistic
changes, reference “the entire semantic class to which that product belongs” (Clankie
1999).
Based on these callouts, it certainly seems that “reference” has a greater role in Brand Genericide
that requires additional exploration. After all, as Milroy & Milroy’s discussion regarding linguistic
change notes: “languages do not innovate; speakers innovate” – perhaps implying that language
must catch up to some other core phenomenon (1985). Bearing in mind this distinction, speaker
innovations require high cue-validity (i.e. a high probability of successful usage) to assimilate
within a language. Granovetter argues that since individuals resist change at varying levels of
acceptance thresholds, a large population needs to adopt the innovation for it to spread
successfully (Granovetter 1973; Milroy & Milroy 1985). So, knowing that Brand Genericide starts
with a trademarked reference in the form of a Proper Name and ends with a generic reference in
the form of a common name, this chapter seeks to understand how theories of reference may
have a greater role to play in this discussion.
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2.3.4.1 Foundational Theories of Meaning
To set the stage, consider the foundational theories of meaning (FTM), which “states the
facts in virtue of which expressions have the semantic contents that they have”. FTM is interested
in explaining what about an individual (or collective of individuals) provides the “symbols of their
language [with] the meaning that they have” (Speaks 2014). Considering brand names are in
themselves words in our language, which Clankie emphasizes, this appears to be an appropriate
place to start.
One applicable theory of meaning that applies contents of thought to expressions of
language is semantic theory. Semantic theory is “a specification of the meanings of the words and
sentences of some symbol system” (Speaks 2014). More specifically, propositional semantic
theories attempt to show that the meaning of a word or expression is a specific entity – whereas
the role of semantics is to pair the expression with the appropriate entity. From this notion of
pairing, we find ourselves in the domain of theories of reference, which also “pairs the expression
of a language with certain values” (2014). Reference refers to a “relation that obtains between
certain sorts of representational tokens (e.g. names, mental states, pictures) and objects” (Reimer
2014). These representational tokens then “hook on to things in the world” (2014), which ties
back to Clark & Clark’s point that reference can be used to pick one specific person out all others.
At the foundation of theories of reference is the notion of success and failure, meaning
that a reference can successfully refer to an object or it can fail to do so. This, in turn, helps to
illustrate what’s at stake for a marketer with regards to Brand Genericide: if a trademarked brand
name is used to reference something other than the specific product from its specific source, and
the reference succeeds (meaning the audience understands the reference to be a referring term
for something other than the original, branded product), the marketer may no longer be able to
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use the given brand name reference to single out his/her specific product from all others without
added context to inform the audience that that is the intended usage of said reference.
Accordingly, the question here becomes: at what point is a brand able to successfully refer to
something other than the original, specific product from the specific source?
To propose a theory for how reference can succeed in one case and fail in another, I look
to how philosophers of language explain the relationship between names and the objects to which
they refer. In doing so, I explore reference from several perspectives, including a mentalist view
of reference and a non-mentalist view of causal origin. I then transition to an extension of causal
origin theory, which looks at a governance view of reference-fixing. Using this extension, I explain
how the destruction of referential governance through a failure of buffered counterfactual
dependence forms the core of my revised theory of Brand Genericide. This then offers an
explanation as to why the brand genericization process occurs.
2.3.4.2 A Mentalist View of Reference
Under mental representation, mentalism attempts to explain the “nature of meaning”
using the mental states of language-using agents (Speaks 2014). One such thesis that employs
such a method is the “Gricean Program”. The Gricean program is tied to the development of an
“analysis of meaning” by Paul Grice (1957, 1969), which has two major components. First, when
explaining facts about what expressions mean, it is to be done using “facts about what speakers
mean by utterance of them” (Grice 1969). Second, the facts described can be explained based on
intentions (2014). This notion of intentions draws out what an individual means when using the
given expression. In summary, the Gricean program provides a theory of meaning – and, perhaps,
of conversation – that emphasizes that “speaker-meaning”, through intention, is fundamental
when attempting to understand what individuals mean. According to Grice, acceptance of the
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expression depends on the speaker’s intended “dossier” (i.e. a mental file containing a definite
description), which “overlaps” with the dossier of the receiving individual (1969). This, therefore,
also assumes that “the speaker expects the hearer to recognize this intention” for a successful
communicative exchange (1969). Therefore, speaker A means a specific referent by uttering a
name if and only if speaker A intends in uttering the name that: 1) speaker A’s audience comes to
believe the specific referent; 2) speaker A’s audience recognizes this intention; and 3) condition 1
occurs on the basis of condition 2 (Speaks 2018). As Speaks points out, “the intuitive motivation
behind [this]… is to begin with the idea that meaning something by an utterance is a matter of
trying to convey one’s beliefs” (2018).
In a communicative exchange, the audience must ultimately evaluate the speaker’s
expression – which is the “possible states of the world relevant to the determination of the truth
or falsity of the sentence” (Speaks 2014). When a referring expression is used as the subject term
in an assertoric sentence, the statement thus made can be either true or false. So, if individual A
states, “my son is in a blue Onesie”, the statement is true if and only if 1) “Onesie” successfully
refers to the specific clothing article made by Gerber that speaker A’s son is currently wearing and
2) the object referred to as “Onesie” is blue. Inherently, the successful use of the reference,
Onesie®, is integral in this assessment of the truth of the statement. However, if the audience,
individual B, has knowledge of multiple objects referred to by the same, homonymous name,
“Onesie”, individual B will not be able to assess the truth of the statement without additional
context on individual A’s intended usage. For the communication to succeed, as intended by
speaker A, context must be “accessible” to the audience – known as the availability principle
(Recanati 1989). This aligns with Clark & Clark’s explanation of mutual knowledge (1979).
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In a scenario where a reference is fixed, the reference refers to the same referent in every
circumstance of evaluation. Kaplan’s theory of direct reference (1989) tells us that a name is
nothing more than a way to refer to a specific referent with no descriptive information conveyed
by the name itself. The reference will always rigidly designate, picking out the “same object in all
possible worlds in which that object exists”; it also “never designates anything else” (LaPorte
2018). So, for example, Onesie® rigidly designates the specific bodysuit made for children by
Gerber, and this rigid designation will hold regardless of who has knowledge of it. However, even
if we assume this theory is correct (which I don’t contest), for the reference to succeed in a
communicative exchange, the assumption is that the audience possesses – and can easily recall –
knowledge of said reference. Without this knowledge, additional context may be needed to
interpret the speaker’s intended usage even though the reference is fixed and rigidly designated.
When it comes to the rigid designation of a general term, such as the label of a product
class, there is a debate in the literature on whether a general term can even rigidly designate in
the first place. Going back to before the term “rigid designator” was coined by Kripke in 1980,
there has been an underlying assumption that only singular terms rigidly designate (LaPorte
2018). In this instance, let a singular term be “a term that signifies exactly one individual thing”
(Ashworth 2015). However, as LaPorte notes, this singular term assumption is challenged by
philosophers such as Cook (1980), Linsky (1984), Salmon (2003 & 2005), Devitt (2005), and
Gómez-Torrente (2006). The primary counter- argument is that a general term can be singular in
“broad sense”, even though it is not a “first-order singular term”, such as a Proper Name (2018).
This is possible by looking at general terms, such as tiger, as higher-order singular terms. Under
this premise, a general term, F, is rigid if any object to which the general term applies, “… in any
possible world, is part of the extension of F in all worlds in which x exists, x being an F essentially”
(2018). So, when looking at a product class label, such as aspirin, this general term will rigidly
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designate if any specific aspirin is an aspirin, therefore meaning that an aspirin cannot be anything
else: it cannot be an acetaminophen, it cannot be ibuprofen, and so on. It is, specifically, an
acetylsalicylic acid-based drug for which it is essentially so. Looking at this in a propositional form,
“Tylenol is aspirin” is false, which we can confirm as competent individuals. Aspirin rigidly
designates the product class of acetylsalicylic acid-based drugs of which Tylenol is not a member
(Tylenol is an acetaminophen).
As an additional point, genericized brands also offer an additional defense for the case on
rigidity: once a brand name loses its trademark due to Brand Genericide, the now generic name
is often used in trademark registrations to differentiate the given product from others. For
example, the legal registration for the trademark on “Otis” includes the names “elevator” and
“escalator” in its product/services description. However, both terms were previously
trademarked brand names owned by Otis – meaning that Otis is using the terms to specify the
class of products/services they operate within. Moreover, these same names, elevator and
escalator, also appear today in competitor trademarks, such as “Sigma” and “Dover”. Quite
literally, the consuming public can then use these legally binding definitions to pick these products
out from all others, emphasizing how a general term can rigidly designate a product class.
Therefore, under the guidance of these arguments, I move forward with the assumption that a
product class label is a higher-order singular term that can rigidly designate.
In the next subsection, my focus turns to a non-mentalist perspective, which sets out to
explain the meanings of expressions based on their use (Speaks 2014). Again, by relying on the
foundational theories of meaning, the goal is to make sense of which parts of expression regulate
meaning, noting that this needs to be done without any reliance on any mental state or mental
representation. One such theory that helps to set this scene is that of Causal Origin.
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2.3.4.3 A Non-Mentalist View of Reference
To get a solid baseline of Causal Origin of Meaning, it is important to include the work of
Kripke in Naming and Necessity; specifically, the usage history of a name, which can be leveraged
to explain its reference (Kripke 1972). This provides an alternative for explaining meaning outside
of the descriptions that users of a name may or may not provide by allowing for a causal relation
between the speaker and the external world (Gasparri 2015). To further build on the history of a
name, Kripke suggests key historical moments to analyze, such as 1) the naming ceremony for a
given object (also known as a baptism) and 2) all successful transmissions between speakers after
the initial baptism (2014). Devitt offers an extension to Kripke’s thesis by suggesting that this
theory can also apply to transmission of names between parts of speech (Devitt 1981), allowing
for a connection to Clankie’s work on the genericization of brand names. In summary, by
explaining the meaning of expressions by leveraging the history of the name, we can trace a
reference back to its origin.
Kripke’s two key historical moments translate to baptism as reference fixing and
transmission as reference borrowing (Kripke 1972; Reimer 2014). The baptism of the name is the
original “dubbing” that that fixes reference to the baptismal object either through perception or
description. From the original dubbing, speakers then pass on the name through “communicative
exchanges” allowing speakers to borrow the reference from those that uttered it earlier in a chain
of “reference preserving” exchanges (Kripke 1972; Evans 1973; Reimer 2014). The condition here
that drives reference preservation, as prescribed by Kripke, is that the speaker’s eventual use of
the referring term aligns with the denotation used by the speaker in the original exchange from
which it was learned.
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Devitt extends this theory in 1981 by pointing out that perceptual confrontations are
capable of “effecting reference change over time…” when a “…sufficient number of such
groundings [occur] over a sufficient period of time” (Devitt 1981). These confrontations can be
either accidental (such as mistaken usage) or intentional (where a speaker intends to bring about
a shift by creating a new reference). According to Devitt, confrontation of the original referential
name-using-practice, along with subsequent repetition of the new name-using-practice, has the
ability to change the reference from that of the original dubbing. However, while reference may
change, Kaplan suggests that some aspect of the original reference likely remains constant (1989).
To see how this plays into the bigger picture, I’ll return to this shortly using the lens of cognitive
psychology.
There are two typical objections to the theory of causal origin: the “qua problem” and
“transition through error”. The qua problem focuses on an instance where identifying the original
baptism may be cluttered by multiple possible baptisms (Devitt 1987; Speaks 2014). Boiling this
down, the issue here is that the theory of causal origins relies on there being only one referencefixing baptism. To illustrate this potential hurdle, Devitt offers the example of “water”, which was
baptized “in the presence of a body of H20” (2014). Devitt’s point here is that no one alive today
likely knows for a fact that that was the original origin of the name “water”. While this is true, the
“qua problem” objection does not hold for trademarked brand names because the trademarked
name is only registered for names that are proven to be unique. Additionally, in the US, trademark
owners are required to document the mark’s first usage, ensuring that the date provided is the
true baptism. The name is then publicly and officially registered to a specific company/owner to
provide a historical record of the naming – thus defining it as a trademark and entitling it to
Federal protection (in the US). In summary, for the special case of trademarked brand names, the
“qua problem” is not applicable.
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To expand on the objection of transition through error, the key is in whether the change
of a reference/referent relationship was by design or by mistake. Evans (1973) offers the example
of “Madagascar”. When the name Madagascar was baptized, it was a rigid designator for the
referent of a portion of mainland Africa. However, as most maps will show you today, Madagascar
is currently the name of an island off the coast of Africa – a completely different referent than the
original dubbing intended. This transition through error shifted the reference from one
geographic object to another object due to Marco Polo’s mistaken usage (Evans 1973; Cumming
2013). So, when Marco Polo’s communications upheld the incorrect usage as valid, the reference
apparently shifted given the reality of what we see on most geographical maps today. When it
comes to brand names, it cannot be denied that some speakers may incorrectly use the
trademarked name to reference a product class instead of the specific good – a mistake trademark
owners often protect against through knowledge campaigns. However, for a reference shift due
to error to become the new reference for a product class, one primary assumption needs to be
true: there can’t already be an efficient common name for the product class (a requirement also
offered by Clankie 1999). Economic efficiency and economy of expression require that an
audience only accept a speaker’s reference if there is no other more-efficient reference already
in place for it. Therefore, if a speaker is unaware of a trademarked brand name’s baptized referent
and chooses to use the name to reference the product class by mistake, the audience theoretically
should only accept the speaker’s name-using-practice if no other efficient reference already
exists. In this case, for the audience, they would become a parasitic consumer of the new
referential governance – a topic I’ll explore later in this chapter.
Given we know that several brand names have undergone reference shift, it also appears
that if no other efficient reference with rigid designation exists for a given product class, there is
a potential for the brand name to become the newly created reference for said product class if it
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is more efficient that the current name or reference-fixing description. This, in turn, begs the
question: why is the product class being named in the first place? Assuming Clankie’s hypothesis
holds true that any shorter name is at risk for genericization, shouldn’t we be constantly renaming
product classes? Pushing this further, if a speaker uses the brand name in an incorrect way
(compared to its baptism), in what context did the speaker hear the brand name in the first place?
If an individual mistakenly uses a brand name to reference the product class and not the specific
product, it is reasonable to assume this was not by luck of the name-drawing lottery – i.e. the
speaker must have had some context or information available to them that triggered the belief
that this name could successfully reference the product class. So, as Kaplan suggests, there must
be some common element between the referents for this to have worked. Evans also draws on
this idea, ultimately proposing a revised theory of causal origin that describes a speaker’s body of
knowledge as being causally derived. I’ll come back to this argument later in the section.
According to Kaplan’s argument, while reference may change, some aspect of the
reference remains constant (1989). One way to expand on this is to leverage cognitive psychology
to help illustrate the existence of this common core using Fimore’s frame semantics (1976).
Fillmore presents the idea that encyclopedic knowledge is contained in our long-term memories,
stored in the structure of frames. These frames represent schematic conceptual scenarios that
trigger features and functions in regard to the referent and events associated with said referent.
This provides us with the information needed to interpret and act on the name or expression used
by the speaker (Gasparri 2015). So, in the case of a brand name, this encyclopedic knowledge can
be thought of as the background awareness of the nature of the given reference. Applying this to
the shifting reference of Brand Genericide, it suggests that the shift occurs within the same
encyclopedia of knowledge that the original reference exists in (assuming there is knowledge of
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the original brand-name-using-practice). The result is a consistent nature with merely a reworked
frame.
Tying this back to theories of reference and building on the idea of knowledge & frames,
consider Evan’s extension of causal origin, the Causal Theory of Names (1973). Evans builds on
Kripke’s work by emphasizing the need for a distinction between “what a speaker denotes (upon
an occasion)” and “what the name denotes”; whereas, Kripke primarily focuses on the speaker’s
denotation (1973). What a speaker denotes is based on the name used by said speaker at time x
during situation y to refer to a specific object. What a name denotes looks, instead, at how it is
used by a group of speakers with no dependence on the scenario in which it is used. By pushing
on this difference, Evans argues against Kripke’s take on causal origin, leveraging the example of
Madagascar to suggest that if the theory held, Marco Polo’s mistaken use of the name was
correctly referring to the continental African version of Madagascar (1973). Therefore, if anyone
is to use the name “Madagascar” today to refer to the island, they are incorrect. However, as
Evans points out, based on what any competent individual knows, today, to be correct,
“Madagascar” is the name for the island off the coast of continental Africa. So, even though the
chain of use for this name can technically be traced back to Madagascar as the mainland version,
the reference has since changed, meaning that the truth value of a proposition in which the
referring term appears will have changed due to the shift of the name’s reference. While Kripke
does draw a distinction between semantic reference and a speaker’s intended reference – in
which, over time, a speaker’s intended reference may evolve into semantic reference that is
causally specified – Evans offers an alternative explanation of referential shift that looks at how
the denotation of a name is fixed. (Evans 1973; Dickie 2011; Cumming 2016).
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As an alternative to Kripke’s theory, Evans offers a theory that attempts to allow for these
referential shifts: the idea that the denotation of a name is fixed by a “speaker’s body of
information,” which is causally derived (1973). Evans goes on to clarify that his theory is not
intended to be a complete theory of the denotation of names, but instead is meant to “…sketch
an account of what makes an expression into a name for something that will allow names to
change their denotations” (1973) – a ray of hope for my attempt to explain how referential shift
may occur in brand genericization. To explain his theory, Evans (1973; 1982) looks to the causal
connection that forms between the name and a specific body of information, doubling down on
“how a system of beliefs about particular things is structured, and the role names play in such a
system” – e.g. a system with “names acting as labels on files” (Dickie 2011). Thinking back to the
Madagascar example, it then holds that we, today, use the name, “Madagascar”, to refer to the
Island because we have a causal connection between the name and an information store on the
island, which was made in a communicative exchange by a speaker who knew the island, right or
wrong, as Madagascar. Therefore, the “dominant causal source of contemporary ‘Madagascar’
beliefs is the island” (2011), resulting in a “Madagascar” labeled “island” file in the speaker’s
mental file framework (Evans 1982 as cited in Recanati 2012). This idea of a mental file ultimately
traces back to Grice (1969) with his discussion of the mental “dossier”.
In 1982, Evans expands his 1973 work by identifying two roles that emerge when a name
is used to reference a given object: the producer and the consumer. According to Evans, the
producer “knows” the object as the given name and has a “specific kind of rapport” with said
object, which is in part created by the name used to identify it (Evans 1982 as cited in Dickie 2011).
From the perspective of Brand Genericide, the producer is likely the trademark owner, who knows
the specific product as the brand name for which it was federally registered. In this scenario,
everyone else who is in the practice of using the brand name to refer to the product is deemed a
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consumer. The consumer does not know the specific product as the trademarked brand name;
however, he/she will use it in practice to refer to the given product based on his/her intention to
replicate the usage as it was originally conveyed to him/her (1982; 2011).
Within the scope of the consumer role, Dickie calls out that Evans actually describes two
sub-populations through the name-using practices that he describes: the participating consumer
and the parasitic consumer (2011). The participating consumer is an individual that refers to an
object using a given name based on a labeled mental file he/she possesses; however, this
individual does not actually know the object under the name. The labeled mental file enables a
reference-fixing relationship to the object. When the individual has yet to establish a labeled
mental file that enables the reference-fixing relationship, the individual can refer to an object
using a given name based on his/her intention of replicating how it was previously communicated
to him/her (2011). During this phase of initial usage, the parasitic consumer may create a labeled
mental file, but the amount of information in it will likely not yet be reference-fixing. Dickie notes
that parasitic consumers can become participating consumers and participating consumers can
become producers over time (2011).
Tying this back to brand names, a participating consumer refers to the specific photoediting software owned and sold by Adobe as “Photoshop” because he/she has an established
mental file with accumulated knowledge of the specific product, which is labeled with the brand
name. For this consumer, this mental file is reference-fixing. However, for the consumer that has
no knowledge of the specific photo-editing software owned and sold by Adobe, he/she is parasitic
in his/her usage of “Photoshop” to refer to the specific product. This consumer is in the practice
of using “Photoshop” to refer to the specific product due to their intention to mimic the usage as
they observed it from the community.
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Dickie (2011) draws on the distinction between producers and consumers by taking
Evans’s 1982 account of reference-fixing and dividing it into 2 sub sections: “how a proper-nameusing practice is established” and “what is required for participation in a name-using practice” by
those who don’t know the object as the name. For the establishment component, Dickie calls out
the practice of using a specific name to refer to an object, which is “established by a core group
of speakers” that know the object as the name (2011). In the case of a brand name, this is initially
the group of core speakers that know the specific product from the specific source to be the
trademarked name. To then participate in this name-using practice, an individual may use the
brand name to refer to the specific product under 2 conditions: 1) the individual has a brand name
labelled mental file that contains information about the specific product that would keep faith
with the core group’s beliefs; and 2) the product “approximately fits… any kind information” that
the individual’s mental file contains (2011).
Noting this distinction, Dickie suggests that outside of the initial core group of individuals,
neither condition is needed to participate in a name-using practice due to cases where
“contamination by information not derived from producers’ beliefs… interrupt[s] transmission of
a name-using practice” (2011). To illustrate this point, she turns to the “Madagascar” example,
which includes an interruption in transmission when Madagascar-as-the-island information
enters the scenario from Marco Polo’s mistaken usage. However, she also notes that
“contamination by extraneous information and radical classificatory error” doesn’t always block
the name-using practice, citing the example of “Chaucer”, a 14th century Poet, whose historical
recollection fictionally morphed over hundreds of years while still managing today to name the
person originally intended by the core group of speakers that knew Chaucer as “Chaucer”. Dickie
describes this as the survival of a name-using practice (2011).
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2.3.4.4 The Governance View of Reference Fixing for Proper Names
To explain how contamination may or may not cause an interruption in a name-using
practice, Dickie presents her own extension of Evans: The Governance View of Reference Fixing
for Proper Names (2011). She hypothesizes that an individual’s use of a referring term to refer to
an object is “governed” by the object’s “possible behavior” (2011). Beginning with the producer,
Dickie describes an “information channel” that forms, connecting the usage of a reference from
person-to-person, which is transmitted causally through an inheritance of information from
person A to person B. By “transmission”, Dickie limits the scope to that of a producer in a specific
name-using practice that “transmits” said practice to a participating consumer. The name-using
practices are established by “producers’ rapport, and are transmitted by some, but not all,
information channels… [where] an information channel… transmits a proper-name-using practice
if and only if it transmits governance” (2011).
This information channel allows us to trace an individual’s labelled mental file for a given
object to the labelled mental files of the speakers that know the object as the given name. Allthe-while, this channel transmits governance unless the consumer is parasitic, in which case
governance may be formed once a labelled file is created and filled with reference-fixing
information. To then block transmission of a “proper-name-using practice”, Dickie suggests that
governance must be destroyed – at which point there may be a change in governance. She offers
“Madagascar” to illustrate this condition, concluding that “Marco Polo’s mistake results in a
switch in governance”, whereas in the case of “Chaucer”, a switch does not occur, preserving
governance because the speaker is still referring to the same person that was originally intended,
albeit an exaggerated version (2011).

65

To better understand how governance can be destroyed, it is important to first think
through how it is maintained. When governance is upheld for a name-using-practice, the producer
or participating consumer must use the name to refer to the given object while keeping faith with
the possible behaviors of the object (Dickie 2011). So, if a speaker sets out on a task to construct
a communicative narrative, there is a range of possible behaviors that must constrain the object
if the specific name is to be used as the reference that the producer(s) intended. For example, the
landlocked region of Madagascar cannot behave like an island; therefore, any narrative that is
constructed with a Madagascar-labelled object that doesn’t behave like a part of continental
Africa will potentially destroy the previously transmitted governance. I use the term “potentially”
strategically to emphasize Dickie’s suggestion that “an absolute match” in behavior is not
necessarily the requirement for successful transition seeing that “representationally relevant”
behaviors can keep faith, allowing us to know what “… a file might be ‘about’” (2011).
As an individual builds out a particular labelled mental file through communicative
exchanges, Dickie distinguishes two components of file development: a developmental core and
a developmental periphery (2011). The developmental core acts as an information filter for
potential insertions or amendments. The periphery consists of the remaining file components.
Within the file, there is a developmental path, which, during a specific time interval, follows how
the developmental core has evolved. This evolution (or change) is governed by maintenance
policies, which Dickie defines as “generalisations, laws, and rules of thumb” intended to regulate
a file’s core developmental path (2011). Therefore, the development path of a mental file from
time A to time B needs to reflect the potential behaviors of said object by ensuring consistent
maintenance policies are in place and faith is kept. To block the successful transfer of the nameusing-practice, Dickie theorizes that a file’s developmental path must deviate from what the path
would have been had the maintenance policies been adhered to (2011).
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When it comes to the transmission of governance in communicative exchanges, Dickie
relies on “buffered counterfactual dependence” to differentiate success from failure (2011).
Leveraging this transitive property, the successful transmission of governance occurs when the
audience inherits the use of the reference from a speaker – in addition to both the speaker and
audience’s labelled mental files being within the relevant possibilities of the object’s potential
behaviors. The expectation on the audience in this scenario “depends counterfactually” on
whether the speaker’s file keeps faith in the first place (2011). If this counterfactual condition
holds, it suggests that speaker B will intend to use the name in the same way as it was used when
originally transmitted to him/her. Additionally, maintenance policies are adhered to and speaker
B’s conceptual core remains intact. However, if this counterfactual dependence does not hold,
governance is not transmitted, allowing for modifications to the individual’s developmental core
that does not keep faith with any prior maintenance policies: reference is now open to shift.
Stepping back from Dickie’s theory, both the mentalist and non-mentalist views of
reference provide varying levels of explanation as to why reference-shifting occurs. The mentalist
theories most closely align to the linguistic theories that discuss semantic content of thought and
contextuals. On the other hand, non-mentalist theories suggest that references exist in the world
regardless of whether you have knowledge of any particular one. So, to tie back to language,
assimilation into a lexicon becomes a result of spreading knowledge of a reference/referent
relationship. Regardless of which set of theories is foundationally true, the real power here is that
theories of reference allow us to view brand name genericization as the result of reference
shifting, providing the underlying mechanism with which language must catch-up.
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2.4 Developing a Revised Theory of Brand Genericide
In my review of linguistic, legal, and marketing research on Brand Genericide and the
genericization of brand names, I emphasize two primary motivations for this chapter, forming two
core questions:
1. How & why does Brand Genericide occur?
2. How & why can Brand Genericide be strategically influenced?
Holding question 2 aside for a dedicated argument in chapter 3 of this Thesis, this discussion offers
an answer to question 1 by applying theories of reference directly to the phenomenon of Brand
Genericide.
Looking at linguistic theories of the genericization of brand names, these theories treat
brand names as the focus by attempting to understand the phenomenon with a strong grasp
specifically on which ones became generic. These arguments attempt to employ economic utility
theories – as well as linguistic change models – to derive how the brand name, as a linguistic
element, changes. For example, Clankie’s theory of brand genericization focuses on observed
characteristics of 100 brand names that have gone through the process of becoming generic,
responding instead to what is quantifiably visible after-the-fact. Though this is valuable to
marketers, theorists, and my argument in chapter 3 of this Thesis, in order to strategically
intervene in the Brand Genericide process before it completes, we need to understand if language
development is really the be-all-end-all of Brand Genericide.
Before the brand name is trademarked, there are two potential referents to consider: the
“company” and the “product class”. As an illustrative example, let the “company” object be
referenced by the name Bayer and the “product class” object be referenced by the descriptive
content acetylsalicylic acid-based drugs. While the name “Bayer” is (and was) a rigidly designated
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reference for the company incorporated as “Bayer”, the product class relied in the early 20th
century on reference-fixing description to reference the given product class. At the time, the
product class had no efficient name.
With a reference for both the company and the product class in place, the situation
changes when a third reference emerges, “Aspirin”, with a rigid designation to the specific
acetylsalicylic acid-based drug made and sold by Bayer. This leaves us with: Bayer, acetylsalicylic
acid-based drug, and Aspirin. So, in the case of Aspirin®, the name was baptized as a direct
reference with rigid designation as part of the trademark registration process, and it was not
confused for any other product at the time (making it eligible for legal protected under US
Trademark Law).
However, as competent individuals, we know, today, that the Aspirin-name-usingpractice is no longer primarily used to refer to the specific acetylsalicylic acid-based drug made by
Bayer; instead, the name, “aspirin”, is primarily used to refer to the product class with no tie to
any specific source. This is due to the presence of yet another reference: “aspirin”, which is a
homonymous version of Bayer’s original brand name, Aspirin®. Notably, “aspirin” is also no longer
a Proper Name having morphed into the form of a common noun – illustrating the linguistic
element of Clankie’s brand genericization. This ultimately raises the question: how did a Proper
Name, a name with a rigid designation, change its reference? Through a lens of Theories of
Reference, the answer as to why Brand Genericide occurs surfaces: the failed counterfactual
dependence in the communicative exchange between individual A and individual B destroys
referential governance and opens the door to reference shift. With the door open, a new nameusing-practice can emerge with its own form of referential governance, which if accepted by the
audience, can diffuse into a community through a series of subsequent uses. If there is a utility
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gain in using the version of the reference that refers to the product class, then the product-class
version of the name-using-practice may become the default practice that speakers assume the
community understands when hearing the name in a communicative exchange (i.e. the generic
name takes on primary significance in the community). Additionally, by removing the focus from
the brand name itself, a parallel event to Brand Genericide emerges: the naming ceremony of a
product class. This couples with the above scenario as it provides an explanation as why the
consuming public may use the generic-name-using-practice as the name’s primary version. So,
together, failed counterfactual dependence and the product class’s naming ceremony form the
perfect storm, providing an explanation as to how and why Brand Genericide exists.
2.4.1 A Discussion of Economic Efficiency and Economy of Expression
To reveal the parallel process of the product class’s naming ceremony, let us first go back
to the Bayer/Aspirin scenario and apply the aforementioned theories of reference. With regards
to mentalism, we find ourselves in a similar boat to current research on Brand Genericide,
focusing on economic efficiency and economy of expression – both of which leverage mentalistbased theories as their foundations.
The argument of economic efficiency, as described by Sung In (2002) in a legal review of
prior litigation, looks at the “death of a trademark” through the lens of utility gain and efficiency.
At first, In depicts a scenario in which the consumer uses the trademarked brand name to convey
quick, efficient notions of the goodwill provided by the brand’s source – where goodwill includes
quality of the product and any associated characteristics. The speaker is able to convey complex
content in the simple wrapper of the brand name vs conveying the same content through
description. In describes this as a form of efficiency in communication (2002). This idea of
economic efficiency can then be extended to whether the product class is more efficiently
represented through the brand name. If so, then In’s logic follows that the Federal government
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should revoke the trademark in order to allow all consumers and producers to use said name to
communicate the content associated with the product class in the nominally smaller way.
Otherwise, the owner of trademark would have an unfair competitive advantage to other
producers of products in the same class. This idea of efficiency also emerges in the literature on
theories of meaning through the work of Russell (1903), who wrote about descriptions, definite
determiners, and the ability to use a name as a compressed description. For example, “the tiger”
is “an abbreviation for something like ‘tiger, species of genus panther’” (Ludlow 2018) – which
illustrates an economical gain by compressing this information into the abbreviation; of course,
this assumes that the audience can successfully interpret the name-using-practice for it to be
understood as the speaker intended.
Clark & Clark also discussed how economy of expression is built upon a sociological
implication that a speaker will gravitate towards a lower-cost linguistic expression when available,
rather than using an expression with unnecessary wordiness (1979). Speakers attempt to “pack
into a word what would have taken many words to express” – in particular, when dealing with
contextual situations that occur frequently in life (1979). Unlike In’s work, which is published in a
legal setting focused on the economic efficiency gained in the marketplace, Clark & Clark examine
this phenomenon from a linguistic, language-evolving angle. Clark & Clark also extend their
discussion to that of reference acceptance – noting that an audience will not accept a new
reference if there is already a cost-effective way of communicating the same content. In this case,
the cost of the audience interpreting the new reference would not be justified. This is covered by
preemption by synonymy (Clark & Clark 1979).
If the speaker’s use of a new reference to describe a content of thought is not rivalled by
a competing reference, then the linguistic theory of conversion helps us to understand how the
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naming unit shifts from one part of speech to another, becoming independent of the lexical
naming unit it once was (Harley 2006; Hansen 2003). As Harley describes, this is due to a cognitive
human impulse to reduce language into forms of common currency that can be shared with
speakers’ audiences (2006).
In this subsection, the idea is that brands take on a meaning more than that of the physical
product from the given source, demonstrating how brand names can connote instead of just
denoting an object. This then highlights a potential efficiency gain that a name can offer a
community. However, this doesn’t explain why the community is looking for the efficiency gain in
the first place. So, to offer an explanation, I turn to causal origin to begin my argument.
2.4.2 Causal Origin and the Naming of Product Class
At the beginning of this discussion, three referents were described: 1) a product class, 2)
a company, and 3) a specific product from a specific source. Of these three referents, two have
legally registered names: the company (whose name is legally registered) and the specific product
from a specific source (whose name is also legally registered as a trademark brand). This allows
these two names to be traced back to their origins in a straightforward manner: its public record.
However, for a product class, there is no legally registered name. This then raises an important
question: how does a product class get its name? This brings us back to Brand Genericide, which
ultimately ends with a rigidly designated, efficient name for a product class. So, on the one hand
we have a need to efficiently and directly reference the product class, and on the other, we have
a phenomenon that knowingly produces an efficient, fixed reference for a product class. This,
therefore, suggests that the phenomenon of Brand Genericide is a side effect of a greater
phenomenon: the quest to baptize an efficient name that rigidly designates the product class.
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To better illustrate this, let us return to the example of Xerox®. At one point, the name
“Xerox” was arguably undergoing Brand Genericide, shifting its reference to the referent of
“photocopying machines” versus the referent of “photocopying machines made by Xerox
Corporation”. To many consumers in the US, the word “xerox” referenced the product class with
no ties to any one specific source. However, after an extensive marketing campaign in the early
2000s that attempted to diffuse the knowledge of the brand name’s original, baptized reference,
the public began to accept the general term of “copier” as the referring term for the product class.
Xerox also launched the campaign slogan: “You can’t Xerox a Xerox on a Xerox. But we don’t mind
at all if you copy a copy on a Xerox® copier” to 1) help position knowledge of the original, baptized
reference and 2) offer “copier” as the generic product class name, filling the gap.
In 2005, Xerox went on to run an advertisement that playfully used the Genericized name
of aspirin to encourage consumers not to use their brand name in a similar, generic fashion:
“When you use ‘Xerox’ the way you use ‘aspirin,’ we get a headache” (Xerox 2005). If successful,
Xerox’s strategic intervention through the instrument of knowledge campaigns would result in
consumers using copier as the referring term for the product class: i.e. create a copy by copying
on a Xerox® copier. Sure enough, today, Xerox® is viewed by many to be a type of copier and not
the name of the product class, signifying that Xerox was able to reverse the effects of Brand
Genericide. By introducing an efficient name that rigidly designates the class, the need to use
“Xerox” as the referring term for the product class is no longer provides a meaningful economic
gain (as is discussed by Clark & Clark’s preemption of synonymy theory, 1979).
While this begins to shed light on how Brand Genericide fits into the greater theory of
reference, it does not answer why a brand name is chosen to be the name of the product class.
For example, the name, “aspirin”, was chosen to reference the product class of acetylsalicylic acid-
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based drugs when its existing reference was already previously used to rigidly designate some
other referent, meaning this usage would inherently cause some user confusion if said users also
knowledge of the original reference. Granted, duplication of names is not uncommon; for
example, jaguar references a type of wild cat, and it also references a brand of car. In both
instances, the name is homonymous: jaguar is spelled the same way and pronounced the same
way in both cases. Nonetheless, both references exist and that’s okay given that both versions of
jaguar can still successfully refer – assuming the audience is able to successfully determine the
speaker’s intended usage.
With regards to Brand Genericide, the issue is not that there are two homonymous
references that refer to different referents – the issue is that, under Brand Genericide, the two
homonymous terms refer to referents that are related (i.e. specific product and its class), which
emphasizes the conflict that the US’s Trademark Law introduces. The Law prevents anyone from
using a trademarked name in any way that can cause consumer confusion, which will naturally
occur with the generic version of the brand name, as a homonymous term, that refers to the same
product class that the product exists in. For example, I can legally use the name photoshop to
name my new type of bicycle because there is little chance a consumer would assume I am
referring to a type of photo-editing software. However, if I launch a new iPhone application for
auto-correcting the brightness of a photo and use the name photoshop to reference the type of
product that is it, there is clearly the potential to confuse consumers who may believe my product
and Adobe’s are related. This is why Trademark Law was established in the first place: to protect
trademark owners from consumer confusion and dilution. To better understand what’s at play
here, cognitive psychology is leveraged in the next subsection.
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2.4.3 Cognitive Psychology and the Encyclopedia of the Product Class
Recalling the discussion of cognitive psychology in section 2.3, consider the brands that
are known to have gone through Brand Genericide (such as aspirin, thermos, elevator, and
escalator); in each case, the generic reference is still used today. One commonality these brands
also possess is that each of these generic names are in the same encyclopedia of the product
classes they once referenced, just not within the originating frame. As a thought experiment,
assume a brand’s name is used to reference an object that is not connected in any way to the
original encyclopedia (i.e. the product class); in this case, there should be minimal consumer
confusion caused by the trademark, unless the chosen name is already used to refer to a different
referent in a predominate way. In this case, the level of effort needed to interpret the speaker’s
intended usage will likely be higher than normal. Therefore, Federal Trademark Law is not
violated, and the original trademark remains intact. To see how this comes together, let us play
out a scenario:
When searching for a name for a product class, speakers are presented with various
options in the form of brand names – whether it is knowingly or unknowingly. These brand
names serve as lexical expressions that reference products and services within the
product class itself with ties to specific sources. As a rigidly designated direct reference, a
trademarked brand name forms a specific frame within the encyclopedia of the product
class. Here, this frame provides a schematic conceptual scenario that triggers features
and functions regarding the referent (i.e. the specific product from the specific source).
These features and functions then provide the background awareness needed to
interpret and act on the brand name reference when used by the speaker.
In line with this scenario, consider how most (if not all) of the known genericized brands were
once market leaders in their respective classes: meaning they were all, at one time, recognized
with high network penetration and cue-validity. In the case of acetylsalicylic acid-based drugs, a
well-known expression (or symbol) was already a house-hold name with the majority of the
product market share: Aspirin. Aspirin, a frame within the encyclopedia of acetylsalicylic acidbased drugs, already was embedded in to the domain of the product class through the naming
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ceremony of the acetylsalicylic acid-based drug made by Bayer (i.e. Aspirin). Furthermore, from a
mentalist perspective, the name “Aspirin” already connoted an embedded idea of being able to
reduce pain.
So, from a notion of efficiency, borrowing the referring term of Aspirin to reference the
class of acetylsalicylic acid-based drugs provided a cost-effective way of dubbing a rigidly
designated direct reference for the product class that inherently brought with it feelings and ideas
that also connote the greater product class. Instead of using a newly coined name for the product
class, which would need to gain its own features and functions through experiences in long-term
memory, “Aspirin” only required a shift of frame: it would remain in the same encyclopedia while
leveraging many of the functions and features already present in brand equity of Bayer’s Aspirin.
As history shows us, speakers re-purposed the existing name of Aspirin by regrounding it
over time as a newly dubbed name for the category (i.e. Devitt’s 1981 argument of perceptual
confrontations as cited in Reimer 2014). This allowed the regrounded reference to gain in cuevalidity, establishing knowledge of the newly purposed direct reference for the acetylsalicylic
acid-based drug product class with no ties to any one product or source. Based on In’s discussion
of economic efficiency, Aspirin’s trademark then needed to be revoked, allowing consumers to
use the name and its newly solidified reference to denote the product class without legal
consequence. Sure enough, the trademark was revoked, and the Proper Name of “Aspirin”
linguistically shifted to the common name of “aspirin” with the notable lowercase “a”. As an
added example, consider again the case of Xerox® and copier. While “copier” was not a
trademarked brand name, its lexical form is derived from “copy”, which is an action contained
within the encyclopedia of the product class of machines that make copies of documents using
scanned photos. Accordingly, the newly coined common name of “copier” still provided
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background awareness to the encyclopedia in question, perhaps in a more efficient, direct way
than even that of the name, Xerox.
In summary, if there are no alternative, efficient non-brand name references to draw from
within the encyclopedia of the product class, then the speaker only has one other option outside
of repurposing an existing brand name: coin a new name. However, if this has always been an
option, then why did dozens of brand names fall victim to Brand Genericide? Using cognitive
linguistics, it is then possible to go full circle regarding Kaplan’s suggestion that some aspect of
reference remains constant during referential shifts: the consistency is found in the encyclopedia
of the product class.
Coming back to the discussion of reference shift due to error, if a trademarked brand
name is used mistakenly to reference a product class, there are three potential scenarios that may
play out. First, the mistaken reference fails because a more efficient reference already exists (i.e.
preemption by synonymy). Second, the mistaken use of reference succeeds because it is a more
efficient reference than any that may or may not currently exist. In this second scenario, I assume
that the mistakenly used reference was originally a reference to a specific product, from a specific
source, within that particular product class. Under this pretense, the trademarked brand name’s
mistaken usage still has a common consistency through the encyclopedia of the product class.
Finally, the third scenario results in the mistaken reference taking hold in the community because
it is a more efficient reference than any that may or may not currently exist; however, the
assumption here is that the brand name accidently used to reference the product class is not
connected in any way to the product class in question. In this case, the incorrect, accidental use
of the trademark becomes a newly coined reference meaning that the brand name is in not at risk
of losing its trademark because it is still unique in its own class. Both the brand name and the
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newly coined reference – which happen to be homonymous – will live on independently with two
distinct referents. In summary, causal origin and cognitive psychology begin to paint a clearer
picture as to what Brand Genericide entails; however, it still doesn’t tell us why referential shift
can occur in the first place or how it comes to happen. For this, I turn to Dickie’s theory of
referential governance.
2.4.4 The Successful (and Unsuccessful) Transmission of Referential Governance
To illustrate the successful (and unsuccessful) transmission of referential governance as
it relates to Brand Genericide, let us begin with three scenarios:
1. A speaker has no prior knowledge of the original brand name reference to the specific
product from the specific source.
2. A speaker has knowledge of both the original reference (brand name refers to specific
product) and to the genericized reference (brand name refers to product category).
3. A speaker has prior knowledge of the generic brand name reference to the product
class.
Under Dickie’s referential governance theory, “governance” is transmitted from speakerto-speaker based on buffered counterfactual dependence, highlighting a “transitive relation
among events” (Lewis 1986). As an example, let us use the referring term of Photoshop®, which
correctly refers to the object of specific photo-editing software owned & sold by Adobe. This
reference was established by a community of producers (Adobe) when the trademark was legally
registered.
Governance around this reference is successfully transmitted from speaker A to speaker
B if and only if both speaker A and speaker B’s Photoshop-files “keep faith” with the referring
object’s “relevant possible beahviours” (Dickie 2011). In this example, the counterfactual
condition becomes:
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If the referential object in speaker B’s “Photoshop” file did not “keep faith with… [the]
referentially potential behaviours” of the object in speaker A’s “Photoshop” file, then
governance would not have been successfully transmitted from speaker A to speaker B.
If the condition holds, counterfactual dependence suggests that speaker B will intend to use the
reference in the same way as it was used when originally transmitted from speaker A, allowing
the individual to pass governance on through additional communication channels. However, if the
counterfactual dependence fails, the original governance (established by the producers that
registered the trademark) is destroyed, allowing the reference to potentially shift if, for example,
new governance is established by those that know the generic reference as the product category.
For any marketer aiming to keep their trademarked brand from becoming a victim of Brand
Genericide, the successful transmission of the original governance is primary objective. To avoid
a genericized fate, the original governance needs to remain intact as communities disseminate
the knowledge of the reference/referent relationship. However, as is evident by the numerous
examples of Brand Genericide that we know of today, we need to be able to account for cases
where governance is not transmitted successfully, causing a potential referential shift and the
activation of the Brand Genericide process for a given brand name.
One such destructive blow that kicks off the Brand Genericide process is the result of a
contamination of the transmission due to “extraneous information” (Dickie 2011). Let us say that
speaker A (accidently or intentionally) broke from prior governance and used “Photoshop” to
reference “the product category of photo-editing software”. The extraneous information is then
processed through speaker B’s development core, comparing the transmitted information to
what is already in his/her existing filing system, allowing speaker B to either add it or reject it. It
is at this junction that the three abovementioned scenarios come into play. If speaker B has no
existing Photoshop-labelled file in his/her mental filing system, speaker B becomes Dickie’s
parasitic consumer in the name-using-practice. As noted by Dickie, over time, speaker B may
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create a Photoshop-labelled file in/her mental filing system, filling it with reference-fixing
information regarding the object that “Photoshop” references. This will then enable speaker B to
become a participating consumer in that specific name-using-practice. Therefore, if speaker B has
no prior Photoshop-labelled file, then speaker B’s developmental path is influenced by whichever
name-using-practice speaker A deploys – original or generic – assuming speaker B decides that
there is value in the efficiency-to-be-gained through the presented name-using-practice.
However, given no labeled file previously existed for the object, the bar for establishing economic
efficiency is low. In this scenario, from the perspective of Brand Genericide, it becomes
particularly concerning if the established referential governance is for that of the generic name,
destroying the original governance from that of the baptism of the brand’s trademark.
In scenario 2, speaker B has knowledge of the original reference, meaning that he/she has
a file established with the brand name label. When speaker A deploys the name-using-practice of
“photoshop” as the generic name for the product class, the buffered counterfactual dependence
required for successful governance transmission fails if speaker A and speaker B’s photoshop-files
don’t align within the realm of relevant behaviors of the specific photo-editing software owned
by Adobe. The ideal result for the perseverance of original governance is that the counterfactual
dependence condition causes speaker B to reject speaker A’s name-using-practice. However, we
know that the Brand Genericide process has successfully completed in the past; therefore,
whether accidental or intention, if speaker A’s name using practice is deemed by speaker B to be
more efficient than the original, speaker B may choose to label his/her product class file with the
generic name, resulting in the destruction of the original referential governance. This then
establishes a new core developmental path on speaker B’s product-class-file founded on
maintenance of a new governance policy that causally traces back to the producers who know the
product class as the brand name.
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Finally, we arrive at a group of speakers that have prior knowledge of the generic brand
name reference to the product class, but no knowledge of the original reference to the specific
product owned and sold by the specific source. As a personal example, prior to beginning my
research on Brand Genericide, I had no knowledge of the referential governance around the
brand, Onesie®; in fact, I didn’t even know it was a brand at all. My personal onesie-labelled-file
consists of reference-fixing information on one-piece bodysuits primarily worn by small children
and some attention-seeking adults. Notably, my file is not limited to one product from any one
specific source. As a result, I constantly deploy a name-using practice that actually goes against
the original governance established when Gerber Products Company filed for a trademark on this
brand name in December of 1982. Because of this, I now have two onesie-labeled files in my
mental filing system: one with “Onesie” as the specific product and one with “onesie” as the
product class – the significant difference being in the capitalization of the “o” (a fact irrelevant to
speech). Therefore, when I use the original-Onesie-using practice (i.e. for the Gerber-made
product), I include additional context in my communicative exchange, by default, to ensure my
audience knows I am talking about that specific good and not the product class. On the other
hand, when I use the generic-onesie-using-practice in conversation, I assume that my audience
will interpret my usage of the term onesie to be a referring term for the product class due to my
perception of its primary significance; accordingly, I don’t include additional context to clarify my
intended usage unless my audience requests it. This surfaces a reality of having multiple files with
a homonymous label: based on the cue-validity of the labels in a speaker’s community, one nameusing-practice may be the default practice unless otherwise specified. As to which name-usingpractice is the default practice, it is an empirical question, and I further explore this in chapter 3.
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2.4.5 Mapping Reference Theories to the Process of Brand Genericide
When using a mentalist view of reference, a non-mentalist view of causal origin, a
cognitive psychological view of encyclopedias, and an application of referential governance, the
result is a coming together of ideas to shed light on the often-overlooked reality that Brand
Genericide is actually a side effect of the naming ceremony of a product class, which is facilitated
by a failure of buffered counterfactual dependence. With this revelation, I map the Brand
Genericide process using five mechanisms:
1. Encyclopedia: This component is a nod to cognitive psychology, illustrating the
encyclopedia in which the reference shift will occur if a brand name is used to label the
product class. If the proposed referring term is not already in this encyclopedia, then the
classes’ brand names are not currently at risk for Brand Genericide.
2. Referent: This component tracks the object or entity to which the name refers. Based on
Evans and Dickie, the file that exists in the individual’s mental filing system will be about
this object.
3. Referring Term: This component tracks the referring term itself – whether it is a
description or a name. The referring term is used to reference an object.
4. Original Referential Governance (A): This component illustrates the referential
governance that regulates the name-using-practice produced by those that know the
specific product from the specific source as the brand name.
5. New Referential Governance (B): This component illustrates the referential governance
that regulates the name-using-practice produced by those that know the product class as
the generic brand name.

With these five mechanisms, I offer the following, theorized, process of Brand Genericide:
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Figure 2: Dery’s Proposed Process of Brand Genericide
As a qualifier to Brand Genericide, two components need to be present: 1) a product class
that is referenced by description (or a complex, inefficient name); and 2) a trademarked brand
name. When the referent of the product class fails to have an efficient name, economic efficiency
and economy of expression theories suggest that individuals will begin to search for an efficient
referring term for the product class. Due to this search, the potential for Brand Genericide is
enabled for every trademarked brand name in the encyclopedia for that product class. If the
product class qualifier is not met, Brand Genericide is still possible due to a speaker’s erroneous
usage; however, the economical requirement to break the original governance model will be
significant due to pre-emption by synonymy. So, it is still possible the mistaken usage of the brand
name could trigger Brand Genericide – it is just not probable. With regards to referential
governance, the trademarked brand name’s producers are those who know the specific product
from the specific source as the brand name. These individuals produced the original governance
that regulates the maintenance of a brand-labelled metal file. Participating consumers in the
brand-name-using-practice are individuals with prior knowledge of the original referential
governance. Parasitic consumers are those individuals without prior knowledge of the original
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reference governance but may participate in the brand-name-using practice to mimic a behavior
seen in their community. Together, as long as governance is transmitted successfully in
communicative exchanges, the brand name’s primary usage is to reference the specific product
from the specific source.
To trigger Brand Genericide for a specific brand name, failed buffered counterfactual
dependence results in two potential outcomes in phase one: 1) the revised reference is rejected
to preserve original governance or 2) the original referential governance is destroyed, and a new
governance model is established. If original governance is preserved, the producers, participating
consumers, and parasitic consumers associated with the originating name-using-practice remain
intact with the potential to further develop. However, if the original governance model is
destroyed, albeit intentionally or accidently, the opportunity for a new governance model
emerges where the producers are individuals who know the product class as the brand name. In
this scenario, we may see parasitic consumers begin to emerge in the generic-brand-name-usingpractice if there is a perceived utility gain in employing the revised name-using-practice or if the
consumer simply has no prior knowledge of the original brand name reference to overcome. Over
time, these parasitic consumers may become participating consumers in the same name-usingpractice as they establish and build their generic-brand-name labelled mental file for the product
class.
In phase one of Brand Genericide, the key characteristic is that there are two
homonymous referring terms present with the same spelling and pronunciation that coexist with
two different referents. While the name has the same spelling and pronunciation, one references
the specific product from the specific source and the other references the product class. In both
cases, each reference rigidly designates and exists in the world even if no one has knowledge of
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it. So, even though I had no previous knowledge of the Onesie reference to Gerber, it still existed
and rigidly designated the specific product.
With the presence of both the original and new referential governance, the only visible
difference can be seen in the written version of the name itself: the name is capitalized for a
Proper Name (i.e. the trademark) and is not-capitalized for the common version (i.e. name for the
product class). However, if the name is used at the beginning of a sentence where the word is
capitalized regardless of form in the English language, if the statement is entirely in UPPERCASE
or Title-Case font, or if the name is spoken, the ability to differentiate which name-using-practice
is deployed becomes improbable. Accordingly, if the audience has knowledge of both references
(and a mental file for each of them), depending on whether one reference is more dominant than
the other, the audience may need additional context to differentiate which name-using practice
is intended by the speaker. Where the communication is written without any of the abovementioned limitations, a combination of Proper Name and common name usage of the brand
name will be observed, indicating that Clankie’s parallel genericization process is attempting to
adjust language where the name-using-practice begins to take hold. Given there are no
participating consumers yet in this phase of the Brand Genericide process, I assume that the
Proper Name usage outweighs the common name usage. In many communities, the ProperName-using-practice will be the default, assumed reference when used in a communicative
exchange, whereas those using the term generically will likely need to add additional context for
it to be understood (where the reference is shifting with more empirical provenance).
In phase two of the Brand Genericide process, the new referential governance model,
which traces back to the individuals that know the product class as the generic brand name, begins
to establish itself more firmly with the emergence of participating consumers in the generic-
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name-using-practice. These participating consumers are individuals that refer to the product class
using the brand name based on a labeled mental file they each possess on the product class. The
information in this file is reference-fixing. What this indicates, however, is that individuals in a
given community are now being exposed to repetitive usage of the new name-using-practice, with
a core development path that is perpetuating successful transmission of the revised governance
model. With this evolution of the parasitic consumer to that of a participating version, I assume
that the usage of the brand as a common name begins to overtake the usage seen as a Proper
Name. For the reason that both governance models are still present (though to a decreasing level
of prevalence for the original version), if individuals have knowledge of both homonymous
referring terms, some subsets of the greater community will still require context to differentiate
which name-using practice is intended due to the shifting reference. However, based on a
speaker’s perception of which reference will be primarily understood by their immediate network
(i.e. the cue validity of the expression), individuals may begin to default to one of the name-usingpractices over the other.
Finally, the brand name enters the third and final stage of Brand Genericide. While we are
still in the encyclopedia of the product class, the generic reference is fixed, meaning that context
is no longer required to determine the speaker’s default intention in the name-using-practice.
Accordingly, the presence of the Proper Name usage of the brand name is minimal to nonexistent, showing a strong dominance of the common name form. Public perception embraces
one primary referential governance model, which traces back to those individuals who know the
product class as the brand name. The presence of parasitic and participating consumers in the
original name-using-practice are also minimal to non-existent in this final phase. Furthermore,
while some individuals may still have knowledge of the original-name-using-practice even after
Brand Genericide completes, most members of the public that once had this knowledge likely
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have archived their original mental file. As a result, a speaker would have to provide additional
context in a communication exchange if he/she want to use the original-name-using-practice and
have the audience recognize that intention. After all, the condition of buffered counterfactual
dependence is now on the product class file and not the specific product file. In summary, by the
time the Brand Genericide process makes it to phase 3, the primary significance of the brand
name is no longer the Proper-Name-using-practice; it is, therefore, in the interest of the public to
revoke any trademark that exists to ensure the name can be used with respect to its primary
significance without legal consequences.
2.5 Conclusion & Future Research
In this chapter, I have operationalized a three-phase model, with qualifier, of Brand
Genericide by leveraging a revised theory that examines the phenomenon through the lens of
theories of reference. To breakdown this marketing problem, theorists, marketers, and lawyers
need to step back and look at Brand Genericide and the linguistic genericization of a brand name
as a reaction to a greater force: the naming ceremony of a product class, enabled by failed
buffered counterfactual dependence of the original referential governance model. In the end, the
naming ceremony of a product class creates a need for an efficient, rigidly designated name to
reference the referent of the product class. Brand names offer a tantalizing option in this scenario
for communities given they are existing direct references that are already known within the same
encyclopedia. Assuming a set of producers that know the product class as the brand name can
establish this governance model by destroying the original version, the public may look to this
generic-name-using-practice as a more economically efficient way to reference the generic
product class compared to the alternative options of trying to make a newly coined name catch
on or sticking with the inefficient product class name or description.
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In this chapter, there are couple of limitations to note, including: 1) a focus on the English
language and 2) an orientation around American culture. Additionally, the impact of Law also
serves as a limitation: alternative Laws, or lack thereof, in other countries may trigger more or
less aggressive naming ceremonies than what is observed in the United States under our current
Trademark system.
With regards to future research, there is an immediate opportunity to conduct a detailed
analysis on the phenomenon of “brand-as-verb”, which is not addressed in this chapter. There is
a lack of clarity in the current literature around why this occurs and what it means in relation to
Brand Genericide. As a result, Courts and consumers seem to be grasping for meaning. By
exploring how and why “brand-as-verb” occurs, researchers can build out a process flow to show
how it is either connected to or different from the legal problem of Brand Genericide. To do this,
there is likely valuable information in the literature on noun-to-verb conversions and instrument
verbs – meaning “to do it with X” – which is theoretically what brand names such as Google® and
Uber® are currently experiencing. The question of particular relevance is whether an increase
usage of brand-as-verb introduces any additional elements to the three phases of Brand
Genericide I propose in this chapter.
Additionally, this chapter has focused heavily on English examples of Brand Genericide.
This phenomenon is by no means American-centric, with examples like “Hoover” in the United
Kingdom representing the international evidence of the process. However, theories of reference
used in this chapter are not specific to any one language. Therefore, by extending this research to
a non-English language and a non-American locale will provide the necessary evidence to confirm
if my theory on Brand Genericide is globally applicable.
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In the next chapter, I focus on how to influence the three phases of Brand Genericide, and
I also provide two examples of how to use social media data, along with part-of-speech tagging,
to measure where in the Brand Genericide process your brand resides across a longitudinal 9-year
data series.
Chapter 3: Protecting Your Brand from Genericide – an Analytical Approach to Knowing How
and When to Strategically Act
3.1 Introduction
Aspirin, Heroin, Escalator, Thermos, Murphy Bed, Yo-Yo, Laundromat, Zip Code, Hacky
Sack, Wine Cooler, Pilates, Netbook, and App Store – common names or registered brand names?
The answer here depends on “when” you ask given each of these once trademarked brand names
fell victim to Brand Genericide: an ancillary reaction to the naming ceremony of a product class
that drives a trademarked brand name to instead reference a product class. Today, all 13
examples above are common names with no Federal protection in the US provided to their
original owners.
In chapter 2, figure 2, I illustrated my theory of the three-phase, Brand Genericide
process. As a brand name transitions through this process, there are three principal reference
orientations: 1) the brand as a Proper Name with a direct, fixed reference to a specific good and
source, 2) the brand name as a direct reference to a specific good and source, but with a shifting
reference, and finally, 3) the brand name as a direct, fixed reference to the generic referent of the
product class. Looking back over the last 100 years at trademarked brands that have since lost
their federal protection, from trademark registration to trademark revocation, the process has
taken anywhere from 5 to 64 years to complete (ex. “Murphy Bed”, which was registered in 1925,
was revoked in 1989). Interestingly, since the early 1990s, the Brand Genericide process appears
to be speeding up. For example, “App Store”, which was registered in 2008 by Apple, was
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abandoned due to genericness in 2013, only 5 years after the initial registration (figure 3). Given
this speed, practitioners have an urgent need to better understand this process – as well as how
to influence it.

Figure 3: Example Victims of Brand Genericide (Trademarks Canceled or Abandoned).
The bars on the right indicate how long each brand was a registered trademark (in years).
For the Brand Genericide process to complete, regardless of duration, there are three
phases that the brand name flows through as reference shifts to that of the product category once
a certain activation qualifier is met. This qualifier has two conditions: 1) the trademarked brand
name is a fixed, direct reference to a specific product; and 2) the product class is referred to using
a reference-fixing description that is deemed inefficient by the speaking public. This combination
highlights a product class in need of an efficient name – as well as the presence of a brand name
that could potentially fill said need.
Once activated, the first phase of Brand Genericide marks a perceptual confrontation: the
once fixed reference queued by the brand name reference takes on a shifting reference that
requires context from the speaker to interpret. An alternative, generic-name-using-practice
emerges in this phase, referring to the generic product class with no tie to any one specific
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product. This is made possible by a failed buffered counterfactual dependence between
communicating individuals where speaker A’s use of the brand name relies on a behavior of the
referring product that does not align with the potential behaviors of the entity that speaker B
references when using the same name. The result is the destruction of the original referential
governance formed by producers that know the specific product as the trademarked brand name.
In this scenario, speaker B can either reject the usage, honoring the original governance, or
become a parasitic consumer in the revised name-using-practice. If speaker B has no prior
knowledge of the original brand-name-using-practice, he/she could reject the name due to their
inability to understand what speaker A means, or he/she could use the reference in future
communicative exchanges to mimic the behavior of his/her community. If the new generic-nameusing-practice continues to diffuse into the wider network, a new form of referential governance
is transmitted, produced by individuals that know the product class as the generic brand name.
In the second phase, usage of the generic-brand-name-using-practice assimilates
knowledge of the new referential governance model into a wider population, indicating not just
perceptual confrontation, but also acceptance, reuse, and taken-for-grantedness of the revised
name-using-practice. Some parasitic consumers evolve to participating consumers, forming
mental files that are filling with reference-fixing information on the product class. In this phase,
there are still individuals present that use the brand name in accordance with its original reference
governance model; however, the proportion of users using the revised reference begins to take a
primary position in the name-using-practices of the consuming public.
Finally, in the third phase of Brand Genericide, the primary significance of the brand name
becomes that of the product class, indicated by a clear dominance of the generic-name-usingpractice. Parasitic and participating consumers in the original name-using-practice are rare –
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potentially requiring additional context in a communicative exchange to ensure the audience
knows he/she is referring to the specific product. The reality here is that many consumers may
not have any knowledge of the original brand-name-using-practice, which results in the name
primarily being used as a common noun with a direct, fixed reference to the broader product
category.
At the root of Brand Genericide is a product class that is missing an efficient reference,
leaving us with a product category in search of a name (seen as “activation” in figure 2). To be
more economical in conversation, speakers attempt to name the product category through
iterative sense making (Grodal et al. 2010) – a search for a common name that can serve as the
needed, rigidly designated, direct reference. While potential names may include newly coined
expressions, they also can include reframed brand names – shifting the already existent brand
name’s reference from a specific product to overall product class. When deciding between a
newly coined reference and the shifting of an existing band name’s reference, it comes down to
what utility there is to be gained, often with the existing brand name’s repurposing winning the
battle.
Both options – newly coined and reframed brand names – are viable as both “copier” and
“aspirin” have proven; however, the consumer decision on which name-using-practice to employ
comes down to utility. When no other more efficient name is available, shifting an existing brand
name’s reference within the encyclopedia of the product class may be more efficient in
conversation than coining a new term, which requires potentially ample context to successfully
transmit governance, while also forming a development path to foster to-be participating
consumers. Bearing all this in mind, it is the lack of an efficient reference to the product class that
creates the environment needed to prime Brand Genericide. Without this need, Brand Genericide
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is a process without a beginning. So, by breaking down and re-interpreting Brand Genericide
under the lens of theories of reference in chapter 2 of this Thesis, the point of infection has been
identified: the existence of a product category without an efficient, direct, and fixed name. By
acknowledging the naming ceremony that ensues, this chapter offers a prescriptive
recommendation on how to strategically intervene in the Brand Genericide process.
To achieve this purpose, three areas are explored: strategies for labeling product
categories, the social learning process, and information diffusion. By combining critical
realizations from these three literatures, I propose a series of strategic interventions that I overlay
on the Brand Genericide process. This chapter concludes with a methodology for identifying the
phases of Brand Genericide overtime by aligning to linguistic theories of brand genericization
(Clankie 1999). To demonstrate the methodology, I conduct an example analysis on two existing
brand names, Onesie® and Photoshop®, over an 9-year sample period consisting of 18 data points
per brand.
To facilitate the tracing of Brand Genericide over time, I leverage quantitative methods
to extract indicators of the phenomenon from social media (specifically, Twitter) by tagging the
relevant Tweets with their part-of-speech, which is used to indicate the Proper-to-common usage
of the target name. Using this ratio, I determine which phase of Brand Genericide the brand name
at time t is likely in. Based on the assigned phase, the marketing practitioner can choose whether
to strategically act. In my illustrative analysis, historical tweets are sampled twice a year by taking
the last 10,000 Tweets of the month of June & December, over a 9-year period based on a keyword search of the brand names, Photoshop® and Onesie®. In total, 117,339 cleaned, English
Tweets are used to trend the usage of Photoshop® and 140,182 cleaned, English Tweets are used
for Onesie®. The results indicate a clear shift from “phase 1” to “phase 2” of the Brand Genericide
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process for Photoshop® with a flip-flop between the Proper-Name-using-practice and the
common-name-using-practice. For Onesie®, the results place the brand name firmly in “phase 3”
of Brand Genericide throughout most of the 9-year period, signified by an overwhelming presence
of the common-name-using-practice (average of 91%).
In summary, this chapter explores the two remaining gaps in the current Brand Genericide
literature: 1) the lack of a detailed methodology for analytically tracing indications of Brand
Genericide over time and 2) no clear discussion around the mechanisms needed to strategically
influence Brand Genericide during its lifecycle. To address the first gap, I leverage quantitative
methods to trace Brand Genericide using social media data. This contribution offers a detailed
approach for looking at Brand Genericide as it progresses over time by using time-stamped usage
data over a multi-year period (thanks to Twitter). This also contributes to the literature by directly
leveraging the current theory on brand genericization to highlight the symptoms of Brand
Genericide (Clankie 1999). I don’t dispute that a lexical change occurs during Brand Genericide –
instead, I focus in chapter 2 on understanding “why” that change is necessary in the first place.
This lexical change becomes a mechanism of language adaptation for the shift in reference, which
parallels my proposed process. Accordingly, changes in the form of the naming unit – such as from
a Proper Noun to a common noun – indicate the presence of a referential shift. With these
indicators, I provide strategic interventions at each stage of the Brand Genericide process to either
enhance, impede, or maintain the ceremonial process. The strategic interventions are borrowed
from Organization Theory, making this chapter practitioner oriented and relevant: marketers have
a reference guide for knowing when to act and how to act, regardless of whether they believe
Brand Genericide is a goal or something to be avoided.
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3.2 Theoretical Development
Building on the general method of theory-building presented in chapter 2 (Lynham 2000;
2002), this chapter offers an extension of the operationalization phase, focusing on connecting
my revised theory of Brand Genericide to the practice of marketing. To accomplish this, I leverage
an application of the social learning literature and an application of information diffusion.
Together, these theories allow me to present a cohesive strategy that not only applies to each
stage of Brand Genericide, but also offers options on how to help Brand Genericide thrive or die
off. However, for the business practitioner to know “when” to act, this chapter also demonstrates
a detailed methodology for tracing indicators of potential referential shift over time. This is
discussed in section 3.5: Methodology for Tracing Brand Genericide over Time using Social Media.
3.3 Literature Review & Initial Discussion
3.3.1 Labeling Product Categories through Description: A Strategic Move or a Ticking Time
Bomb?
Dr. Stephen Covey, the author of the 7 Habits of Highly Effective People, once said, "I am
not a product of my circumstances. I am a product of my decisions." This quote brings to bear an
important question: are brands really victims of Brand Genericide – or, are they victims of decision
makers that failed to act in time? Using this perspective, it is important to start this literature
review from the catalyst of the Brand Genericide phenomenon: the inefficient reference to the
product class. However, what if a seemingly inefficient reference-fixing description is actually
beneficial when a product category first emerges? In this scenario, the discussion really comes
down to whether a descriptive name may increase user adoption and acceptance versus
undergoing an effort to establish a name-using-practice for a product category that consumers
are yet to know much about.
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To play out this scenario further, consider the emergence of a new market category,
which is said to exist when multiple products are deemed substitutes for a particular market
demand (Navis & Glynn 2010). To be a market category, there needs to be a common type of
product and a “… concept, label, or identity that reflects the commonalities that link together the
members of the category” (Mervis & Rosch 1981; Navis & Glynn 2010). This category is then
recognized among consumers and producers and is shared to reference the products held within
it.
The category name serves as a collective identity. Typically, there are two common
associations of the collective identity: 1) it is “the best representation of what it means to be a
member of the category” and 2) it can sometimes be formed from “…hybrids of previously
unconnected categories, such as ‘electronic’ book, ‘mini’ van, or ‘personal’ computer” (Navis &
Glynn 2010). In the case of “hybrid identities”, the collective identity needs to be iterated on and
“blended” into a singular meaning to gain acceptance as the reference to the product category
(2010). To better understand how these collective identities come to be, consider the work of
Grodal et al. around The Coevolution of Technologies and Categories during Industry Emergence
(2015). According to Grodal et al. (2015), product categories and their associated names are
presented as “sociocognitive constructs of interest”. These categories are labeled as “socially
constructed partitions that group together objects perceived to be similar” (2015). Interestingly,
these social partitions play directly into the hands of theories of reference discussed in chapter 2:
the referent is the perceived group of related products, which becomes the category or
encyclopedia.
One way of creating “…associated labels that stakeholders use to make sense of the
emerging industry” is through the linguistic recombination of elements tied to the products in the
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collective; or, as Navis & Glynn described it, creating a hybrid identity. These labels are chosen as
a recombination of descriptive words that help the consumer in understanding the product class,
making the category’s label “easily comprehensible” (2015). According to Grodal et al., this
invokes a level of understanding that would be “difficult to achieve through labels that are created
anew” (2015) – i.e. newly coined names.
In similarity to Navis & Glynn, the requirement of a singular meaning is echoed in Grodal
et al.: for the linguistic recombination to be accepted, it must be refined through iterative sensemaking to produce an economically efficient reference. For example, Grodal et al. discusses the
category label “smartphone” (2015). This category label was once preceded by “camera phone”
and “PDA phone” to describe the product class of mobile devices with utility features. In these
examples, the label was a description; however, “camera phone” and “PDA phone” were not as
conversationally efficient as the public demanded. Accordingly, through iteration, “smartphone”
became the newly coined name of the product category, establishing a referential governance
produced by those that know this product class as the name, smartphone.
The prescriptive research on product category labeling positions the naming of a product
class using a reference-fixing description, providing an interesting link to the activation of Brand
Genericide. Here, the strategic move to “…coin new category labels through linguistic
recombination to communicate the defining characteristics of their designs to customers and
industry commentators, but also to differentiate their products from those of competitors”
inadvertently elects a reference in the form of a definite description, allowing for the consumer
to be able to identify the reference “uniquely against their common ground” (Clark 1986). While
in the case of smartphone, no brand names became generic, by not introducing an efficient, direct
and fixed name as the category’s reference, brand names within the category are at risk if they
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are more efficient substitutes for the wordy descriptive references of “camera phone” and “PDA
phone”.
The intersection of initial interpretability and the need for efficient names creates a
tension for the organizations that live within a label-less product category. On one hand, a
reference-fixing description can be infused into the market to drive early consumer
comprehensibility, but it will ultimately risk triggering Brand Genericide if an efficient name
doesn’t emerge quickly soon after. Then, on the other hand, if Brand Genericide can be prevented
outright by infusing a direct, fixed efficient name into the market for the category label, it will
potentially weaken initial consumer comprehensibility, but will ensure brand names in the
product class stay brand names in the product class. This double-edged sword highlights the
reality that if the product category doesn’t survive due to lack of initial consumer
comprehensibility, the firms that create those products may not survive to see Brand Genericide
occur anyways. So, for some newly formed product categories, the risk of Brand Genericide may
be necessary to ensure early survival in the marketplace. Therefore, if Brand Genericide is a risk
that marketers will be intentionally and knowingly exposed to, it becomes a critical requirement
to know how to prevent Genericide later in the process. To derive this strategy, I turn to the
literature on social learning.
3.3.2 Social Learning
The diffusion of a name-using practice into a community requires the knowledge of
referential governance; otherwise, the name-using practice likely will be used in a series of
unconstrained ways. The knowledge of the referential governance ensures that the name-using
practice is used in the way its producers intended, such as a brand name referring to a specific
product from a specific source. For successful governance transmission, individual A must learn
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the name-using practice from individual B in a social, communicative exchange – assuming
Dickie’s (2011) buffered counterfactual dependence holds true. However, without social learning,
the name-using practice (and its associated governance) has no way to cascade, preventing the
consuming public from knowing that brand A references product Y. If we step back and recognize
that knowledge exists within an information space, and with time, this knowledge can be
“modified through learning” in a “social learning cycle” (Boisot 1995; McGaughey 2002), we can
see the channel through which governance is transmitted from speaker-to-speaker.
In this social learning cycle, an interacting collection of actors (or speakers) engage in two
steps: creating knowledge and applying knowledge. To begin, actors scan available data for
opportunities and threats, codify the information, and generalize it through abstraction. When
thinking about opportunities and threats, there are two ways to view this when it comes to Brand
Genericide: an opportunity to establish a referential governance model or a threat towards an
existing policy. For example, an opportunity may be to name a product category, whereas a threat
may be to break from a prior name-using-practice to instead pursue a more efficient option,
destroying the original referential governance. Regardless of the lens applied here, if the threat
materializes, actors may then diffuse the newly codified and abstracted information, apply it, and
embed it as the new norm, resulting in phase three of Brand Genericide.
The key here is that name-using-practices are not free from modification, as Dickie and
Evans illustrate in their theories of reference. Through the social learning process, a name-usingpractice and its associated governance become increasingly transparent to individuals as the
knowledge of said practice cascades through replication in communicative exchanges. It is
therefore through an application of transparency and replication that an intellectual asset, such
as a brand-name-using-practice, becomes a social norm (McGaughey 2002). Notably, these same
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pillars of transparency & replication that ultimately enable the diffusion of knowledge and solidify
the Proper-brand-name-using practice in a community, also present an opening for intervention
if an individual, for example, has interest in encouraging or stopping said learning process. In this
case, the introduction of additional information, such as Dickie’s depiction of erroneous
information, enables knowledge transformation.
To influence the social learning process by targeting transparency and replication,
McGaughey (2002) offers four strategic points of intervention: identification, understanding,
transmission, and application. When targeting transparency, an individual can attempt to
strategically intervene in the identification of the opportunity/threat or to strategically intervene
in the understanding of the information to-be-learned (2002). In other words, a transparencytargeted intervention has the potential to stop the social learning cycle by either attempting to
keep the community from assessing the new/revised knowledge or by removing the need to
diffuse the knowledge in the first place (such as by providing the product class with an efficient,
direct, and fixed name). Alternatively, by targeting replication, the owner can attempt to
intervene in the latter stages of social learning, where members of the community are
transmitting and applying the new or modified name-using-practice with an increasing frequency
(2002). This can be done through knowledge campaigns and policing (i.e. finding individuals who
are using the name is the wrong way and threatening legal action against them). Either way, the
goal is to create a disincentive for participating in the generic-name-using-practice.
3.3.3 Intervention Mechanisms for Social Learning
At each point of intervention, the individual can choose from three strategic mechanisms:
he/she can enhance, impede, or maintain the social learning process (McGaughey 2002). If
“enhance” is chosen, the individual attempts to support the learning process, encouraging the
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community to recognize the opportunity and to understand the additional information that is
available. In this case, the change-agent may view the proposed form of the intellectual asset (or,
name-using-practice) as beneficial to the community. If the individual, instead, chooses to
“impede”, the change-agent attempts to either stop the process or inject additional information
to guide the learning process away from its current path. In this scenario, the individual may view
the proposed form of the intellectual asset as harmful or not ideal. Finally, if “maintain” is
pursued, the actor essentially does nothing. For all three of these strategic interventions, a
baseline assumption is that the owner must first be aware of the need to manage the intellectual
asset from manipulation. The owner must also be motivated to act to protect the intellectual
asset. Additionally, if the owner is both aware and motivated, there needs to also be a capability
to act (2002). Without these three perquisites, the learning process continues without action,
defaulting to “maintain”.
If either enhance or impede is pursued by an individual looking to strategically influence
the social learning cycle, the intervention is defined across four mechanisms: 1) the domain, 2)
the instrument, 3) the intensity, and 4) the temporality (McGaughey 2002). Domain represents
who or what the intervention is targeting. Instrument represents the mechanism used to
intervene (such as a legal threat of retaliation). Intensity represents the level of investment and
effort made by the change-agent. Finally, temporality represents the response time and duration
of the owner’s intervention (2002). Together, the four dimensions create a play-card on how the
social learning process will be enhanced or impeded.
When determining how and when to act, one additional contributing element is network
centrality, which refers to how important the intellectual asset is to the actor’s core (2002).
Network centrality is seen in how centralized the brand name is to the core identity of the
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organization. For example, when looking at Bing® versus Microsoft®, both brand names are
owned by the same company; however, the mental file labelled with Microsoft® encompasses not
only the company name, but also the greater umbrella for all products sourced from their
company. Bing®, on the other hand, is the brand name of one of Microsoft’s many products.
Accordingly, losing Bing’s trademark may not be as catastrophic of a blow as compared to losing
the protection of the Microsoft® trademark, given consumers can still differentiate Microsoft
from other like companies. Depending on how central the brand name is to the core of the
company, it may then impact whether a company chooses to intervene in the Brand Genericide
process – as well as the intensity they are willing to put forth. This really boils down to
motivational dispositions, which are the strategic intentions of the intellectual asset’s owner
(2002). One example that highlights this is Microsoft’s active attempt to use enhance the practice
of using “Bing” as a verb in the television show, Hawaii 5-0. In a November 2010 episode, one of
the characters can be heard saying “Bing it” with the intention of using “Bing” as a verb. In this
strategic marketing move, a trademark owner intentionally attempts to form a link between the
already legitimized brand name of “Bing” and an action, actively trying to get the consuming
public to use the name in an unexpected way. Though this example leverages “brand-as-verb”
versus a name-using-practice, it still emphasizes a deliberate attempt to use a trademarked brand
name to represent something broader than the specific product.
In summary, this review of social learning and intervention clearly outlines how
individuals (or companies) can choose to protect their brand names. While some firms may elect
to intentionally repurpose their brand name, others will choose to protect it, and still others many
choose to do nothing (knowingly or unknowingly) – the key is that the social learning cycle can be
influenced with the right set of strategic actions. Regardless of the intervention path chosen, my
assumption is that the individual or firm has a reason for acting in such a way, aligned with the
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greater mission of the organization. This consideration is considered as the strategic interventions
of the social learning process are appended to the process of Brand Genericide in section 3.4.
3.3.4 Information Diffusion
Before aligning the strategic interventions outlined in section 3.3.3 to the Brand
Genericide process presented in chapter 2, it is important to have a foundation for how
information, or rather, knowledge, diffuses into a community. Information is diffused to an
audience through an interactive network. This diffusion process is best understood by using
information diffusion theory – a theory with two levels of scope: macroscopic and microscopic
(Gruhl et al. 2004). Macroscopic refers to “across the corpus”, as in, across the ecosystem.
Microscopic then minimizes the scope from the larger ecosystem to more direct individual-toindividual pairings (2004). Information diffusion theory attempts to answer the question: can you
model and predict flows of information within a network of actors (2004)?
In answering this question, time becomes critical as mainstream adoption of the internet,
both through computers and mobile devices, has fundamentally altered the dynamics and
principles of information diffusion (Gruhl et al. 2004). Before the dawn and adoption of the
internet, the major obstacle for the diffusion of information was the time and cost of getting that
information exposed to a large enough audience to influence widespread adoption and increased
cue-validity. Today, however, this cost has been significantly lessened: through the internet, the
cost of diffusing information through a widespread, diverse network is essentially free (2004). As
long as the information is accepted by the audience because there is a gain in some form of utility,
the information will cascade. This is referred to as the game theory approach (Morris & Young as
cited in Gruhl et al. 2004).
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When it comes to how information flows through networks, there are two models
presented in the information diffusion literature: threshold and cascade (Gruhl et al. 2004; Kempe
et al. 2003; Goldenberg et al. 2001). An audience’s willingness to accept additional information is
representative of a threshold model. When it comes to a threshold, every person has a unique
perspective of utility – meaning that individuals will have varying thresholds of acceptance
(Goldenberg et al. 2001). Interestingly, utility can also be gained in an additional way, through
social acceptance (i.e. everyone else is doing it, so I gain by mimicking that behavior) (Clark & Clark
1979). Under this theoretical application, individuals may not gain utility through efficiency, but
instead, gain it as a measure of social acceptance. In information diffusion theory, this is referred
to as a cascade model (Kempe et al. 2003). This also aligns back to Dickie’s (2011) example of the
parasitic consumer who does not know the specific object as the name but elects to join the nameusing-practice with the intention of mimicking a social norm.
As a hybrid of the threshold and cascade lenses, the model of individual propagation
extends the theory of information diffusion to include aspects of infection and propagation
networks (Gruhl et al. 2004). Following the typical analogy of a spreading disease, this model
leverages the principles of both cascade and threshold to understand how information spreads
throughout a network, infecting one individual at a time (2004). This “disease” propagation is
explained in four stages: 1) a person becomes susceptible to the disease, 2) the person is exposed
and becomes infected & infectious, and 3) the person recovers or is removed from the network
(i.e. death) (2004). Bringing this back to Brand Genericide, chapter 2 calls out that the
phenomenon is a side effect of the naming ceremony of a product class; in other words, it is a
symptom of a virus infecting brand names. Through the lens of individual propagation, the phases
of Brand Genericide translate to: 1) a speaker is susceptible to using the brand name generically
due to the need to more efficiently label the product class, 2) the speaker infects members of the
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community by using the repurposed name in their own communicative exchanges, and finally, 3)
the repurposed reference either becomes the direct, fixed reference for the product class or it
dies off.
While these theories offer insight into how knowledge can diffuse into a population,
Granovetter (1973) highlights a key point: since individuals resist change at varying levels of
acceptance thresholds, a large population needs to adopt the innovation for it to spread
successfully (Granovetter 1973; Milroy & Milroy 1985). Bearing this in mind, there are three
potential diffusion results, only one of which ends up with a repurposed brand name becoming
the reference for the product class:
1. In the first scenario, the attempt to present the repurposed reference in a nameusing-practice fails to diffuse beyond the speaker (Milroy & Milroy 1985). In this
scenario, the repurposed reference likely did not hold any perceived utility gain for
the audience (either through efficiency or social acceptance). As a result, the
repurposed name-using-practice dies off due to low, if any, repetition.
2. In the second scenario, the repurposed name-using-practice diffuses into the
speaker’s direct community and goes no further (1985). While the speaker’s attempt
to use the repurposed reference likely contains little, if any, gain in efficiency, the
speaker’s direct network (friends, family, work group, etc.) choose to adopt it,
perhaps to conform with the immediate group mentality. However, in this scenario,
the level of utility gain perceived outside of the immediate network is not enough to
persuade speakers to become parasitic consumers in the name-using-practice,
preventing its spread through the greater community.
3. In the final scenario, the repurposed name-using-practice diffuses into the speaker’s
direct community and continues to subsequently diffuse into other networks through
individuals in the direct community with ties to other networks (1985). In this
scenario, the repurposed reference is perceived in multiple networks as a means in
which to gain utility. As a result, the innovation diffuses through networks, gaining
validity along the way through repetition, eventually allowing the name to become
the reference to the product class.
For scenario three to succeed, Milroy & Milroy (1985) and Granovetter (1973) argue that weak
ties between individuals become critical links between smaller direct networks and the larger
ecosystem. It is these weak ties that form the bridge that allows for information to spread
throughout the public (1985; 1973). The members (with weak ties to other networks) are called
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central figures (1985). Once these central figures adopt the innovation, they disseminate it
throughout their extended networks, assuming, of course, that there is an opportunity for utility
gain. This diffusion process follows an S-shaped curve of adoption: it starts off slow, speeds up,
and then levels out once the innovation is widely accepted (1985). Milroy & Milroy also suggest
that societies that are largely weakly connected will experience diffusion at a more rapid pace
(1985).
This subsection of information diffusion is particularly relevant to this chapter as it
exemplifies how knowledge diffusion scales to the level of the public. After all, Brand Genericide
is said to only legally exist when the brand name’s primary significance is viewed by “the public”
to be generic. In section 3.5, the Proposed Methodology for Tracing Brand Genericide over Time
using Social Media examines indicators of network diffusion by following sample usage of two
brand names over a 9-year period.
3.4 Application: The Five Strategic Interventions of Brand Genericide
By applying the principals highlighted in section 3.3 from the social learning and
information diffusion literatures, the goal of this section is to offer marketing practitioners a
variety of strategic options for each phase of the Brand Genericide process illustrated in chapter
2. In doing so, this answers one of the driving motivations of my Thesis: How and why can Brand
Genericide be strategically influenced?
3.4.1 Strategies for Brand Genericide - The Activation Qualifier (Phase 0)
The phenomenon of Brand Genericide requires a qualifier to kick start the process. In
Chapter 2, I describe this qualifier as a product category with the lack of an efficient, direct name.
At this point in the process, the product category is likely labeled with a reference-fixing
description, as prescribed by Grodal et al. (2015). However, without an efficient, fixed category
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label, a naming ceremony for the product class will require an efficient alternative reference, likely
from within the category’s exiting encyclopedia. This then puts the brand names in said category
at risk. This “activation qualifier” encompasses McGaughey’s notion of transparency, specifically
in the identification of potential opportunities and threats. Without it, there is no need to
repurpose any of the brand names as the category label (outside of mistaken usage, which should
fail to diffuse into the community if knowledge of the brand name in question is widely known).
Here, it is up to the practitioner to preemptively act:
Strategic intervention target: transparency
-

Point of intervention: opportunity identification
Domain: competitors, consumers, media
Instrument(s): educational campaigns
Intensity: will vary based on the brand name’s core centrality (closer to core = higher
intensity)
Temporality: must act before the brand name’s reference is repurposed

Given these specifications, the practitioner has the ability to: (choose one)
1. “Impede” the identification of the opportunity. To impede, the practitioner can consider
introducing an efficient name for the product category that is not associated specifically
with the product he/she is looking to protect. In doing so, the naming ceremony of the
product class is offered an efficient reference to ground and diffuse, removing the need
for consumers to look elsewhere for naming options. To ensure assimilation into the
public, there likely is a sizeable advertising cost needed to ensure the knowledge of the
inserted reference diffuses widely. A real example of this is seen in Xerox® brand’s efforts
to position the Xerox® branded product as a “copier”. Xerox makes an effort here to offer
a product category label and explains its usage directly in the print advertisement as a
way to help the consuming public interpret the innovative reference. Alternatively, the
practitioner may instead choose to simply emphasize the brand name’s connection to its
specific product and source, leveraging advertising and marketing vehicles to create
knowledge of the brand name’s reference to ensure its original referential governance is
widely transmitted. This takes on a defensive orientation. A real example of this is
Johnson & Johnson’s use of the word “Brand” in their product label: “Band-Aid® Brand
Bandages”. The trademarked brand name, “Band-Aid”, is clearly shown with its original
intended reference: a specific bandage made by Johnson & Johnson. In chapter 4, I
present an additional vehicle for knowledge diffusion: the jingle. If successful, the
diffusion of knowledge around the brand name’s proper usage will decrease the
economical appeal of using the name generically.
2. “Enhance” the identification of the opportunity. The practitioner may choose to directly
offer his/her brand name as the generic name for the product category, becoming the
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producer of the generic-name-using-practice. In doing so, the practitioner will likely try to
increase initial consumer comprehensibility of a novel product category, allowing the
brand name to be directly linked to the product category itself. While this may help to
more quickly diffuse the brand name into a community, it comes with a greater risk of
Brand Genericide if not managed correctly when generic usage begins to emerge in the
community. Also, given legal suits that look to prove brand genericness attempt to show
examples of the trademark’s owner using their own brand name incorrectly, this strategy
directly provides evidence to opposing counsel in the case of a cancelation attempt.
Therefore, if the brand is central to the network of the firm that owns the mark (i.e. their
primary identifier), practitioners need to exercise extreme caution if choosing this action.
3. “Maintain” the status quo. When the trademark owner is unaware of the impending risk
to their name, is unable to act, or is not motivated to act, no interventions are taken.
Under this strategy, the market controls the fate of the Brand Genericide process, not the
practitioner.
If the practitioner has chosen to not intervene preventively, the brand name may enter phase 1
of Brand Genericide. Clankie (1999) offers characteristics of brand names that are likely to become
generic, which a practitioner may wish to consider while weighing the strategic action to take.
They include: 1) the brand name is shorter than the product class name (meaning that the generic
usage will likely drive efficiency) and 2) the brand name is associated with only a single product
(meaning that the usage would have minimal perceptual confrontation versus a brand with wide
scope) (1999).
3.4.2 Strategies for Brand Genericide – Phase 1
Once Brand Genericide begins in phase one, members of the consuming public have
identified the opportunity to use the brand name as a repurposed reference for the product
category, and its potential repurposing has been interpreted and successfully understood. The
actors within the community are now beginning to transmit the new knowledge to gain
acceptance by applying the brand name as the common name of the product category in their
communicative exchanges. In doing so, the additional information begins triggering mental
alarms, creating perceptual confrontations by challenging the original referential governance. If
the audience decides to engage in the generic-name-using-practice, perhaps due to a gain in
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efficiency or to mimic the community, the strategic target for intervention is no longer
transparency, it is now replication.
Phase one’s strategic specifications:
-

Strategic intervention target: replication
Point of intervention: transmission
Domain: competitors, consumers, media
Instrument(s): policing, threats of retaliation, educational campaigns
Intensity: will vary based on the brand name’s core centrality (closer to core = higher
intensity)
Temporality: the practitioner must act before the generic-brand-name-using-practice is
replicated outside of a speaker’s immediate social network

Given these specifications, the practitioner has the ability to: (choose one)
1. “Impede” the transmission of the new name-using-practice. If electing to impede, the
practitioner may choose to leverage instruments to discourage the replication of the
generic-brand-name-using-practice. Such instruments may include legal retaliation for
incorrect usage (compared to the original referential governance) and conducting
educational campaigns around the correct usage of brand name. The practitioner may
also choose to introduce an alternative, efficient name for the product category not
associated specifically with his/her product. Regardless of the instrument chosen, a cost
will be incurred.
2. “Enhance” the transmission of the new name-using-practice. To attempt to enhance the
transmission of the new-name-using-practice, the practitioner may choose to broadcast
the modified practice to the community, intentionally replicating the generic reference’s
usage. In an extreme show of support, the practitioner may also choose to abandon the
trademark’s legal registration to remove the threat of retaliation. This will encourage
competitors to use the generic name in a similar way.
3. “Maintain” the status quo. When the trademark owner is unaware of the impending risk
to their name, is unable to act, or is not motivated to act, no interventions are taken.
Under this strategy, the market controls the fate of the Brand Genericide process, not the
practitioner.
For a brand undergoing Brand Genericide, this phase is critical. At this point in the process, the
diffusion of the repurposed reference is likely contained within the direct communities of the
speakers who are using the generic-brand-name-using-practice. However, if the process if not
impeded here, the repurposed reference will soon begin to diffuse into the broader community
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through with weak ties to other networks. This will increase the number of replications, causing
a chain of reference-borrowing groundings that will be much more difficult to derail.
3.4.3 Strategies for Brand Genericide – Phase 2
By phase two, participating consumers in the generic-brand-name-using-practice may
emerge, along with an increased number of parasitic consumers in the same practice. Knowledge
of the revised referential governance model is being embedded into the societal norm through
re-grounding in a wider and wider network. This diffusion indicates that the target of strategic
intervention is still replication. However, the point of intervention is now in the application of the
new name-using-practice.
Phase two’s strategic specifications:
-

Strategic intervention target: replication
Point of intervention: application
Domain: competitors, consumers, media
Instrument(s): policing, threats of retaliation, educational campaigns
Intensity: the repurposed name-using-practice is diffusing & regrounding, so intensity is
higher than the intensity of phase one
Temporality: the practitioner must act before the generic-brand-name-using-practice
becomes the consuming public’s default practice for the brand name

Given these specifications, the practitioner has the ability to: (choose one)
1. “Impede” the application of the new name-using-practice. If electing to impede, the
practitioner may choose to leverage instruments to discourage the replication of the
generic-brand-name-using-practice. Such instruments may include legal retaliation for
incorrect usage (compared to the original referential governance) and conducting
educational campaigns around the correct usage of brand name. The practitioner may
also choose to introduce an alternative, efficient name for the product category not
associated specifically with his/her product. Regardless of the instrument chosen, a cost
will be incurred. The notable difference between the “impede” of phase two vs. phase
one is the intensity requirement. Because regrounding of the repurposed reference is
occurring, instruments used to deter the action need to be strong and severe.
2. “Enhance” the application of the new name-using-practice. To attempt to enhance the
transmission of the new-name-using-practice, the practitioner may choose to broadcast
the modified practice to the community, intentionally replicating the generic reference’s
usage. In an extreme show of support, the practitioner may also choose to abandon the
trademark’s legal registration to remove the threat of retaliation. This will encourage
competitors to use the generic name in a similar way.
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3. “Maintain” the status quo. When the trademark owner is unaware of the impending risk
to their name, is unable to act, or is not motivated to act, no interventions are taken.
Under this strategy, the market controls the fate of the Brand Genericide process, not the
practitioner.
The primary difference between the first and second phase of Brand Genericide is that knowledge
diffusion of the new name-using-practice is spreading wider and wider. As a result, a bigger
audience of speakers need to be dissuaded from using the generic-brand-name-using-practice,
which is inherently more difficult than in phase one and, likely, costlier.
3.4.4 Strategies for Brand Genericide – Phase 3
By phase three of Brand Genericide, the consuming public either only has knowledge of
the generic-brand-name-using-practice or, for those that also have knowledge of the original
referential governance, the assumption is that the generic practice is the default to-be-used in
communicative exchanges. Bearing this in mind, the target of the practitioner’s intervention again
returns to transparency. To alter the name-using-practice, the original proper-brand-name-usingpractice needs to be restored by helping the community to identify an opportunity for an even
more efficient product category reference. It is likely that the original trademark will be, or has
been, canceled or abandoned at this point.
Phase three’s strategic specifications:
-

Strategic intervention target: transparency
Point of intervention: identification
Domain: competitors, consumers, media
Instrument(s): educational campaigns
Intensity: the practitioner must reposition the original proper-brand-name-using-practice as
the default practice for the given name – this will take time and significant investment
Temporality: if the trademark hasn’t been revoked, it may be canceled soon

Given these specifications, the practitioner has the ability to: (choose one)
1. “Impede” the transmission of the proper-brand-name-using-practice. To attempt to
impede the transmission of the original, proper-name-using-practice, the practitioner
may elect to broadcast the modified practice to the community, intentionally replicating
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the generic reference’s usage. In a show of support, if the trademark still holds, the
practitioner may also choose to abandon it to ultimately remove any remaining threat of
retaliation. If this strategic action is selected, the practitioner has chosen to join the
consuming public in employing the generic-brand-name-using-practice.
2. “Enhance” the transmission of the proper-brand-name-using-practice. To influence the
public to reassess the now primary name-using-practice that references the product
category, the practitioner may choose to introduce an alternative, even more efficient
name for the product category that is not associated specifically with his/her product.
However, the proposed alternative will need to provide a significant utility gain to the
community to be accepted and diffused. One example where this strategy was
successfully executed was in the 1953 case of Singer Sewing Machines. Even though, in
1896, the brand name “Singer” was deemed to be a generic reference for the product
class of sewing machines, over 50 years later, in 1953, Singer was granted the right to
recall their brand name as a protected mark after “years” of marketing, which the Court
noted was “continuously and widely” executed (Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F. 2d 519 Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit 1953). The Court ruled that Singer Mfg. Co. had successfully
changed public perception of the mark and differentiated it from sewing machines. This
example, nonetheless, emphasizes the level of difficulty (and time needed) in reestablishing the prevalence of the proper-name-using-practice.
3. “Maintain” the status quo. When the trademark owner is unaware that Brand Genericide
is all but complete, unable to act, or not motivated to act, no interventions will be taken.
However, if the actor is aware, able to act, and motivated to do so, he/she may choose to
maintain the application of the now generic-brand-name-using-practice and focus instead
on referencing his/her specific product using an alternative form. For example, when
Thermos’s trademark came under pressure due to Brand Genericide, the organization
began to position its reference for the specific product using a distinctive logo. In doing
so, the brand equity of the brand would not be lost due to the dilution of the reference
in the open market.

Figure 4: Proposed Process of Brand Genericide with Strategic Interventions
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To offer a prescriptive recommendation on how to strategically intervene in the Brand
Genericide process, three areas were explored so far in this chapter: strategies for labeling
product categories, social learning, and information diffusion. Leveraging these literatures, a set
of strategic intervention targets, clear points of intervention, and alternative intervention
mechanisms were presented and applied to each phase of my Brand Genericide process (see
figure 4 for mapping).
3.4.5 Strategy Summary & the Need for Tracing Brand Genericide over Time
Recall from section 3.3.1 that product categories require a name and that this name is
bound by the same reference-referent relationship as any other reference. To ensure ease in
comprehension, Grodal et al. (2010) suggests using linguistic recombinations of descriptive words
to help the consumer to more easily understand the product category label. While this may
increase category recognition initially, it also positions the category’s reference as a referencefixing description, which is not always efficient – i.e. think “acetyl-salicylic acid-based drugs”
versus “aspirin”. However, for this name have its “default” reference be to the product category
and not to a specific product, the generic-name-using-practice needs to diffuse into the
community through a series of communicative exchanges that attempt to successfully transmit
the new referential governance.
To save a brand name from its potential Genericized fate, practitioners need to be able
to intervene in the Brand Genericide process based on their corporate strategy. To aid in this
cause, I leverage interventions in social learning, which relies on ideas from information diffusion.
The social learning cycle of creating and applying knowledge allows me to introduce two areas of
targeted intervention that the brand owner can choose to utilize: transparency and replication.
Within transparency, the practitioner has the ability to point their interventions at 1) the
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identification of opportunity/threats or 2) the understanding of the information. Within
replication, the practitioner can point their interventions at 1) the transmission of the repurposed
asset or 2) the application of the repurposed asset. The specific intervention mechanisms include:
impeding, enhancing, or maintaining. Only one mechanism is applied at a single time t.
Assuming the brand owner is aware of the impending Brand Genericide, able to act, and
motivated to act, the practitioner can elect to leverage the targets and mechanisms described in
this chapter as a perspective way to strategically intervene in each of the Brand Genericide stages
– including the initial labeling of the product category. If Brand Genericide completes (phase
three), strategic interventions are still available; however, an alternative course of action may be
to abandon the now generic brand name and attempt to use a different form of reference to
identify the specific product, such as a logo or novel color scheme.
The one gap that remains in this chapter is a way to know where a brand name is in the
Brand Genericide process, providing motivation for a need to trace the phenomenon over time.
To fill this gap, two aforementioned theories are required: 1) brand genericization (i.e. lexical
change) and 2) information diffusion theory. Clankie’s (1999) work highlights the reality that as
Brand Genericide progresses, the lexical components of the original Proper Adjective or Proper
Noun mutate to spawn a common noun (or verb). My methodology, which I present in section
3.5, relies on the assumption that as Brand Genericide progresses and the repurposed brand
name diffuses into expanding networks and communities, the common noun and verb occurrence
will increase (see figure 10). So, by monitoring the ratio of Proper Name usage to common name
usage, indicators of diffusion can be monitored over time.
To serve as way to measure part-of-speech change, I turn to Clankie, who highlights: “…
the subject [brand genericization] will likely be aided in great part by our ability to search the
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Internet for unmonitored usage activity and through being able to rapidly process increasingly
large amounts of data through corpora such as COCA…” (2013). In this excerpt, Clankie makes a
few notable points: 1) searching the Internet for usage activity (i.e. how names are used) can shine
light on brand genericization; 2) we have the ability to process data quickly; and 3) he mentions
Brigham Young’s Corpus of American Literature – a potential data source. My approach is detailed
in the following section, 3.5, leveraging two currently trademarked brand names: Onesie® and
Photoshop®.

Figure 5: Proposed Process of Brand Genericide with Part-of-Speech Indicators
3.5 Methodology for Tracing Brand Genericide over Time using Social Media
As reviewed in subsection 2.3.1, the first detailed account of linguistic change, as applied
specifically to brand names, is offered by Clankie (1999). In his Thesis (and later works), Clankie
orients his arguments around the idea of genericization as a “… process by which a brand name…
undergoes a series of grammatical and semantic changes to become a common class-noun
representative of the entire semantic class to which that product belongs” (1999). While my view
of Brand Genericide is that it is actually a side effect of the naming ceremony of a product class,
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made possible due to failed buffered counterfactual dependence, I do agree that as the
consuming public begins to more regularly use the generic-brand-name-using-practice, to align to
this change, language adjusts by creating a common form of the original brand name. To measure
this lexical change, I therefor leverage Clankie’s third hypothesis of brand genericization: “…
genericization is a regular hierarchical process” (1999). Through this process, a Proper Name (seen
as a Proper Noun or Proper Adjective) becomes a common name/noun. In written forms, the
move from a Proper Name to a common name is signified through majuscule loss – i.e. losing the
word’s capitalization. When it comes to identifying Proper vs common name usage in text,
capitalization is a key indication when context cannot be derived retroactively. Therefore, when
forming a sample data set to assess indicators of Brand Genericide, any observations collected
where the brand name appears at the beginning of a written communicative exchange is excluded
from the set. This is a needed exclusion given that the first letter in any English-language sentence
will default to a capital letter, making Proper vs. common indistinguishable to most, if not all,
automated part-of-speech taggers. This also applies to communicative exchanges were all words
are in UPPERCASE font or Title-Case font, which are both removed from the analysis due to our
inability to tag the words in these exchanges properly.
One potential limitation for systematically mining grammatical changes in a corpus of
communicative exchanges is the assumption that individuals are using English-based grammatical
rules correctly, capitalizing the word when it is a Proper Name. Particularly in social media, Tweets
are crafted without the help of a copy editor (a benefit that magazines, newspaper articles, and
the like enjoy regularly). Therefore, if some individual leaves a word decapitalized, it does not
automatically mean that he/she is not referring to the Proper Name’s referent; however,
regardless of intention, the lack of capitalization will have a resounding effect on what information
is diffused. For example, when a Tweet is presented in an individual’s direct network with a brand
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name that is not capitalized, the lack of capitalization sends 1 of 2 potential messages: 1) I am
using this name in a generic way; or 2) I am referring to the specific product, but I know that you
know that I intended that. While the Tweet may be understood within the speaker’s direct
community given shared knowledge between its members, if the lowercase-usage of the name is
later diffused into a broader community, assuming that the wider audience will know what the
speaker is referencing without the immediate group’s shared knowledge is a significant risk, which
could inadvertently trigger a perceptual confrontation in the greater community, resulting in
either the rejection of the lowercase-name-using-practice or the creation of a parasitic consumer
in the generic-name-using-practice. Therefore, while some individuals may not leverage
grammatical rules correctly, the presence of a lowercase, common name in the corpus is still
meaningful to the analysis.
In summary, the use of the lower-case name may inadvertently serve in destroying the
brand-name-using-practice’s original referential governance, even if the speaker’s intention was
not to diffuse the revised name-using-practice. Tying this back to Dickie’s referential governance
discussion, this example parallels her illustration of erroneous information that is introduced into
the name-using-practice. Here, the erroneous information is the decapitalization of the first letter
of the brand name. Following this logic, if a brand name experiences majuscule loss (for whatever
reason), it still serves as a warning indicator for potential Brand Genericide. Therefore, if the
majuscule loss increases over time, this indicates that the generic-name-using-practice is being
used, transmitting a new governance model that may become the default name-using-practice if
the knowledge of the new governance successfully diffuses into a large enough portion of the
community.
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To align brand genericization to Brand Genericide, I have included a part-of-speech layer
to the process I define in chapter 2 (see figure 5). When a trademarked brand name is used only
in the Proper-name-using-practice, the part-of-speech should be either a Proper Adjective or a
Proper Noun. In both cases, the name will have an upper-case first letter, which informs the
audience of the type of reference. So, even if you didn’t have knowledge of the given reference,
the capitalized first letter still allows you to interpret the reference as a Proper Name. By phase
one of Brand Genericide, assuming grammar is used properly, there is an increasing presence of
common name usage, signified by a lack of capitalization. Given phase one represents the
introduction of the generic-name-using-practice and the first emergence of parasitic consumers
in said practice, I assume that the Proper Name usage still outweighs the common name usage.
Therefore, to suggest that a brand name is in this phase, the Proper Name usage must be greater
than 0%, the common name usage must also be greater than 0%, and the Proper Name-tocommon name ratio needs to be greater than 1.00, signifying a higher proportion of proper name
usage. For example, if the Proper Name usage of the brand name is 51% and the common name
usage is 49%, then the resulting ratio of Proper-to-common usage is 1.04x.
As the generic-brand-name-using-practice and its associated referential governance
diffuses further into the greater community, phase two of Brand Genericide marks a shift in
measurement: the Proper Name-to-common name ratio is now less than 1.00. This warns the
practitioner that the common name is now more frequently used when compared to the original
Proper Name, regardless of speaker intention. If this phase is assigned, the practitioner faces an
increasing amount of urgency if his/her goal is to prevent Brand Genericide from completing.
Finally, if the observed part-of-speech becomes overwhelmingly common, practitioners
are advised to consider the strategies presented for the third phase of Brand Genericide. When I

118

say overwhelmingly common, I assume that the difference in the Proper-usage-to-common-usage
ratio will be 1) less than 0.20x and 2) statistically relevant (which is dependent on the sample size,
desired confidence level, and desired margin of error). I choose less than 0.20x, i.e. proper usage
is observed 1/5 as often as common usage, as a line in the sand to represent overwhelmingly
common, though this can certainly be further debated by researchers looking to build on this
topic. In summary, if the assumption is that there are N million Tweets per day submitted on the
Twitter platform containing the brand name in question, and a practitioner wants to be 95%
confident in his/her analysis with a 2% margin of error, the practitioner needs to sample at least
2,401 Tweets from each sample date to be statistically relevant (assuming N is a large population,


such as greater than one million Tweets). This is derived by calculating ݊ ൌ ܰ  כାேିଵ, where ܺ ൌ
ഀൗ మ ככሺଵିሻ
మ

ெைா మ

, ܼఈൗ is the critical value at the desired level of confidence, p is the expected
ଶ

proportion (with 50% being the most conservative estimate), and MOE is acceptable margin of
error (Dhand & Khatkar 2014). If the practitioner has the means to extract and pay for the full
population of Tweets contains his/her brand name, then the sample size estimation is no longer
needed.
I argue in chapter 2 that Brand Genericide is a side effect of the naming ceremony of a
product class, enabled by failed buffered counterfactual dependence. So, when measuring lexical
changes, the practitioner should also measure the part-of-speech usage of competing brands in
the impacted product category. This will serve as a bench mark and point-of-comparison for the
semantic usage of the brand. In other words, if the brand name emerges in the collected sample
with a statistically significantly higher common name usage compared to other competing brands,
there is clear motivation to act using the strategies illustrated in section 3.4 of this chapter.
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To illustrate how to use social media to trace Brand Genericide over time by looking at
the part-of-speech used in the communicative exchanges, I offer a procedure in section 3.5.1
using two example brand names: Onesie® and Photoshop®.
3.5.1 Sample Procedure
The following novel procedure demonstrates how practitioners can trace indicators of
Brand Genericide over time to know “when” to apply the strategic interventions proposed in
section 3.4 of this chapter. The steps include:
Step 1. Extract a sample dataset (or the full population) from a social media source, leveraging
multiple time periods for a given brand name (where the brand name is not the first word of a
sentence, is not used in all UPPERCASE font, and is not used in Title-Case font). Limit the dataset
to the English language (the practitioner may choose to broaden this based on the level of
inspection needed). Within each sample year, at least 2 dates should be selected to pick up on
any mid-year trending. Additionally, at least 5 years of data should be used (or more, based on
availability). To determine the sample size if the full population is not extracted, ensure it is
representative based on your population, desired confidence level, and an acceptable margin of
error. The practitioner should also consider geographical constraints where available.
Step 2. Classify the brand name’s part-of-speech in each observed communicative exchange using
a part-of-speech (POS) tagger. One example POS tagger is from the Stanford Natural Language
Processing Group (Manning et al. 2014), which has been cited over 3,000 times since its
publication in 2014. This POS tagger is available through several interfaces, including Python and
Java.
Step 3. Limit the results of the tagger to include Proper Name and common name results, filtered
to nouns and adjectives only. The tagger will look at every word in a corpus; however, the goal
here is to only look at what is relative to Brand Genericide.
Step 4. Leveraging the coding provided by the POS tagger, calculate the ratio of Proper Name-toCommon Name usage using this formula: “Proper Name % usage” divided by “common name %
usage”.
Step 5. Trend the ratio over the sampled time periods.
Step 6. Align the findings to the phases of Brand Genericide:
If the Proper Name usage > 0.0 and the common name usage = 0.0, then label as “Phase
Zero”. In this example, there are no indicators of Brand Genericide.
If the Proper Name-to-Common Name ratio > 1.0, the Proper Name usage > 0.0, and the
common name usage > 0.0, then label as “Phase One”. Test to ensure the proper name
usage is statistically greater than 50% based on a desired confidence level. For example,
with a sample of at least 1,000 observations, at the 95% confidence level, the proper
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name percentage would need to be greater than 54% for there to be evidence to suggest
the true population percentage is greater than 50%.
If the Proper Name-to-Common Name ratio < 1.0 and greater than 0.20, the Proper Name
usage > 0.0, and the common name usage > 0.0, then label as “Phase Two”. The
difference between the Proper and common usage percentages must be statistically
significant, given a desired confidence level. This signifies that the common name usage
is beginning to overtake the Proper name usage, though it has not yet become
overwhelmingly common.
If the Proper Name-to-Common Name ratio < 0.20 and the common name usage > 0.0,
then label as “Phase Three”. The difference between the Proper and common usage
percentages must be statistically significant, given a desired confidence level. This
signifies that the name usage is now overwhelmingly common. Note that the requirement
for Proper name usage to be present is no longer required.
Step 7. Repeat analysis for other brand names in the product class. This will provide a class
baseline for comparison. ** Due to limited funding, this step is not included in the sample analysis
that follows.
Step 8. Repeat as new time period become available for analysis, noting the date on which any
strategic interventions were conducted.
3.5.2 Sample Data Collection
To extract indicators of brand name usage in communicative exchanges, there are two
forms of digitized data to consider: formal and informal. For example, Clankie (2013) suggests
COCA as a potential data source for monitoring usage. COCA – officially known as the Corpus of
Contemporary American English – is a digitized corpus of the English language derived from
transcripts, fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, and academic journals. In total, COCA
includes roughly 20 million words per year from 1990-2017 – a total of over 560 million words.
COCA also includes part-of-speech tagging, performed by Brigham Young University (Davies
2008). However, there are two reasons why this corpus does not help in the quest of measuring
indications of Brand Genericide over time: 1) the corpus relies on published works, which most
likely have been edited for potential trademark dilution (i.e. published content is more likely to
be policed by trademark owners and lawyers for incorrect usage); and 2) the corpus doesn’t
capture how language is used in an everyday way by the public. Instead, the ideal dataset for a
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practitioner looking to trace Brand Genericide over time is one that resembles spoken language
and is not likely to have been formally reviewed for incorrect usage.
Therefore, as an alternative to COCA, I propose the use of Twitter, a microblogging service
that allows users to share messages of 280 characters or less, to conduct the analysis given how
this source is rich in how language is used in everyday life. According to Statista
(https:\www.statista.com\), the number of monthly active Twitter users has grown from 30
million in Twitters first fiscal quarter of 2010 to 330 million in their third fiscal quarter of 2017. In
fact, the average number of active numbers per month has been over 300 million since the
beginning of 2015 and over 200 million since the beginning of 2013. In the US, the average number
of monthly users in Twitter’s third fiscal quarter of 2017 was roughly 68 million (about 21% of the
US population). Additionally, in 2014, Twitter conducted a study in partnership with The
Advertising Research Foundation, FOX, and DB5 to analyze brand exposure in Tweets (Orban
2014). Of the 12,000-people studied in their representative sample (accounted for age, gender,
and device), 80% mentioned a brand name at least one time in the seven-month study period
(September 2013 – March 2014) with over 50% of the sample mentioning a brand name at least
15 times. Finally, researchers, such as Zappavigna (2011), have leveraged Twitter due to its ability
to show language development in a social context and its ability to make conversation searchable.
In summary, with a growing base of Twitter active users mentioning brand names at least twice a
month, on average, I trace indicators of Brand Genericide in this Thesis using this source of
searchable, time-stamped Tweets.
When it comes to building a sample dataset, I leverage Twitter’s official search API.
Practitioners have three options in accessing this service: 1) standard free access that will return
a 1% random sample of the full API for up to 7 days of history; 2) premium paid access that will
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return a full data pull for the last 30 days; or 3) premium paid access for the full Twitter archive
back to 2006. Tweets can be retrieved from the premium levels at a rate of 500 Tweets per request
and 60 requests per minute, which can be done through a coding language such as Python using
the “Search Tweets” library (accessible at https://twitterdev.github.io/search-tweets-python/#).
Premium access is made available through Twitter’s enterprise API service. The premium APIs
were launched in November of 2017. The paid subscriptions are available on a month-to-month
basis or through an enterprise contract. For the purposes of this example analysis, I purchased
one month of premium, full-archive access, which gave me a pool of 1,000 API requests to work
with. In total, I collected 295,649 Tweets that contained at least one instance of “photoshop” or
“onesie” in their text (case insensitive).
In my sample, I leverage the Twitter Premium API to collect Tweets across 18-time periods
from June of 2010 to December of 2018, with a max of 10,000 Tweets per time-period per brand
name (see table 1 for a list of time periods and Tweet counts). Each period is queried twice, once
for each example brand name using the API’s keyword search feature, which is not case sensitive.
Each query is set up to extract the last 10,000 Tweets from the target month (from newest-tooldest) with the added requirement that the Tweet is in English – a native feature in the Search
Tweets Python wrapper. In the initial pull from Twitter, I also immediately exclude:
1. Retweets.
2. Any Tweets published from a user with “photoshop”, “Adobe”, “onesie”, or “Gerber”
in the username.
This leaves me with the initial sample counts in the column “Tweets” in table 1. Retweets are
removed to ensure the analysis only looks at novel communicative exchanges where the
published text is original. Tweets are also deleted when published by users that may be associated
with the specific product. This ensures that the Tweets are not from producers that know the
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product as the brand name. Once collected, additional steps are taken to remove noise from the
sample dataset, including:
1. Removing all special symbols and characters, such as punctuation, hashtags, URLs,
extra line breaks, and anything double-byte.
2. Deleting duplicate Tweets (assessed with a composite key of user id + text + time
period).
3. Deleting Tweets in UPPERCASE font or Title-Case font.
The results of the clean-up activity are seen in column “Tweets for Analysis” in table 1.
Special symbols and characters are removed given most POS taggers, including the Stanford
tagger used in this chapter, do not require them for processing. Duplicate Tweets are also
removed to ensure each unique communicative exchange enters the analysis only once in the
given time period for the specific brand name in question. Finally, Tweets in UPPERCASE font or
Title-Case font are deleted because we cannot assess proper-versus-common usage in these
scenarios. An example of the cleaned Twitter text can be seen table 2. In the next subsection,
3.5.3, each cleaned Tweet goes through the Stanford POS tagger, illustrating how “Photoshop”
and “Onesie” are grammatically used throughout each sample.

Table 1: Sample Brand Genericide Tracing Statistics for “Photoshop” and “Onesie”
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Table 2: Cleaned Sample Tweets from June 2018
3.5.3 Sample Part-of-Speech Tagging
Using the sample data described in subsection 3.5.2, a traditional POS tagger is used,
which has been cited over 3,000 times since the public release of the tool’s first version in 2010.
This tagger is called the Stanford CoreNLP toolkit (Manning et al. 2014). This POS tagger provides
the user with the ability to: tokenize, strip xml from the sample text, identify words that have
truth issues (such as words in all UPPERCASE), assign POS, derive the base form of all tokens (i.e.
“Googling” Æ “Google”), assign gender roles where appropriate, and recognize names among
other features (2014). I use this tagger to determine the part-of-speech in this sample analysis for
each word in the sample Tweet dataset.
To illustrate how the tagger works, consider the example, “Someone please use
photoshop to turn Johnny into Ronald McDonald”. The tagger begins by tokenizing the text, which
segments each lexical unit as a component of a list. Once tokenized, the tagger assigns part-ofspeech to each individual element of said list. The result is seen in figure 6. In this example,
“photoshop” is used as a common noun, denoted by the code “NN”. For a full listing of the Penn
Treebank

POS

tags

produced

by

this

model,

please

https://www.ling.upenn.edu/courses/Fall_2003/ling001/penn_treebank_pos.html.
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Figure 6: POS Example Using the Stanford Core NLP Tagger
Once the “Onesie” and “Python” sample datasets are tagged, the last step before analysis
is to extract the common name and Proper Name codes. In this example analysis, I limit my
extraction to nouns specifically. “NN” and “NNS” represent singular and plural common nouns.
“NNP” and “NNPS” represent singular and plural Proper Nouns. In total, the sample “Onesie”
dataset consists of 109,489 tagged instances of “Onesie” used as a noun, and the sample
“Photoshop” dataset consists of 108,985 tagged instances of “Photoshop” used as a noun. An
example of this result is shown in table 3. Using this tagged keyword dataset, the next step is to
compute the Proper-to-common name ratios for each sample period.

Table 3: POS Example from “Onesie” Tweets where NN = common noun and NNP = Proper Noun
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3.5.4 Ratio Creation, Trending, and Strategic Intervention
So far in this sample analysis, 1) a sample Tweet dataset has been extracted across 18time periods based on a keyword search for two targeted brand names (“Onesie” and
“Photoshop”), and 2) the brand name’s part of speech has been tagged in each Tweet, highlighting
whether the brand name was used as a Proper Noun or common noun. For this analysis, roughly
110,000 examples have been collected for each respective brand name. The next steps in the
analysis are to: 1) calculate the ratio of Proper-vs-common usage and 2) trend this ratio over time.
Using the ratio and the criteria outlined in step 6 of the example procedure of subsection 3.5.1,
the phases of Brand Genericide are then mapped.

Figure 7: Proper Name Usage for “Onesie” and “Photoshop” Across 18 Sample Time Periods
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Figure 7 illustrates the Proper Name usage for both sample brand names over 18 sample
time periods from 2010 to 2018. For Onesie®, the there are two notable observations: 1) the
series is relatively stable between 0-20%, suggesting that the usage in the greater Englishspeaking community is not rapidly changing; and 2) the lower valleys in the series correspond with
December, which could align to holiday shopping and the winter months (i.e. when a consumer
may be more likely to come across the need to use “onesie” in a communicative exchange). For
Photoshop®, the series appears to be downward trending with a 26-percentage point drop in
Proper Name usage from June of 2010 to December 2018, sounding an alarm to the Photoshop®
trademark owners.

Figure 8: Proper-to-Common Name Ratio for “Onesie” and “Photoshop” (18 Sample Periods)
(Yellow = Indications of Brand Genericide (BG)’s Phase 2; Red = Indications of BG’s Phase 3)
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The final step is to calculate the Proper-to-common name ratio in order to map in the
Brand Genericide phases, along with each phase’s accompanying strategic interventions. The
results are visualized in figure 8. To interpret this output, consider this example: in June of 2010,
across nearly 6,000 sampled instances where “Photoshop” is used as a noun in a Tweet, Proper
Name usage is observed 2.27x as often as common name usage. Leveraging the criteria from step
6 in the sample procedure of subsection 3.5.1, the Proper-to-common name ratio is > 1.00;
therefore, in June of 2010, Photoshop® exhibited symptoms of the first phase of Brand Genericide.
In fact, of the 18 time periods where the keyword, “Photoshop”, is sampled in this analysis, 13
shows symptoms of the first phase of Brand Genericide, while 5 display the more severe
symptoms of Brand Genericide’s second phase: a Proper-to-Common Name Ratio under 1.00x.
Stepping back, this historical trace of “Photoshop” usage in English Tweets informs us that the
warning indicators of Brand Genericide were visible for, at least, the last 9 years. Based on when
a practitioner chooses to act, if ever, he/she should use the strategies aligned to the most recent
symptoms that the brand is exhibiting.
Based on the most recent usage results for “Photoshop” in December of 2018, Proper
Name usage was observed 0.76x as often as the common name form (i.e. the common name form
of “photoshop” was observed 1.32x as often as the Proper Name form). With a sample of 5,622
nouns from 6,233 available sample Tweets, it can be assumed, due to the large sample size, that
this difference is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Given the Proper-to-common
name ratio is below 1.00, but above 0.2, the symptoms indicate Photoshop® is currently in the
second phase of Brand Genericide. Looking back as subsection 3.4.3, phase two’s strategic
specifications are:
o
o

Strategic intervention target: replication
Point of intervention: application
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o
o
o
o

Domain: competitors, consumers, media
Instrument(s): policing, threats of retaliation, educational campaigns
Intensity: the repurposed name-using-practice is diffusing & regrounding, so intensity is
higher than the intensity of phase one
Temporality: the practitioner must act before the generic-photoshop-name-usingpractice becomes the consuming public’s default practice for the “Photoshop” brand
name

Noting these specifications, a practitioner from Adobe (or a hired marketing practitioner) should
act upon the strategy that best aligns with the Adobe company vision:
1. “Impede” the application of the generic-photoshop-name-using-practice. If electing to
impede, the practitioner may choose to leverage instruments to discourage the
replication of the generic-photoshop-name-using-practice. Such instruments may include
a ramp up in legal retaliation for incorrect usage and deploying a large effort around
educational campaigns that emphasize the correct usage of Photoshop®. If Adobe wants
to truly stop the Genericide process, they should explore introducing an alternative,
efficient name for the product category of photo-editing software that is not associated
specifically with their specific product. Regardless of the instrument chosen, a cost will be
incurred due to the intensity required to combat the generic usage. Because regrounding
of the repurposed reference is already occurring (and represents more than half of the
usage in the observed sample), the instruments used to deter the usage of the genericname-using-practice need to be strong and severe.
2. “Enhance” the application of the generic-photoshop-name-using-practice. To attempt
to enhance the transmission of the generic-photoshop-name-using-practice, the
practitioner may choose to broadcast the generic usage of “photoshop” to the
community, intentionally replicating it. In an extreme show of support, Adobe may also
choose to abandon their trademark’s legal registration to remove any threat of
retaliation.
3. “Maintain” the status quo. If Adobe never reads this Thesis and is completely unaware
of the impending risk to their brand name, if Adobe is unable to act, or if Adobe is not
motivated to act, no interventions need be taken. Under this strategy, the market controls
the fate of the Brand Genericide process, not Adobe.
Continuing in the analysis, Gerber’s trademarked brand name, Onesie®, exemplifies a gloomy
prognosis. In the December 2018 sample set for “Onesie”, which includes 6,088 English examples
of “Onesie” as a noun, the Proper-to-Common name ratio is below 0.20x, meaning that “onesie”,
the common name form, is used 15.3x more often than the Proper Name form. Without debate
(and based on this data source), in December of 2018, Onesie® exhibited severe symptoms of
Brand Genericide, indicating a strong alignment to phase three. In fact, across the 18 sampled
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time periods, 17 show signs of phase three. This is also seen in figure 8 – all observations are in
the red zone. Looking back as subsection 3.4.3, phase three’s strategic specifications are:
o
o
o
o
o
o

Strategic intervention target: transparency
Point of intervention: identification
Domain: competitors, consumers, media
Instrument(s): educational campaigns
Intensity: Gerber, or a hired practitioner, must reposition the original proper-Onesiename-using-practice as the default practice for the name, “Onesie” – this will take time
and ample investment
Temporality: given Gerber’s trademark on Onesie still is active today, Gerber should
prepare for the worst; trademark revocation soon is highly likely without significant
intervention

Noting these specifications, a practitioner from Gerber (or a hired marketing practitioner) should
act upon the strategy that best aligns with the Gerber company vision:
1. “Impede” the transmission of the original, proper-Onesie-name-using-practice. To
attempt to impede the transmission of the original, proper-name-using-practice of
“Onesie”, Gerber may elect to broadcast the generic practice to the community,
intentionally replicating it. In a show of support, Gerber will choose to abandon the
trademark in order to remove any remaining threat of retaliation. If this strategic action
is selected, Gerber has chosen to join the consuming public in employing the genericonesie-name-using-practice.
2. “Enhance” the transmission of the original, proper-Onesie -name-using-practice. To
influence the public to reassess the now primary name-using-practice that references the
baby jumpsuit product category, Gerber may choose to introduce an alternative, even
more efficient name for the product category not associated specifically with their
product. However, the proposed alternative will need to provide a significant utility gain
to the community to be accepted and diffused. Instruments to accomplish this task may
include: well-funded educational campaigns, increased policing of incorrect usage, and a
newly created jingle to facilitate knowledge diffusion of the original referential
governance.
3. “Maintain” the status quo. If Gerber never reads this Thesis and is completely unaware
of the impending risk to their trademark, if Gerber is unable to act, or if Gerber is not
motivated to act, no interventions need be taken. However, if the Gerber is aware, able
to act, and motivated to do so, they may choose to maintain the application of the now
generic-onesie-name-using-practice and focus instead on referencing their specific
jumpsuit using an alternative form, such as a design, distinctive logo, or custom
packaging. In doing so, the brand equity of the “Onesie” brand will not be lost due to the
dilution of the reference in the open market.
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Given the consistent generic usage of “onesie” on Twitter over the last 9 years, Gerber’s
trademark appears primed for revocation. While the goal of this Thesis is not to provide
justification on which to build a legal suit, the intention is to highlight what strategies a company,
such as Gerber, can take to reclaim the primary significance of their mark. For Gerber, hope is not
yet lost. As previously illustrated in this Thesis, two companies have come back from the advanced
stages of Brand Genericide: Singer Sewing Machines and Xerox Branded Copiers. In both
instances, the practitioners were able to reemphasize the original referential governance model
by introducing a more efficient product class name: Singer offered “sewing machine” and Xerox
offered “copier”. Eventually, the consuming public adopted the new name-using-practices and
subsequently returned to the original Proper-brand-name-using-practices from the archives of
their mental filing systems.
This section is intended to serve as a strategic guide for trademark owners of brand names
that are at risk of Brand Genericide. Leveraging social media data, freely available part-of-speech
taggers, and basic statistics in R, Python, or any other mathematical tool, it is possible to extract,
assess, assign, and act before your brand name becomes the next victim of Brand Genericide.
3.6 Conclusion & Future Research
By using the theory formulated and operationalized in chapter 2, this chapter leverages
quantitative methods to 1) extract indicators of Brand Genericide from social media (e.g. Twitter),
2) tag the relevant Tweets with their part-of-speech (using the Stanford NLTK), 3) assign the
symptoms to the different phases of Brand Genericide, and 4) provide strategic interventions at
each stage to enhance, impede, or maintain the product class’s ceremonial process. In completing
these four tasks, this chapter progresses this Thesis’s agenda by answering the question of “when”
to strategically act with regards to Brand Genericide. It also details “how” to strategically act in a
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detailed review of how social learning and information diffusion theories can be mashed together
to drive change (if the practitioner so desires).
In this chapter, there are four limitations in the sample analysis of Onesie® and
Photoshop®. First, the sample sets are not completely random. Using Twitter’s premium API, I
extracted Tweets from 18-time periods; however, I only took the last 10,000 Tweets of the given
month (sequentially based on the Tweet’s date of publishing). With the Enterprise subscription,
the Twitter API includes a randomization feature, which solves this limitation (noting, of course,
that access to the Enterprise API subscription is beyond the funding of this Thesis). The
practitioner, such as Adobe or Gerber, may also choose to extract all Tweets that include their
brand names, thus removing the need to sample all together.
Second, while Twitter provides a wealth of unspoiled consumer content with over 200
thousand new Tweets per minute, part-of-speech (POS) tagging of this micro-blog data is plagued
by noise, linguistic errors, and bad grammar (Owoputi et al. 2012; Derczynski et al. 2013). Some
of the reasons for these difficulties include: “short messages; inclusion of URIs; username
mentions; topic markers; and threaded conversations” (2013). For these reasons, traditional POS
taggers trained on datasets composed of non-micro blog text may face limitations in tagging
Tweets. Having said that, there are two reasons this may not impact the analysis in this chapter:
1) a capitalized first letter is the primary driver of common and Proper noun identification in
taggers; and 2) several data cleansing methods were leveraged in this analysis (see subsection
3.5.2). Therefore, in the case of tracing Brand Genericide, there is likely little noise from this
limitation. However, as an opportunity for future research, a Twitter-relevant POS tagger, such
the one presented by Derczynski et al. (2013), can be used to confirm the Onesie® and Photoshop®
results. Additionally, it is also important to note that some auto-correct features on mobile
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devices and word processors automatically change the first letter of specific names to an
UPPERCASE letter. For example, the iOS operating system currently updates uber to UBER. This
presents a limitation for tracing Brand Genericide for some brands even when the name is being
used generically. For the example in this chapter, both “onesie” and “photoshop” are not (yet)
autocorrected by iOS, Android, or Windows operating systems.
Third, the collected Tweets in this chapter’s sample analysis are not constrained to the
United States. While I do require the Tweets to be in English, the geo-tagging feature in Twitter
was not enabled until March of 2010 and is still only an opt-in feature with limited adoption. The
Twitter Premium API and Enterprise service both offer the ability to filter by location – but the
limitations above will reduce the amount of data returned. As an alternative, many researchers
rely on the user’s location, which is often provided in the user profile and is available in the
extracted Tweet object when using the Search Tweets Python wrapper. Practitioners may wish to
include this additional data element to their analyses if they are aiming to analyze Tweets by
geographic location.
Finally, this chapter relies on one source, Twitter, to identify symptoms of Brand
Genericide. While this certainly can highlight tangible evidence of Brand Genericide (as seen in
this channel), practitioners should be warned that their brand may still be infected by the
phenomenon even if the Twitter analysis turns up minimal results. For example, if your brand
name is not something that is often communicated through Tweets, such as talking about an
escalator (a fully Genericized brand name), there may be minimal Tweets to extract that employ
the Proper or generic-name-using-practices. In such cases, other sources should be explored –
such as consumer surveys or other micro-blogging sites.
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With regards to future research, there is a need to further explore the role of computer
mediated discourse as it relates to Brand Genericide. Looking at Brand Genericide over the last
century, there are two phases that can be seen in its evolution: BCMC and ACMC – i.e. “before
computer mediated communication” and “after computer mediated communication”. Thinking
back to the process of Brand Genericide prior to the dawn of computer mediated communication
(CMC), the naming ceremony of a product category progressed due to a natural need for a utility
gain. However, this natural need was in no way forced. Then, once the given reference was
repurposed to gain some form of utility, the innovation would spread through spoken
conversation and formal written texts, often taking decades to fully disperse to the public. On the
other hand, when computer mediated discourse entered the picture in the mid to late 1980s and
exploded with popularity in the 1990’s due to the high adoption rate of the internet, new powers
came to be, which force nature’s hand in language development. The issue is that the usability
and interface properties of CMC have injected a new form of utility gain into the scenario: fitting
your computer mediated message within the physical and psychological constraints of the ICT
medium you are using (i.e. text/character limits and the need to communicate through
technology at the speed of communication). These unnatural constraints on language force
individuals to make a choice: conform or change communication method. As a result, the naming
ceremony of the product class takes on a new sense of urgency – an urgency that can literally
speed up the Brand Genericide process.
Additionally, an opportunity for future research exists with how diverse cultural factors
and languages impact Brand Genericide, its process, and the resulting strategies. In this chapter,
the scope is limited English. It is also bounded by the Trademark Laws of the United States. By
altering the language, the culture, or the Law, there needs to be research done to understand
how this Thesis generalizes. Second, future research should look to predict when the various
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stages of Brand Genericide will occur – something that could be examined potentially using a time
series or hazard model approach. By having a prediction of when the different phases will occur,
it will better enable practitioners to plan out the timelines of their strategic interventions. By
knowing the time frames, practitioners may be able to balance an intervention agenda that
promotes Brand Genericide at one point and looks to stop it at another.
In summary, what these perspectives for future research highlight is that this chapter is
just the beginning of a research agenda. For example, by knowing when and how to act,
researchers and practitioners can also look at what worked and what did not. In other words,
assuming a company intervenes after 2006 (when Twitter launched), a future paper should look
at how field configuring events (including strategic intervention) reflect in the subsequent use of
the name in Tweets. If done correctly, this will to provide an experimental analysis that can help
to identify success and failure of strategic interventions, expanding the research to a whole new
level of prescription.
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Chapter 4: Towards Strategic “Jingle” Success: Profiling Jingles in an Effort to Effectively &
Efficiently Build Knowledge of a Brand’s Reference
4.1 Introduction

Figure 9: Jingle Features Extracted from MATLAB Software
The musical features of two auto-dealer jingles are depicted in figure 9. In the top two
charts, the audio waveform of the 30 second sound bursts display two seemingly different
patterns, with “jingle 2” taking roughly 10 seconds to build up to a consistent form. Then, in the
bottom two charts, chromograms are displayed, showing the magnitude of the pitch classes
present into each jingle. Again, based on visual cues, the jingles appear to be different.
As a marketer, successful jingles can be used for three primary objectives: the first is the
ability to evocate a brand during brand choice – ensuring the brand is at least present in a
consumer’s choice set. Second, jingles can be used to influence brand consideration, assuming
the brand has been evoked into the choice set. Third, and perhaps not as obvious, a jingle can
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work to impede Brand Genericide – the topic of chapters 2 and 3 – by ensuring the public has
established easily accessible knowledge of the brand’s original reference. So, at a 10,000-foot
view, jingles serve as an instrument to diffuse information to a broad audience. This information
can be the knowledge of a reference, or perhaps potential associations that marketers hope to
establish. Jingles are everywhere: on the radio, embedded in commercials, and broadcasted
through internet advertisements. Stepping back for a moment, did you ever learn about a product
or service through a jingle? Did you ever get a jingle stuck in your head? My bet is yes to both.
With this in mind, the focus turns to what establishes failure or success of a jingle; after all, not
all jingles we are exposed to accomplish the tasks they set out to achieve.
By defining the purpose of jingle, defining success, breaking down the dimensions of a
jingle, understanding the role of exposure, and extracting features, we can theoretically uncover
a profile for a “successful” jingle that strategically is designed to enhance familiarity by speeding
up the consumer learning curve. To do so, I extract underlying musical, semantic, and phonetic
jingle features (such as those displayed in figure 9) to deploy an enhanced clustering method that
provides the sought-after profiles, allowing me to conduct a future study to determine if any
profiles drive enhanced familiarity.
4.2 Theoretical Development
Building on the general method of theory-building presented in chapter 2 (Lynham 2000;
2002), this chapter builds on the application phase, by exploring an instrument that can be used
to impede Brand Genericide (as described in section 3.5.4). To accomplish this task, a marketer
can either offer the community an alternative, efficient name for the product class, or, the
marketer can attempt to leverage knowledge campaigns to ensure the public knows that the given
brand name references the specific product and not the class. While this chapter does not yet
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offer a jingle formula to best impede Brand Genericide, it does establish a jingle as an available
instrument that can be used in a knowledge campaign to diffuse and build knowledge of the
original-name-using-practice.
In this chapter, I contribute to both the marketing and music analytics literatures by 1)
establishing an application of an enhanced clustering method of jingles; 2) quantitatively profiling
jingles across three dimensions (phonetic, semantic, and musical); and 3) offering a research
agenda that will attempt to provide evidence on which features drive familiarity with limited
exposure – a finding that will greatly impact the marketing practitioner community. With the
jingle clusters derived, this enables me, as well as other researchers, to plan for future
experiment(s) to determine whether certain levels of exposure to varying jingle profiles enhance
knowledge of brand’s reference/referent relationship, as measured through familiarity.
4.3 Literature Review & Initial Discussion
4.3.1 Brand Choice & Familiarity
Princeton University Professor, Philip Johnson-Laird, once wrote on the psychology of
reasoning: “in order to decide, judge; in order to judge, reason; in order to reason, decide (what
to reason about).” In this quote, Johnson-Laird emphasizes three actions: to judge, to reason, and
to decide. In marketing, brand choice relies on a similar set of psychological events. In choosing a
brand, consumer choice relies on two stages: brand consideration and brand evaluation
(Nedungadi 1990). Tying this back to Johnson-Laird’s famous line, in order to decide what to
reason about, a brand must be in a consumer’s “choice set” – meaning that the brand is “primed”
(1990). Then, to reason, the consumer relies on brand associations established in their memory
(Keller 1993; Nedungadi 1990). Based on these reasons, the consumer judges the sufficiency of
each brand choice through brand evaluation – a set of decision rules that drive his/her choice
(1990; 1993). These associations are driven by a “brand’s schema”, which forms a “hierarchical
139

network of associations to the brand” (1993). Finally, the consumer decides on which brand to
purchase. This notion of a choice set allows the decision process to kick off, and it is with this
initiation that I focus this discussion.
A consumer choice set is as straightforward as it sounds – it is the set of brands a
consumer chooses between when making a brand choice (such as for a purchase decision).
Another name for the choice set is the consideration set – emphasizing that consumers consider
brands that are within a specific set when making a decision. To be in a consideration set, the
brand must be accessible to the consumer (1990). To be accessible, Nedungadi describes
influencing factors: 1) strength of the brand’s activation (based on “frequency, recency, and
salience”); 2) strength of the associations formed between the brand and other features; and 3)
priming (a cue from the consumer environment that activates the brand) (1990). However, of the
three factors, without priming, the brand will never enter the choice set.
Priming is the “probability of retrieving brand i in the subcategory I, given an external
prime j” (Nedungadi 1990). This probability can be expressed through the equation:
ܲሺ݅ȁ݆ሻ ൌ ܲሺܫȁ݆ሻ  ൈ ܲሺ݅ȁܫሻ
(Nedungadi 1990)
In this formulaic expression, ܲሺܫȁ݆ሻ represents “the probability of retrieving subcategory I when j
is primed” and ܲሺ݅ȁܫሻ represents “the probability of retrieving brand i, given that subcategory I is
retrieved” (1990). Accordingly, if the consumer has no knowledge of the brand’s
reference/referent, then ܲሺ݅ȁܫሻ is zero, meaning that the brand does not enter the consumer’s
consideration set. For this reason, the knowledge of the reference/referent relationship for a
particular brand becomes a critical assumption of brand choice. Here, “brand knowledge is brand
awareness” (Keller 1993).
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To create this knowledge and increase the likelihood of priming, Keller suggests the
development of supporting marketing programs (1993). These programs are often crafted to
“enhance brand awareness and establish strong, and unique brand associations in memory”
(1993). This awareness is related to brand familiarity – a construct that encourages consumer
confidence for a particular brand and also influences consumer attitudes (Holden & Vanhuele
1999; Keller 1993; Huron 1989). According to Alba & Huchinson (1987), brand familiarity is a
continuous measure of a consumer’s “level of direct and indirect experience with a product”
(cited in Kent & Allen 1994). Laroche et al. (1996) describes this confidence as a function of brand
familiarity. Therefore, with confidence being one of the reasons for judgment (Bennet & Harrell
1975; Howard & Sheth 1969), increased familiarity with a specific brand becomes a sought-after
element to encourage brand choice (Huron 1989; Park & Lessig 1981).
Confidence gives the consumer a belief that their “evaluative judgement of the brand is
correct” (Laroche et al. 1996; Howard 1989). It ultimately serves as one of two roles: knowledge
confidence or choice confidence (Laroche et al. 1996; Urbany et al. 1989). Knowledge confidence
reflects the consumer’s certainty around what is known about the brand. Choice confidence is the
consumer’s certainty around which brand to finally purchase (1996). Bringing this full circle, if
familiarity of the brand’s reference/referent relationship is non-existent (i.e. the
reference/referent relationship is not yet known), there is no awareness that brand X and product
category Y are connected, meaning that the brand cannot be primed, and the brand cannot
intentionally be considered in the choice set. This motivates a need for research that looks more
closely at the impact of brands being “known” (Holden & Vanhuele 1999 indirectly touch on this
as they look to understand experiment results where students were found to be guessing). From
what this review begins to expose, knowledge of a brand name’s reference to a specific product
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from a specific source is not just important for its ability to deter Brand Genericide, it is critical to
enable brand choice in a consumer buying decision.
Levels of familiarity are described in three buckets: 1) low; 2) moderate; and 3) high (Park
& Lessig 1981). Under low familiarity, a consumer has little knowledge regarding the features or
dimensions of the brand, resulting in a limited ability to assess the utility of said brand. As
familiarity strengthens, consumers with moderate familiarity gain knowledge of “relevant and
needed product information”, though still limited with fragmented salience. Finally, under high
familiarity, the consumer experiences near-to-complete knowledge regarding the features or
dimensions of the brand (1981). However, for a brand to be merely primed for consideration, only
a low level of familiarity is required. Granted, if other brands in the consideration set have higher
levels of familiarity, those with limited or lesser familiarity will have a more challenging time being
chosen.
Tying this back to Evans and Dickie’s theories of name-using-practices and referential
governance as discussed in Chapter 2, the levels of familiarity described above appear to mirror
the three types of consumer: parasitic, participating, and producer. When an individual becomes
a parasitic consumer in a brand-name-using-practice, the individual does not yet have an
established mental file on the particular product but will create a shell if his/her intention is to
mimic the practice as it was communicated to him/her. As with low familiarity, the consumer has
some exposure to how the name is used, but he/she knows little-to-nothing about the product
(i.e. referent). As a participating consumer in the name-using-practice, a mental file is both
created and expanded upon, filling it with reference-fixing information. This, in turn, follows the
moderate familiarity path: the consumer does not know everything there is to know about the
product, but he/she does have some content in their mental file. Finally, to achieve the highest
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level of familiarity, the consumer needs to know everything (or close to everything) about the
given product. This also appears to parallel the producer status, which is that of an individual (or
group of individuals) that knows the product as the name. With regards to branding, the producer
of the original name-using-practice is often the trademark owner, who would, in theory, also
know everything there is to know about the product. Stepping back, I draw these parallels to
emphasize that the entirety of this Thesis focuses on building knowledge of a brand and its
referent, which requires diffusion into the greater community to ensure survival – whether that
be survival of the brand name or survival of the product in a purchasing decision.
With brand choice and familiarity described, it is critical to differentiate the underlying
mechanisms of Nedungadi’s two stages of brand choice, evocation and evaluation. Under brand
evocation, the minimum requirement for a brand to emerge in a consumer’s choice set is some
level of knowledge of the given brand’s reference/referent relationship – i.e. the consumer needs
to know a product’s name and that the product, itself, exists. To evoke a brand, the consumer, for
example, needs to know that the reference of Mattress Discounters® refers to the referent of a
specific franchise of stores that sell mattresses. By forming, at least, a base level of knowledge of
the reference and its referent, the consumer gains familiarity as a parasitic consumer. However,
upon this anchor, associations can be formed that allow for a more strategic evaluation of the
brand in question by creating and filling a mental file on the product over time.
In the stage of brand choice, brand evaluation is driven by associates that relate features
or qualities with the product, anchored by the brand reference. Unlike evocation, which relies on
reference, evaluation assumes that there is knowledge of the reference/referent relationship and
attempts to build associations upon it. So, using the aforementioned example, the goal is to
associate Mattress Discounters® with features, such as quality, cheap, and convenient. These
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associations, once formed, exist in the mind, not in the world, meaning that there is no truth in
the relationship outside of the consumer’s beliefs. Accordingly, this underlying mechanism differs
greatly from the mechanism of reference relied upon in evocation. Associations can be further
understood through associative learning, a theory that “… amounts to a constellation of related
views that interprets learning as associating stimuli with responses… or stimuli with other stimuli”
(Mandelbaum 2015). Through associative learning, relationships are learned under the condition
of “when a token of x is activated, then also activate a token of y” (2015). This forms associative
structures that contain associative pairs. The relationship that forms between the tokens (or
associates) represents a psychologically based connection.
To establish knowledge of a reference/referent relationship, it is important to review how
knowledge is created: as Alavi & Leidner (2001) argue, there are four modes of knowledge
creation: 1) socialization, 2) externalization, 3) internalization, and 4) combination. In each of
these, the practice of knowing takes knowledge and moves it between its implicit/unspoken form
and its spoken/shared form. Through this process, knowledge creation becomes “as much about
transferring knowledge from one source and state to another” as it is to creating new knowledge
(Alavi & Leidner 2001; Holsapple & Joshi 2000). Therefore, as knowledge is created through one
of the above modes, you know more and more. Without the practice of knowing, you cannot
possess knowledge – and conversely, if you possess knowledge, you must have gone through one
of the steps of knowing (i.e. knowledge creation). This is duality. In the next subsection, the
creation of knowledge with regards to brand evocation and consideration is reviewed.
4.3.2 Repetition & Building Familiarity in Marketing
For knowledge to be formed, the marketing literature seems to agree that the key is
repetition through repeated exposure (Carr et al. 2017; Unkelbach 2011; Yalch 1991; Scott 1990).
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With this exposure also comes the notion of gradual learning through a learning curve, which
emerges in the context of associative learning (Mandelbaum 2015). This phenomenon impacts
the associations developed for brand consideration. Gallistel et al. notes, however, that the
learning process for individuals is “generally step-like, rapid, and abrupt” and not as gradual as
some researchers argue when looking at group averages. Regardless, the notion of how long it
takes for this abrupt transition to occur is debated (2004). For example, Gallistel et al. write that
some learning “… is so quick that it is literally one-shot” (2004) – suggesting that in some cases,
there may be no curve at all. On the other hand, Yalch argues that multiple exposures to an
advertisement are needed to establish memory, illustrating that there is “… a significant two-way
interaction between the number of exposures and the type of advertising” (1991). In marketing,
there are also additional theories that rely on this notion of repetition, such as those highlighted
by Holden & Vanhuele (1999): 1) the Exposure Effect (Zajonc 1974); 2) the False Fame Effect
(Jacoby et al. 1989); and 3) the Truth Effect (Bacon 1979; Hawkins & Hoch 1992).
Under Zajonc’s Exposure Effect, the argument is made that “… mere repeated exposure
of the individual to a stimulus is a sufficient condition for the enhancement of his attitude toward
it” (Zajonc 1968; Zajonc et al. 1974). Zajonc also offers the idea that “mere exposure” is a condition
in which “the given stimulus [is made] accessible to the individual's perception” (1968), implying
that consumers are more likely to prefer an entity that they’ve been previously exposed to
(Antonova & Gorbov 2018; Bornstein & D’Agostino 1992). So, even with minimum familiarity, a
brand can be evoked in a consideration set just through mere exposure. Zajonc et al. also propose
the idea of an exposure function to capture this effect (1974), which produces a learning curve.
However, one additional phenomenon to consider is Jacoby et al.’s 1989 False Fame
Effect, which highlights a different, but related, phenomenon: 24 hours after initial exposure, non-
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famous names were perceived by experiment participants to be famous. Based on this result, it
suggests that while mere exposure can drive the evocation of a brand into a consumer’s
consideration set, low levels familiarity can also distort the true nature of the exposure content,
meaning that marketers need to ensure that enough consumer exposure occurs to create
knowledge of a designed or desired “truth”.
This idea is seen in the Truth Effect, which Bacon (1979) describes as way to form a
perceived truth through repeated exposure to a statement (Bacon 1979; Holden & Vanhuele
1999; Unkelbach et al. 2011). In Bacon’s experimental work, the statements used are fictions and,
yet, they still fostered the perception of truth after repeated exposure. As described by Unkelbach
et al. (2011), “statements’ rated truth increases when people encounter them repeatedly”. This
suggests that repetition, which can increase the level of familiarity, can present itself as truth in
the consumer’s mind even if it is not actually a truth that exists in the world. Therefore, looking
at the Exposure Effect, the False Fame Effect, and the Truth Effect in totality, the power of
exposure emerges as a powerful tool that marketers can utilize to diffuse information to a
population of consumers. However, these effects also raise concerns: 1) limited exposure may not
be enough to drive moderate or high-level familiarity (as seen in the False Fame Effect) and 2)
repetition can ground perceived truths that are not actually true (as seen in the Truth Effect). To
ensure a brand is evoked correctly and is considered based on the right information, marketers
need to understand how to balance the mix of exposure and familiarity to achieve their corporate
goals.
While working on this balancing act, marketers also need to consider that learning curves
are “negatively accelerated”, meaning that as exposure or practice repeats, with every additional
repetition there are “diminishing returns” (Ritter & Schooler 2001). As a marketer, this
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emphasizes the importance of the initial exposure, given with each subsequent exposure of the
content, less and less is be learned. So, if a marketer’s goal is to create knowledge of a brand’s
reference/referent relationship (allowing it to be evoked in a brand choice scenario or as an
instrument to impede Brand Genericide), the exposure content needs to be designed in such a
way as to maximize the derived familiarity as to emphasize that the right truth is learned: i.e. the
brand name references a specific product/service. To do so, memory-enhancement devices may
be used to shorten the learning curve.
4.3.3 Memory Enhancement: Jingles as a Mnemonic Device
The use of memory enhancing devices is drawn from psychological research on
“mnemonics” (Bellezza 1981; 1984; 1996; Yalch 1991). These memory-enhancing devices
encompass “… learning strategies which can often enhance the learning and later recall of
information” (1981). This is done using cognitive structures that creates mediators in the learning
process between the consumer and the signal, which contains the information to-be-learned.
These mediators aid in the cognitive cuing of information, increasing the likelihood of recalling
the “… to-be-remembered information” (1981). According to Bellezza, “the essential part of
learning with a mnemonic device is to associate the information to be remembered with one or
more cognitive cuing structures…” that are “… later used by the learner to recall the information
through a self-cuing process” (1981). These cues can be images, abstract words, or even music
(Yalch 1991). However, it is important to keep in mind that mnemonics do not create knowledge,
they act as aids in the learning process.
When designing a mnemonic, there are two necessary conditions: constructability and
associability (Bellezza 1981; Yalch 1991). Constructability ensures that the consumer can
construct the cues needed to recall the information – i.e. does the mnemonic contain the specific
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information that needs to be learned? In the case of brand evocation, if a mnemonic is used to aid
in the learning process of establishing knowledge of a brand’s reference/referent relationship,
then the relationship needs to be in the device: the brand name and the product/service need to
be called out. Otherwise, at the end of the memory-enhancing exposure, without both
components, the consumer will not develop any familiarity towards the reference/referent
relationship. In addition, the cuing device needs to be discriminable from its information (1981) –
meaning that you cannot use the reference/referent relationship as the device to mediate the
same information. The second condition, associability, is the ability to associate the device with
the information to-be-remembered (Bellezza 1981). Another way to describe this is the “ease of
linking information to the mnemonic cue” (Yalch 1991). If the device is too difficult to
comprehend, the noise created will slow or stop the learning process. So, for a mnemonic is be
successful, 1) the to-be-remembered information must be contained in the device; 2) the device
needs to be unique/novel; and 3) the device needs to be simple enough to understand (i.e. cannot
distract from the information to-be-learned).
For marketers looking to create knowledge of a reference/referent relationship, one
potential mnemonic device is the jingle (Yalch 1991). A jingle is a short burst of sound containing
both music and lyrics (spoken or sung). Often, the lyrics represent a slogan. The idea of using
music to communicate information “in a memorable way” is not new (Yalch 1991; Huron 1989).
Yalch goes on to emphasize that “memory enhancement represents one of the oldest and most
important uses of music in advertising”. He also cites Wells et al. (1989), who offer an illustrative
quote on the topic: “finger-snapping, toe-tapping songs have tremendous power because they
are so memorable” (as cited in Yalch 1991).
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However, the literature is mixed on whether using music in advertisements is, in general,
an effective way to enhance recall. Yalch highlights how some researchers believe that music and
its underlying structure can enhance learning (Taylor 2015; Bower & Bolton 1969; Sims 1980;
Waldron 1977; as cited in Yalch 1991; Huron 1989). On the other hand, other researchers have
found cases where the learning enhancement did not work out as planned (Bottari & Evans 1982;
Reineke 1981; Rubin & Wallace 1989; as cited in Yalch 1991). Kohli et al. (2007) also warns against
these potential exceptions. In Yalch’s paper, he attempts to uncover when it is “desirable” to use
a jingle as a way to communicate a slogan. To study this, Yalch offers a jingle as a mnemonic
device, citing Bellezza. He finds that jingles do aid in the recall of information when other cues are
not readily available to the consumer (1991). Through a series of experiments conducted on a
population of 103 undergraduate students, he noted the observation that slogans communicated
in the form of a jingle resulted in higher recall of the brand name versus when the slogan was
presented without music. He attributed the effect to “… music’s value as a mnemonic aid in
creating an elaborate network of associations that facilitates subsequent retrieval” (1991). In his
discussion, he references an acceleration of the learning process; however, Yalch does not offer
any insight into specific jingle features that accelerated the learning. Instead, he concludes that
the presence of music, in general, helped.
Also published in 1991, Wallace offers a proposal to study the use of music in
advertisement, focusing on whether recall can be improved. Wallace calls out that research prior
to the 1990s focused on music’s effect on attitudes (Gorn 1982; Kellaris & Cox 1989; Maclnnis &
Park 1990; as cited in Wallace 1991) or consumer moods (Alpert & Alpert 1988 as cited in Wallace
1991). However, at this point, no one had tried to understand whether music could enhance the
memory of an advertisement (holding aside Yalch’s paper, which was published in the same year).
Wallace calls out how some jingles just get stuck in your head, offering the example of the “Oscar
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Mayer” song. He also notes that “jingles seem to be easily recalled even if they have not been
heard for years” (Wallace 1991). Based on these two observations, Wallace posits that music can
enhance recall of information, noting that there may be scenarios in which this improvement
doesn’t occur. He highlights the need for clear lyrics and a simple, basic pattern – both of which
refer back to Bellezza’s essential requirements for constructing a mnemonic device.
In his 1994 follow-up article, Wallace finds, through experimentation, that “text is better
recalled when it is heard as a song rather than as speech, provided the music repeats so that it is
easily understood.” Wallace also highlights the need for repeated exposure to ensure the
information is easily learned. However, the focus of this article is not specifically on jingles;
instead, he leverages a series of ballads from a folklore collection where he could identify verses
with “… clear end rhymes, consistent rhythmical patterns, [and] accompanying melodies...”
(1994). His goal is to see if information presented with music is still recalled better than text that
contains “sufficient rhyme and rhythm” – i.e. an attempt to see if it is music or just enhanced
features of rhyme & rhythm that result in memory enhancement. In his theoretical framework,
he hypothesizes that melody provides “rich information about the features of the text as well as
a direct connection between components of the melody and components of the text”, indicating
that information presented with music will result in better recall. Leveraging 64 undergraduate
students, Wallace conducts an experiment including sung and spoken versions of the folklore
ballads. As expected, the experimental results show that sung ballads facilitate better recall than
spoken text (1994).
Bearing in mind the contributions of Yalch (1991) and Wallace (1991; 1994), in my
research to-date, I have not yet come across a paper that attempts to understand which features
of a jingle drive the enhanced learning process, making the jingle a potentially effective mnemonic
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device. To work towards an experimental design for unpacking strategic jingle success, with
success defined as creating knowledge of a brand’s reference/referent relationship, I offer a
research agenda that goes beyond Yalch and Wallace to study jingle profiles that drive learning as
measured through familiarity. To do this, three dimensions of a jingle are explored: semantic,
phonetic, and musical. The lack of a comprehensive study that attempts to understand what jingle
feature combinations enhance the creation of knowledge (as measured by familiarity) of the
brand’s referent/reference relationship is a primary motivation of this chapter.
One additional question to be answered is in how a jingle may be able to drive familiarity
after limited exposure. In section 4.3.2, the discussion looks at how repetition can be a driver of
knowledge creation, regardless of whether the knowledge gained is based on a truth. However,
to achieve a quick, abrupt transition in the learning curve (such as Gallistel et al. 2004’s “oneshot” learning phenomenon), there may be another mechanism involved that enables limited
exposure to have a greater-than-anticipated result. To understand this better, recall Wallace’s
description of a jingle being stuck in your head (1991). Antonova & Gorbov (2018) describe a
similar occurrence, known as an earworm – i.e. a song that is “stuck in your head.” With dedicated
research going back to Kellaris (2001), it is known that earworms are a form of “cognitive itching
[that] is a mental repeating of a stuck melody that only exacerbates the situation by launching a
cycle of involuntary repeat of the melody” (2001). However, outside of a series of descriptivist
studies that attempt to observe earworms (Kellaris 2001; Levitin 2006; Williamson et al. 2014;
Sacks 2010; Liikkanen 2008; Beaman & Williams 2010; Williamson et al. 2012; Williamson et al.
2014; Antonova & Gorbov 2018), research on what causes earworms is limited to-date. What we
do know, however, is that earworms tend to last for about 24 hours and any “active attempt to
block or eliminate the earworm are less successful than passive acceptance” (Beaman & Williams
2010).
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What’s particularly interesting about this earworm phenomenon is that it essentially puts
a song on “playback mode” in a consumer’s mind (Levitin 2006). Given this feature of an earworm,
if a jingle can be designed to trigger an earworm effect, causing a jingle’s message to spin on
repeat in the consumer’s mind, the question becomes whether this can increase the repetitions
a consumer experiences and ground the truth faster. If this is achieved, then a jingle only needs
to be exposed by a marketer enough times to trigger the earworm, at which point the consumer
will unconsciously assume responsibility for continuing the repetition on their own, thus limiting
the role that the marketer needs to play after initial exposure.
4.3.4 Semantic & Phonological Structure of Jingles
Jingles contain two basic elements: text and music. Traditionally, the text of a jingle takes
the form of a slogan, which is an independent grouping of words that have both semantic and
phonetic capacities. According to Kohli et al., a slogan “… represents one of the three key elements
of brand identity; that is, the elements by which the brand communicates with the world around
it” (2007). Given a brand name is a referring term, the reference/referent relationship itself has
no descriptive ability – it simply refers, identifying a given product or service from all others.
However, a slogan has the ability to “communicate what the brand is about,” serving up a piece
of the brand’s identify (2007). Others have attributed slogans as contributors to brand equity,
helping to deter competitive influences (Dahlén & Rosengren 2005). Accordingly, the content of
a slogan typically employs the brand-name-using-practice and a set of to-be associated features.
These features, which paint an image of the brand, act as “hooks” to the fish that are consumers
(Kohli et al. 2007; Dahlén & Rosengren 2005).
Looking at how a slogan’s features influence recall, Kohli et al. (2007) cites two studies:
Corder (1986) and Bradley & Meeds (2002). Upon further review, Corder finds in a study of slogan-
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identification that shorter slogans are more easily recalled by measuring the shape of recall versus
complexity level (1986). Corder also suggests that longer, more complex slogan need higher levels
of exposure to be internalized. Bradley & Meeds (2002), in an attempt to study the syntactic
complexity of slogans, transform the grammar of slogans to measure the effect on comprehension
and recall. While they find that comprehension is not impacted by syntactic manipulations (such
as using active vs passive voice), they do find that simpler structures, such as active voice, enhance
recognition (2002). From these two studies, the researchers illustrate that shorter slogans with
simple syntax structures enhance recall and recognition. Kohli et al. (2007) also point out that, at
the time, “no article was found that focused specifically on developing a systematic approach for
creating effective slogans”. They then conclude by offering a list of 7 qualitative slogan-creation
guidelines for marketers.
More recently, Skorupa & Duboviciene (2015), citing the importance of slogans in
marketing, perform a descriptive analysis on 110 English slogans (equal parts commercial and
social marketing) to understand which phonetic and semantic techniques are most heavily used.
With regards to phonological characteristics of slogans, Skorupa & Duboviciene look for the
presence of “rhyme, rhythm, alliteration, assonance, consonance and onomatopoeia” (2015). As
reasoning, they suggest that these phonological characteristics provide a mnemonic effect given
that they are “attention-grabbing” or “emphatic” (in the case of onomatopoeia). With regards to
semantic characteristics of slogans, Skorupa & Duboviciene look for the presence of
“personification, simile, metaphor, hyperbole, metonymy, euphemism, polysemy and
homonymy, and apostrophe” (2015). They emphasize these characteristics due to their tie-in to
cultural contexts. So, by analyzing the 110 English slogans, the phonetic components that most
frequently emerge are rhyme and alliteration. For the semantic components, a broader selection
pop up, including: personification, simile, metaphor, hyperbole, euphemism, polysemy, and
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homonymy (2015). While this article does not test the impact of having these features within a
given slogan, it does provide me with a clear starting place for the different semantic and phonetic
characteristics I need to include in this chapter (definitions for each of the abovementioned
semantic and phonetic devices is provided in appendix 10). Additionally, though not mentioned
in this section, it is also important to measure the number of times the brand name is referenced
in the jingle. With the slogans covered, the next section looks at the musical structure of a jingle.
4.3.5 Musical Structure of Jingles
When it comes to understanding the musical structure of jingles, this review first looks at
the general structure of music. As a starting point, Maddage et al. (2006) illustrate a music
structure pyramid, which illustrates the layers within a segment of music.
As the foundation of the pyramid, “beat space segmentation” is represented through a
timing layer (2006). This layer includes polyphonic music – i.e. segments that have multiple notes
playing at the same time – and captures features such as tempo, note durations, and rhythm. In
the second layer, the music becomes monophonic music, meaning one note is played at a time.
Here, the melody is analyzed, extracted from the polyphonic music below (2006). To extract the
melody, an extraction approach is required, such as salience-based melody extraction (Salamon
& Gómez 2012). In the third layer, music regions are represented. This layer contains: pure
instrumental, pure vocal, mixed, and silence (2006). This layer represents that type of sounds we
hear. Finally, in the uppermost layer, Maddage et al. present the “semantic meaning(s) of the
song,” which include the introduction, verses, chorus, outro, and bridge (2006). According to
Maddrage et al., this is the “most difficult” to understand – likely requiring qualitative
analysis/coding. In summary, the music structure pyramid highlights the need for 1) beat pattern
extraction; 2) melody pattern extraction; and 3) vocal pattern extraction (2006).
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To extract the features from the bottom layer, the music must be segmented into frames
in order to provide a quasi-stationary series for analysis (Maddrage et al. 2006; Ong 2006; Logan
& Salomon 2001). The smallest frame available is a music note, represented by the duration of
the music note (Maddrag et al. 2006). Some other researchers, such as Ong (2006), instead elect
to divide music into fixed-length segments. Once in frames, the music is decomposed into subbands of frequency ranges based on the different octave scales. Once decomposed, low-level
measures can be extracted, such as: beats per minute (Bogdanov et al. 2011), onset rate
(Bogdanov et al. 2011; Doraisamy & Ruger 2003), local timbre (De et al. 2015; Aucouturier &
Pachet 2002), pitch (Hanna et al. 2007; Doraisamy & Ruger 2003), power spectrum (Rauber 2003);
bark (Bosteels & Kerre 2008; Rauber 2003; Pampalk 2001), spectral masking (Rauber 2003;
Pampalk 2001), intensity/Sone (Bosteels & Kerre 2008; Rauber 2003; Pampalk 2001), tonality (De
et al. 2015), flux strength (Bosteels & Kerre 2008; Rauber 2003; Pampalk 2001), and rhythm (De
2015; Hanna et al. 2007; Maddrage et al. 2006; Doraisamy & Ruger 2003).
With regards to the second layer, the focus turns to the melody. According to Salamon &
Gómez (2012), the Music Information Retrieval (MIR) community describes melody as “the single
(monophonic) pitch sequence that a listener might reproduce if asked to whistle or hum a piece
of polyphonic music, and that a listener would recognize as being the ‘essence’ of that music when
heard in comparison.” Before melody can be analyzed, it needs to be extracted (assuming it is a
polyphonic piece of music). To do this, Salamon & Gómez (2012) propose a salience-based melody
extraction method that calculates and subsequently analyzes pitch contours, which are composed
of “harmonicity, pitch continuity, and exclusive allocation.” Using these contours, Salamon &
Gómez write the rules that identify the contours of the melody versus other non-melodic contours
(2012). This is performed by first extracting the sinusoid, allowing them to equalize the loudness
of the music, divide the music into shorter, equal length segments, and apply frequency &
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amplitude corrections. Next, using a salience function, a harmonic summation of weighted
energies is calculated. From here, pitch contours are estimated using the salience peaks within
each segmented frame. Finally, the rules are defined in an effort to filter out all non-melodic
contours (where vibrato is not present), ideally leaving just the melody (2012). Upon completion
of the extraction process, the melody is monophonic, and can be analyzed using the low-level
measures described above. An additional option for analyzing polyphonic music is provided by De
et al. (2015), who propose a signal separation approach leveraging compositional representations
of the magnitude spectra to analyze pitch contours, loudness, and cepstral features (which looks
at the music’s short-term spectral based features, such as power/bark).
In the second layer, harmonic features are extracted and analyzed (Maddage et al. 2006).
A common way of analyzing harmony is through chord modeling, which looks at the progression
of chords over the course of the piece (2006). Maddage et al. highlight the four types of chords
as “major, minor, diminished and augmented… [with] 12 chords per chord type that can be found
in western music” (2006). Serra & Serra (2009) also illustrate the usage of harmonic pitch class
profiles (HPCP). These profiles leverage spectrum peaks that emerge in specific frequency bands.
The third layer of the pyramid looks to identify the various music regions around the usage
of instrument, voice, and silence (Maddage et al. 2006). To extract these regions, Maddage et al.
propose a method for music indexing and retrieval that leverages Gaussian Mixture models that
are trained on a set of manually coded segments of music (tagged as pure instrumental, vocal, or
silence). The features used in the model include the Octave scale cepstral coefficient (OSCC) and
the Mel-frequency cepstral coefficient (MFCC) (2006). With a trained series of models, music
segments are classified. Finally, the remaining “top” layer of Maddage et al.’s (2006) music
structure pyramid requires manual coding for analysis due it the contextual nature of the features.
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With a magnitude of potential features available for extraction across the different layers
of the music structure pyramid, one way to bring this review back to the notion of mnemonics is
through a discussion on psychoacoustics. Psychoacoustics involves the relationship between
music (technical, sounds) and how humans interpret and perceive the music (Rauber et al. 2003;
Bosteels & Kerre 2008). Looking at psychoacoustics as a science, the field analyzes “the different
sensations sounds produce” (Pampalk 2001). An example of a psychoacoustic feature is
fluctuation strength, which allow us to better differentiate between rhythmic patterns (2001).
When trying to understand which features may better enhance the mnemonic device that is the
jingle, leveraging psychoacoustic features that are known to have a relationship with human
minds is worthy of future exploration.
4.4 Methodology for Clustering a Sample of Jingles
The literature review in section 4.3 is anchored by two strategic uses of a jingle: 1) to
create knowledge of a brand’s reference/referent relationship; and 2) to establish associations
between a brand and a set of features, which enables a consumer to consider the brand once it
is evoked. However, without first evoking a brand name in the choice set, the consumer will not
have the opportunity to consider it; therefore, my goal is to understand how a jingle can work as
a mnemonic device to enhance the learning process, establishing knowledge of the preexisting
reference/reference relationship (as measured through familiarity). The resulting research
question becomes: how can a jingle be strategically designed to enhance familiarity of a brand
name’s reference/referent relationship with limited exposure?
By building knowledge of a brand’s reference/referent relationship, the jingle/slogan
combination acts as an information diffusion device that helps to build knowledge of the
reference/referent relationship in the consumer’s mind. Accordingly, this Thesis positions a
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strategically designed jingle as a method for impeding Brand Genericide – the focus of chapters 2
and 3. When looking at how Brand Genericide can be strategically influenced, for brands at risk
of Genericide, a jingle that serves as a mnemonic device may be able to speed up the learning
process for establishing, or reestablishing, knowledge of the brand’s reference. This works as a
method in impeding the Brand Genericide process by ensuring that the public knows that the
brand name is a specific reference to a specific product. In turn, this helps to drive down the
efficiency that would be gained by using the brand name as a repurposed reference, causing the
public to instead look for a different, more efficient name somewhere else.
However, for a jingle to be used as a method of strategic intervention (i.e. providing a
marketer with an instrument for intervening), jingle profiles need to be established that can be
tested, through experimentation, for an ability to successfully enhance familiarity of a brand’s
reference/referent relationship. Additionally, to ensure that marketing costs are optimized and
competitors are outpaced, a goal of the resulting experimentation will be to test if any sampled
jingle profile can enhance familiarity after limited exposure due to an earworm effect.
To fulfil this research agenda, there is a reasonable motivation to both restrict the jingle
feature set to focus the to-be-designed experiment(s) on a particular sample of features and to
not have to test every sample jingle independently. Therefore, to create the testable profiles, a
sample of jingles needs to be profiled. This is accomplished through the following four milestones:
1) Collect a sample data set of jingles.
2) Extract a set of features from each sample jingle, ensuring each of the following
dimensions are represented: phonetic, semantic, and musical structure.
3) Cluster the jingles using the feature-set identified in #2 and a measure of distance that
produces clear clusters that are homogenous internally and heterogeneous externally.
4) Describe the identified clusters.
The following detailed methodology offers a novel approach for clustering a sample set of jingles.
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4.4.1 Sample Data Collection
To facilitate this profiling exercise, a sample of 80 jingles is collected. To minimize the bias
of previous exposure to a brand name in any future experiments, jingles are extracted from a
series of jingle-producer websites and YouTube with a conscious effort to avoid market leaders
(ideally allowing future experiments to leverage jingles that the study participants will hear for
the first time). Using Audacity, which is open source software, jingles are captured and saved in
WAV format for feature extraction. In total, the sample consists of 12 Jingle-based companies
(found through Google search) and YouTube, totaling 13 contributing sources. The jingles also
represent 14 product categories (see Table 4) and range in duration from 5.2 seconds to 64.3
seconds.

Table 4: Jingle Sample Counts
Once stored in WAV format, each jingle is manually transcribed (see figure 10) to allow for
semantic and phonetic feature coding in section 4.4.2.

159

Figure 10: Jingle Transcription Example
(Full jingle text hidden to preserve copyright)
4.4.2 Selecting & Coding Features
To perform a cluster analysis, features need to be selected, extracted and/or manually
coded for each sample jingle. These features will serve as stimuli within the to-be constructed
profiles and ultimately represent three dimensions of a jingle: semantic, phonetic, and musical.
As highlighted in section 4.3.4, Skorupa & Duboviciene (2015) provide a descriptive study of 110
English slogans (equal parts commercial and social marketing) to identify the most heavily used
phonetic and semantic techniques. The results surface two primary phonetic components: rhyme
and alliteration. Additionally, the results highlight several often-used semantic components:
personification, simile, metaphor, hyperbole, euphemism, polysemy, and homonymy (2015). In
alignment with these results, I include rhyme, alliteration, metaphor, simile, personification, and
hyperbole in my sample feature-set.
To manually code these features, two Academics are consulted: one with a PhD in
American Literature with a Post-Doc in Rhetoric & Writing Studies and the other with a PhD in
American Studies, who currently serves as the Associate Director of a Writing Center at a
prestigious private university. Each coder is asked to identify whether each jingle contains at least
one instance of the phonetic or semantic device in question, marking the variable with a 1 for
“yes” and a 0 for “no”. To make it into the final sample set for profiling, I only retain values where
the coders both flag the given jingle with the given semantic or phonetic device. I then create a
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summary variable for semantic usage and for phonetic usage, which is the sum of the underlying
features (to avoid using binary variables from the cluster analysis, only these two summary
variables are included in the clustering process). Due to the difficulty in coding euphemism and
polysemy, both features are not included in this exercise. Additionally, homonymy and smile
returned a limited cross-validated response; therefore, I exclude both from the final analysis. A
manual coding for the frequency of brand mentions in each jingle is also included in the feature
set, as well as when the brand name first appears in the jingle (based on percent of word count;
i.e. if there are 10 words in the jingle and the brand appears as word 2, proportion into the jingle
when the brand first appears is 20%). An example of these coded features is provided in figure
11.

Figure 11: Jingle Semantic & Phonetic Coding Example
(Full jingle text hidden to preserve copyright)
With regards to musical features, section 4.3.5 highlights over a dozen to consider: beats
per minute, onset rate, local timbre, pitch, power spectrum, bark, spectral masking,
intensity/Sone, tonality, flux strength, rhythm, pitch contours, loudness, cepstral features, and
harmonic pitch class profiles. Additionally, given that this experiment is based on forming
knowledge and learning, it is also important to look at psychoacoustics. For example, Anotonva &
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Gorbov (2018) offer an analysis of psychological effectiveness in advertising, focusing on dynamic
range, volume, and tempo. They define psychological effectiveness as “… the degree of inﬂuence
on the mental processes of consumers… [that] is characterized by the number of consumers
involved, the degree of attraction of their attention, as well as the depth of impression that
remains in the memory of recipients of advertising” (2018). By conducting an inter-group study
with 296 participants, Anotonva & Gorbov find that dynamic range influences overall
effectiveness of advertising, whereas volume and tempo do not indicate any influence (although,
together, all three features do influence effectiveness, perhaps indicating an interaction effect).
Based on these findings, I ensure a measure that represents each of these features is included in
the final feature set.
To extract the musical features from each sample jingle, I leverage Essentia – an open
source C++ library with a Python wrapper that specializes in “audio analysis and audio-based
music information retrieval” (Bogdanov et al. 2013). Essentia fully supports Linux and iOS
operating systems; however, the Windows deployment is limited. In this case, Windows users
should consider installing a virtual Linux machine using a platform such as BASH to gain access to
the full Essentia offering. It is important to note that “Essentia is not a framework, but rather a
collection

of

algorithms

(plus

some

infrastructure)

wrapped

in

a

library”

(https://essentia.upf.edu/documentation). For a full list of algorithms and their references, please
reference https://essentia.upf.edu/documentation/algorithms_reference.html.
Essentia also offers an out-of-the-box streaming music extractor that enables a
command-line like experience for calculating low-level, tonal, and rhythm descriptors
(https://essentia.upf.edu/). The extractor uses a 44kHz sample rate, monophonic sound, and it
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normalizes the data using replay gain value. Many of the features in this tool can be extracted at
a summary or frame-by-frame level.
To build out the sample dataset, I extract 50 features using Essentia’s streaming music
extractor. The first 49 are defined in the Appendix of this Thesis (Appendix items 1-5). They include
35 “low-level” features, 6 “rhythm” features, and 8 “tonal” features. I also extract an additional
feature on the primary tonal chords key, which I code as 11 dummy variables, representing A, C#,
D#, G#, A#, G, D, F, C, B, and E (which is included for descriptive analysis only, not for clustering).
When all dummies are equal to 0, the primary tonal chords key is F#. With regards to the
psychoacoustic features described by Antonva & Gorbov (2018), dynamic range is proxied using
the “average loudness” variable (#5), volume is proxied using the “loudness EBU128” variable
(#18), and tempo is proxied using the “beats per minute” variable (#38). The remaining 46
variables offer a wide net of low-level, rhythm, and tonal features that cover many musical
components of the jingles, such as those described in section 4.3.5. Coupled with the manually
coded semantic and phonetic features, the dataset represents a detailed, 57 feature-rich jingle
signature for each example record (see figure 12 for an example of a jingle’s musical features)
that represents elements from all four levels of Maddage et al.’s music structure pyramid.
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Figure 12: Jingle Feature Extraction Example
4.4.3 Selecting a Measure of Similarity
When it comes to measures of music similarity, the most commonly used technique is
Euclidean Distance (Azcarraga & Enriquez 2013; Bogdanov et al. 2011; Bosteels & Kerre 2008;
Rauber et al. 2003). The formula is as follows:

ඨ
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Where x and y represent two vectors.
However, when using Euclidean Distance, several assumptions are made: 1) independence
between the vectors; 2) a constant scale; 3) features are approximately orthogonal; and 4) all
features have an equal weighting (Slaney et al. 2008). Given the dimensionality of musical data
and the additional layer of semantic and phonetic features, the likelihood of satisfying the
Euclidean Distance assumptions is not promising. Additionally, in many cases of music retrieval
and classification, only one feature is examined in a given analysis. So, in a hunt for a measure of
similarity that fits my research objective, I have come across additional similarity measures
potentially may offer a better fit, including: timbre similarity (Aucouturier & Pachet 2002);
Kullback-Leibler Divergence (Bogdanov et al. 2011; Ong 2006; Logan & Salomon 2001); Earth
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Mover’s Distance (Bogdanov et al. 2011; Hanna et al. 2007; Pampalk et al. (2005); Logan &
Salomon 2001); Cosine Angle Distance (Ong 2006); and Chroma Similarity (Seera et al. 2009).
Timbre similarity emerges as a similarity measure that relies on a single musical feature:
timbre, as measured through Mel Frequency cepstrum Coefficients (MFCC). MFCCs are “shortterm spectral-based features” (Logan 2000) and “are based on the known variation of the human
ear’s critical bandwidths with frequency” (Hasan et al. 2004). This approach ultimately aims to
group songs together that “sound the same” – with MFCCs being the primary driver behind the
identification. Aucouturier & Pachet (2002) cite nine additional authors that have used timbre
similarity in their works; however, this approach does not meet the expectation of this Thesis,
which requires a distance measure that can account for multiple features and dimensions beyond
one single feature of interest (i.e. MFCC).
The Kullback-Leibler Divergence (Kullback & Leibler 1951) measures the directed
divergence between two probability distributions by examining “how inefficient on average it
would be to code one histogram using the other as the code-book” (Cover & Thomas 1991 as cited
in Rubner et al. 2000). Rubner et al. assess the Kullback-Leibler Divergence in their attempt to find
a measure for information retrieval in image classification. One of their findings is that KullbackLeibler Divergence, as well as the extension of Jeffrey Divergence, “only [account] for the
correspondence between bins with the same index, and do not use information across bins”
(2000). They also find sensitivity to bin size – highlighting an underlying need for consistent bins.
Additionally, while this measure emerges several times in the music similarity literature
(Bogdanov et al. 2011; Ong 2006; Logan & Salomon 2001), it is important to note that the metric
is not communicative or symmetric, meaning that it is not a true distance measure. When
compared to other distance measures in Bogdanov et al. 2011, the authors find that other
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techniques, such as adjusted cosine distance (as a classification model using multiple low-level
features), perform just as well Kullback-Leibler Divergence (based on Gaussian Mixture Model
using MFCC means) when profiling songs, if not better in some scenarios.
Earth Mover’s Distance emerges as an extension of Kullback-Leibler Divergence,
representing the divergence between geometric representations. As Pampalk et al. (2005)
highlight, “the Earth Movers Distance computes the necessary ‘work’ to transform one model into
another”. In some implementations, the first step involves the Kullback-Leibler Divergence, which
is used to derive the distances between the clusters (the distance term is used loosely here given
that we know Kullback-Leibler Divergence does not technically calculate distances). Next, the
process looks at the “minimum cost to transfer” information to derive similarity (2005), which
leverages a cost matrix often referred to as “ground distance” (Tang et al. 2013). Earth Mover’s
uses weighted point sets to minimize distance (Typke et al. 2004). One well cited example that
leverages this distance metric is Rubner et al., who uses Earth Mover’s Distance for an image
profiling task where weighted points are calculated and expressed as weighted distributions,
forming histograms (over 3,500 citations on Google Scholar). Additionally, in song retrieval, Logan
(2004) offers an example using probability distributions for MFCC features – focusing on timbre
similarity. In regards to the potential application in my jingle-based analysis, Earth Mover’s
Distance requires a weighted point set that is not representational of the sample data; therefore,
I continue the search for alternative options.
Chroma Similarity pops up in a times-series-based music identification approach
presented by Seera et al. in 2009. This method looks to analyze a “chroma time series”, which is
“a mid-level feature representing harmonic content” (2009). While this method ultimately
provides fruitful results for the authors in successfully identifying cover songs, it leverages only
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one musical feature: the chroma time series. Given my objective of profiling jingles across multiple
features from three dimensions – i.e. semantic, phonetic, and musical – this technique also does
not meet the requirements.
This, therefore, leaves this discussion with the Cosine Angle Distance, which is the “cosine
angle distance between the parameter vectors” (Ong 2006). This produces a symmetric, twodimensional similarity matrix “that contains all the distance measures for all the possibilities of
frame combinations” (2006). The matrix is w. One benefit of this approach that Ong (2006)
highlights is that cosine similarity is more sensitive to tonal features than Euclidean distance,
which exist in my sample feature set (recall from section 4.4.3 that there are 8 tonal features
extracted for each jingle in the sample). This sensitivity comes from cosine similarity’s ability to
produce a meaningful similarity score among vectors with low signal energy (Cooper & Foote
2002) – a property not supported by other distances, such as Euclidean Distance. Ong also notes
that “the cosine angle distance is very sensitive to the various compared feature vectors…
[making] it very useful in finding very similar items” (2006). In order to illustrate the benefit of
cosine distance when compared to Euclidean distance, I also use both distances later in the
section (figures 24 and 25) to emphasize the importance of the increased sensitivity of cosine
distance.
To calculate the cosine of an angle, Ong (2006) notes the following formula:

Foote (2000) offers the following formula to calculate the cosine angle distance of two feature
vectors:
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Where m denotes the m-dimensional of the feature vector.
In this formula, ܸ and ܸା represent feature vectors on which distance is calculated. To calculate
cosine angle similarity, I use the “Statistics and Machine Learning Toolbox” in MATLAB (version
R2017b). MATLAB calculates cosine distance as “one minus the cosine of the included angle
between points (treated as vectors)” (https://www.mathworks.com/help/stats/pdist.html). In
the MATLAB command (see figure 13), “pdist” calculates the distance between feature vectors in
the specified file using a method specified by the user, such as cosine distance. On my sample of
80 jingle feature vectors – which have been normalized using the “StatisticalNormaliz” function in
MATLAB – this procedure produces a table with the distances between every possible 2-jingle
combination (i.e. sample size of 80; choose 2; results in 3,160 distances). Because I use a
normalized dataset, cosine similarity is computed as the dot product between the normalized
feature vectors. Using the MATLAB code in figure 13 for “ZZ”, figure 14 shows the pairwise
distances calculated between the jingle feature vectors of the first 12 jingles (compared to the
first 12 jingles).

Figure 13: Calculating the Cosine Distance Metric in MATLAB
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Figure 14: Cosine Distance between Jingle Feature Vectors (Subset of First 12 Jingles)
Using this cosine distance matrix, a dendrogram is derived to provide an aid for visually
assessing the number of clusters to be used in a subsequent non-hierarchical cluster analysis
(assuming cosine distance is able to clearly partition the data). In the resulting dendrogram (see
figure 23), the vertical axis represents the distance (or dissimilarity) between clusters. In figure
23, image (A), there appear to be two larger clusters on the left, with a smaller, very distinct
cluster on the far right (blue circles added for emphasis). Going deeper into the tree, figure 23,
image (B), highlights the potential for 7 moderately sized clusters, which is created by breaking
the two larger groups in image (A) into smaller subsections. Given that the goal of this analysis is
to derive jingle profiles with feature sets that can be used in later experiments, I explore the
option of 7 clusters to provide a better opportunity for feature contrast. In the next section, I
leverage an enhanced clustering method to derive the final cluster memberships for the needed
jingle profiles.
To illustrate why cosine distance better fits the requirements of my analysis (versus
Euclidean distance), consider the resulting dendrogram in figure 16. By applying Euclidean
distance with Ward’s method on the normalized sample, the dendrogram suggests that there are
two larger clusters (figure 16, image (A)) using the sample features, with one of the clusters
representing more than half of the sample population. In looking at whether additional clusters
are present, figure 16, image (B) suggests that the larger cluster on the left of the dendrogram
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will only break into smaller, more concentrated clusters if the cross-cluster dissimilarity is reduced
(i.e. the resulting clusters will be more similar to each other than if only two or three clusters are
chosen in the final analysis). However, even if the cross-cluster dissimilarity is significantly
reduced, it appears a core grouping of the jingles stay together on the far left of figure 16, image
(B).

Figure 15: A Dendrogram Produced with Cosine Distance in MATLAB for the 80 Sample Jingles
(The Blue Circles Indicate Potential Cluster Groupings using the Hierarchical Approach)

Figure 16: A Dendrogram Produced with Euclidean Distance in MATLAB for the 80 Sample Jingles
(The Blue Circles Indicate Potential Cluster Groupings using the Hierarchical Approach)
To further refine the resulting clusters with Euclidean distance, I use the K-Medoids
methodology to see how varying executions of k clusters play out given my jingle sample (this
approach is explained and defended in the next section). As expected, the non-hierarchical tuning
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outputs a core cluster that stays grouped through k=7 (highlighted in figure 17, this cluster’s
membership doesn’t drop below 35). Notably, by forcing 7 clusters with Euclidean distance,
several smaller clusters emerge with memberships of only 3-5 jingles each. Comparing this to the
cosine distance approach, figure 15 shows that using cosine allows the methodology to detect
relatively well-balanced clusters without needing to sacrifice dissimilarity cross-cluster – a more
desirable outcome. The resulting memberships, through subsequent, non-hierarchal tuning, is
displayed in figure 19. Here, the smallest cluster membership is 8 jingles (or, 10% of the sample).

Figure 17: MATLAB-Produced Cluster Memberships using K-Medoids with Euclidean Distance
Where k = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (PAM Algorithm)

4.4.4 Selecting an Enhanced Clustering Method
While the hierarchical approach using cosine distance in subsection 4.4.3 reveals up to 7
moderately-sized clusters in the sample (seen in the dendrogram in figure 15, image (B)), the next
task is selecting an enhanced clustering methodology to partition the 80 jingles into “k” clusters
where “k’ is a user-selected number of groupings. The goal is to form 7 groups of jingles where
the cosine similarity in each group is high (i.e. homogenous groups). When selecting a nonhierarchical methodology, the key requirements include: 1) must be compatible with cosine
distance, 2) must be robust to outliers (given then smaller sample of 80 jingles), 3) must have a
low sensitivity to noise (given the feature vector is primarily composed of musical features), and
4) must have the ability to partition a dataset into k groupings.
Traditionally, when asked to create “k” clusters, many researchers turn to the standard kmeans algorithm (coined by MacQueen in 1967), which natively leverages Euclidean or
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Manhattan distance to minimize the within group sum of squared error (Park et al. 2006; Huang
1998). While simple to interpret and computationally inexpensive to process, there are several
limitations in this approach, including: random cluster centers (making the replication of results
difficult if random centers are chosen), sensitivity to outliers, sensitivity to the noise present in
the sample feature vectors, and an inability to handle clusters of difference sizes or densities
(Arora & Varshney 2016; Bhat 2014; Hautamäki et al. 2005). In summary, while k-means outputs
“k” clusters, the remaining analysis requirements around cosine distance, robustness to outliers,
and low sensitivity to noise are not satisfied.
As an alternative approach, “the K-Medoids algorithm is used to find Medoids in a cluster
which is centre located point of a cluster” (Arora & Varshney 2016). K-Medoids is an enhanced
version of k-means with two key differences: 1) the Medoid, which acts as the cluster center, is
an observation from the sample (meaning the results can be easily replicated); and 2) the function
works to minimize the “sum of dissimilarities”, which reduces sensitivity to noise and to outliers
(2016; Park et al. 2006). Notably, this method also is compatible with multiple similarity measures,
including cosine angle distance. Given that this technique meets all requirements, I choose to use
this method to cluster the 80 jingle feature vectors. Arora & Varshney (2016) provide the following
K-Medoids step-by-step process:
1. Choose “k” observations randomly from the dataset to serve as Medoids.
2. Calculate the distance between each data point and each Medoid; find the closest
distance for each data point and assign it to that Medoid.
3. Choose a non-Medoid (a) data point as a Medoid, calculate the total cost of
configuration, which is the total sum of distances from (b) to the closest associated
Medoid (a); identify the non-Medoid data points with the lowest cost of configuration.
If there is a reduction in dissimilarity, make (a) the new Medoid.
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With each iteration, the Medoid positions are slightly altered in a search for the most ideally
located position to further minimize dissimilarity. When no additional gains are found, the process
ends, and the final clusters are identified (Bhat 2014).
One way to deploy the K-Medoids method is with the PAM algorithm (Partitioning Around
Medoids): a minimization function defined by Kaufman & Rousseeuw (1987; 1990). PAM
leverages the following function: ݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ݉݅݊ σୀଵ σȁ ݔെ ݉ ȁǡwhere  ݔrepresents “the data
point in the space representing a data item” and ݉ represents the Medoid of the given cluster, ݅
(Bhat 2014).
To implement the sample jingle feature vectors, I leverage the kmedoids stats package in
MATLAB. As is seen in figure 18, in the kmedoids MATLAB command, I specify the usage of cosine
distance, PAM, and my sample data, which has been normalized. I also specify that the algorithm
should be re-run 10 times, ultimately returning the best result (based on minimizing the sum of
distances). The result is an 80x1 table specifying the cluster membership of each jingle (see figure
19 for membership counts).

Figure 18: MATLAB script for K-Medoids with Cosine Distance and the PAM algorithm

Figure 19: MATLAB-Produced Cluster Memberships using K-Medoids with Cosine Distance
Leveraging the PAM algorithm in an implementation of K-Medoids with cosine distance,
the sample of 80 jingle feature vectors is partitioned into 7 clusters. As is seen in figure 19, these
clusters are relatively well-balanced, ranging from 10% of the total sample to 20% of the total
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sample. Before each jingle cluster is described with regards to its semantic, phonetic, and musical
features, let us look at the cluster memberships across a multi-dimensionally reduced space.
To visualize the clusters, I leverage MATLAB’s implementation of the t-SNE algorithm,
which

is

the

abbreviation

for

t-distributed

stochastic

neighbor

embedding.

This

multidimensionality reduction technique, originally developed by Maaten & Hinton (2008),
derives a set of “embedded points in a low-dimensional space whose relative similarities mimic
those of the original high-dimensional points” (https://www.mathworks.com/help/stats/tsne).
According to Maaten and Hinton, the technique “visualizes high-dimensional data by giving each
data point a location in a two or three-dimensional map (2008). Many nonlinear scaling
techniques, such as curvilinear components analysis (Demartines & Herault 1997 as cited in
Maaten & Hinton 2008) and Laplacian Eigenmaps (Belkin & Niyogi 2002 as cited in Maaten &
Hinton 2008), struggle with visualizing high-dimensional data due to an inability in “retaining both
the local and global structure of the data in a single map”, whereas t-SNE is built to fill this gap
(2008). Maaten & Hinton use a symmetrized cost function and leverage the Student-t-distribution
when calculating distance for the low level of dimensionality (2008). One additional benefit of the
MATLAB implementation of this algorithm is the available option to dictate the measure of
similarity used (i.e. cosine is supported).

Figure 20: MATLAB Script for TSNE Algorithm with 3D-Plot
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In addition to scaling the sample data across three dimensions using cosine distance, the
MATLAB implementation also allows the user to overlay labels on the data-points. Using this
optional feature, I visualize the 80 jingle samples and overlay the 7 K-Medoid-derived clusters
onto the graphic using a color key: cluster 1 (dark blue), cluster 2 (orange), cluster 3 (dark purple),
cluster 4 (violet), cluster 5 (green), cluster 6 (yellow), and cluster 7 (turquoise). While this
visualization only represents three reduced dimensions of a complex series of feature vectors, the
images in figures 30 & 31 (which is a rotated version of 29) are 3D plots that clearly show how the
K-Medoids approach differentiates the cluster memberships. Additionally, figure 23 is labeled
with the cluster membership from the K-Medoids analysis performed in section 4.4.4.

Figure 21: 3D-Plot of Jingle Sample Data Using t-SNE
(The Color Key Represents the Clusters Memberships Identified through K-Medoids)
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Figure 22: A Rotated 3D-Plot of Jingle Sample Data Using t-SNE
(The Color Key Represents the Clusters Memberships Identified through K-Medoids)

Figure 23: A “Labelled” 3D-Plot of Jingle Sample Data Using t-SNE
(The Color Key & Labels Represents the Clusters Memberships Identified through K-Medoids)
Maaten & Hinton (2008) also enable the user to adjust the perplexity level in their
algorithm, allowing the user to adjust the stability between local and global patterns by defining
“the effective number of neighbors” to each data-point. While higher perplexity values are often
reserved for larger datasets, Maaten & Hilton strongly encouraging to keep the perplexity
between a minimum of 5 and maximum of 50. The MATLAB implementation defaults to a
176

perplexity of 30. Figures 30, 31, and 32 include the results when running t-SNE with three different
perplexity levels: 8, 12, and 20.

Figure 24: A “Labelled” 3D-Plot of Jingle Sample Data Using t-SNE with a Perplexity of 8.
(The Color Key & Labels Represents the Clusters Memberships Identified through K-Medoids)

Figure 25: A “Labelled” 3D-Plot of Jingle Sample Data Using t-SNE with a Perplexity of 12.
(The Color Key & Labels Represents the Clusters Memberships Identified through K-Medoids)
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Figure 26: A “Labelled” 3D-Plot of Jingle Sample Data Using t-SNE with a Perplexity of 20.
(The Color Key & Labels Represents the Clusters Memberships Identified through K-Medoids)
Across the three figures (32, 33, & 34), by adjusting the effective number of neighbors, two larger
clusters clearly pop out – an observation also shared in the dendrogram presented in figure 15,
image (A). Then, by overlaying the cluster memberships from K-Medoids, we can begin to
interpret how the clusters relate to each other. Therefore, these visuals suggest clusters 1 (dark
blue), 2 (orange), 3 (dark purple), and 6 (yellow) appear to be more related to each other when
compared to clusters 4 (violet), 5 (green), and 7 (turquoise). While this helps to illustrate the
similarities in the feature vectors, this analysis relies reduced dimensionality, meaning the
distances shown are, to some degree, distorted. So, because the K-Medoids approach utilizes the
entirety of the features in each vector, it likely explains, for example, why two yellow data-points
(records 36 and 43) appear to be disconnected from the rest of their cluster.
4.5 A Review of the Resulting Jingle Clusters
Leveraging the cluster memberships assigned in section 4.4, the resulting clusters are
described in this section using the original, non-normalized dataset.
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4.5.1 Cluster 1 Description
Cluster 1, which is composed of 14 jingles, is characterized by high phonetic complexity
with 93% of its members exhibiting the use of rhyme and 50% exhibiting the use of alliteration.
These jingles also show a wider than average bark-band spread, meaning that the variance of the
spectral energies across each jingle is higher, touching on a wider range of hearing. There is also
a higher-than-average spread of pitches in this subpopulation (signified by a much higher Mel
band spread), along with a presence of percussive sounds (indicated by a higher-than-average
zero crossing rate). Compared to the remaining 66 jingles, cluster 1 also demonstrates fewer
brand mentions, no metaphors or personification, and the quietest beats.
Summary: Cluster 1 is semantically basic, phonetically complex, and relies on a wide range of
sounds while avoiding the overemphasis of any one pitch or beat.

Table 5: Selection of Stand-Out Summary Statistics for Cluster 1
4.5.2 Cluster 2 Description
Cluster 2, which is composed of 8 jingles, is characterized by the greatest average usage
of the brand name (by frequency), little-to-no semantic complexity, and moderate phonetic
complexity. With regards to musical features, this group possesses the highest average tonal
harmonic pitch class profile across all clusters, as well as the highest pitch silence (i.e. roughly a
measure of the identifiability of tones) and highest tonal chord change rate. The 8 jingles also
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have a low detection of beats, low tonal chord strength (i.e. minimal conformity to any one key),
and a consistent range of loudness.
Summary: Cluster 2 relies on brand name repetition with a relatively shorter overall word count,
has a steady loudness, expresses clear tones, leverages multiple chords across the musical frames,
and avoids semantic complexity.

Table 6: Selection of Stand-Out Summary Statistics for Cluster 2
4.5.3 Cluster 3 Description
Cluster 3, which is composed of 16 jingles, heavily relies on semantic devices, is
danceable, puts out a lot of energy, minimizes the use of silence, and showcases the strongest
beats-per-minute of any of the clusters. This cluster is also the weakest on phonetic complexity
and is not dynamically complex, meaning there is little variation in the loudness of the jingle. The
energy across the Bark-band spectrum is consistent throughout the jingles with no differentiated
crest.
Summary: Cluster 3 is made to get the audience dancing – it is high energy that never lets up
while also drawing on semantic complexity to keep the audience thinking. This cluster is toetapping and thought provoking.
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Table 7: Selection of Stand-Out Summary Statistics for Cluster 3
4.5.4 Cluster 4 Description
Cluster 4, which is composed of 11 jingles, heavily relies on rhyme, but barely utilizes any
other phonetic or semantic device. These jingles are overwhelmingly composed of flat bands that
lack energy and demonstrate a wide range of loudness with meaningful spectral skewness – all
while having the highest beat count. The number of chords used is limited, resulting in belowaverage danceability. There is also less of a percussion presence in these jingles versus other
clusters (noted by the zero-crossing rate).
Summary: Cluster 4 is composed of slow, even-toned, often flat jingles that rely on rhyme to
entertain the brain given the remaining features are nothing short of lackluster.
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Table 8: Selection of Stand-Out Summary Statistics for Cluster 4
4.5.5 Cluster 5 Description
Cluster 5, which is composed of 14 jingles, leverages a mix of both semantic and phonetic
devices; notably, with the highest rate of personification usage. These jingles have the quickest
rhythm onset rate compared to the overall sample, the most pronounced beat, and leverage
several chords with a notable spectral spread. However, the energy is comparatively low versus
other clusters, the jingles have flat components, the pitch is not easily identifiable, and there is a
low presence of percussion in the overall cluster membership.
Summary: Cluster 5 contains jingles that ramp up quickly, have a clearly pronounced beat, and
leverage both semantic & phonetic devices; however, the pitch is not easily identifiable, and the
energy quickly levels off with only a moderate output.
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Table 9: Selection of Stand-Out Summary Statistics for Cluster 5
4.5.6 Cluster 6 Description
Cluster 6, which is composed of 8 jingles, has an above-average frequency of brand
mentions. This subset of the jingle population does not use semantic devices; however, there is a
heavy investment in rhyme (all 8 jingles use rhyme) and moderate hyperbole usage. While these
jingles have the strongest rhythm onset rate, loud beats, a consistent (above-average) energy,
meaningful peaks in loudness, and the highest level of dynamic complexity, the beats per minute
and danceability are among the lowest of all the clusters. These jingles employ a wide range of
frequencies with a notable crest, in addition to being somewhat noisy (signified by the higherthan-normal spectral spread).
Summary: Cluster 6 is the home of upfront, to-the-point, phonetically and musically charged
jingles that come at the audience with a consistent blast of energy and complexity, which
ultimately results in below-average danceability.
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Table 10: Selection of Stand-Out Summary Statistics for Cluster 6
4.5.7 Cluster 7 Description
Cluster 7, which is composed of 9 jingles, has higher-than-normal phonetic and semantic
usage in every coded feature. These jingles exhibit the highest loudness range with accompanying
crest, a skewed spectral spread, the highest rhythm beats count, the greatest use of silence, a
strong dynamic complexity (of the loudness fluctuation & dynamic range) and the greatest use of
percussion sounds. This group also offers the lowest percentage of brand mentions (5%), the
lowest tonal chord change rate, the lowest spectral complexity (i.e. limited to no spectral peaks),
and the broadest usage of the spectral bands (compared to the other clusters). Interestingly, 44%
of this cluster also leverages the key of “D”, which is the single highest usage of any key across all
the clusters. As a reminder, the dummy variables for each primary key were not included in the
cluster analysis step (subsection 4.4.4).
Summary: Cluster 7 is a semantic and phonetic device treasure trove, presenting its content with
quick onset, dynamic uses of loudness and crest, and a notable presence of percussion sounds;
however, the proportion of brand mentions is half of what the top cluster, 2, presents.
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Table 11: Selection of Stand-Out Summary Statistics for Cluster 7

Figure 27: Summary of Jingle Profiles
Figure 27 provides a single view of the key feature summaries for each jingle cluster.

4.6 Conclusion & Future Research
Chapter 4 offers an instrument for creating knowledge of a brand’s reference/referent
relationship. A jingle is offered as a potential memory-enhancing device that can speed up an
otherwise unpredictable learning curve. In addition to impeding Brand Genericide by affirming
the reference in the minds of consumers (or creating knowledge if they weren’t previously
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exposed to the reference relationship), a jingle also serves as a mechanism for driving brand
evocation, ensuring the given brand is included in a consumer’s consideration set when making a
choice. However, to strategically prescribe how a jingle can be used to accomplish such as task,
this chapter offers a research agenda to theoretically determine which jingle profiles enhance the
familiarity of a brand’s reference/referent relationship. Additionally, this research agenda seeks
to understand if certain jingle profiles trigger an earworm effect, causing stuck song syndrome.
To design and implement such an experiment, example jingle profiles are uncovered from
the sample dataset of 80 commercial jingles. This is done by designing (and implementing) a novel
approach to clustering jingles. The resulting methodology includes: selecting features across three
dimensions (semantic, phonetic, musical), choosing a measure of similarity that best fits the use
case of the analysis, running an enhanced clustering method on the multi-dimensional sample,
visualizing the results through multi-dimensional scaling, and finally, describing the resulting jingle
clusters.
Using the 7 profiles derived and described section 4.5, a research agenda should be
pursued around the following questions. For each question, the 7 jingle profiles derived in this
Thesis can be leveraged to conduct a controlled experiment to compare and contrast each
cluster’s primary features (see figure 27 for summary). If a jingle profile is shown to enhance
familiarity after limited exposure when compared to the remaining 6 profiles, the researcher
should conduct an additional, feature-specific experiment to explore causal relations. The
questions include:
1. Which jingle profile(s) drives enhanced knowledge of the brand reference/referent
relationship after a controlled number of exposures?
2. Which jingle profile(s) enhance the creation of associations after a controlled number
of exposures?
3. Which jingle profile(s) are most likely to trigger an earworm effect after a controlled
number of exposures?
4. Is there an underlying model that can be used to predict familiarity as a function of jingle
profile, number of exposures, and demographics of the respondent?
Beyond the need to pursue these three research questions, there are also several
limitations in this chapter. To begin with, only English jingles are included in my analysis. While
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the features should generalize, to test the robustness of my methodology, non-English jingles
should be assessed. Additionally, the sample itself is a limitation. The resulting jingle profiles are
a direct result of the specific jingles I collected, as well as the features I choose to include. With a
different sample of jingles and/or set of features, the resulting profiles likely will change.
Therefore, future experiments that are conducted in the pursuit of answers to the above research
questions should test several jingle datasets and potentially explore additional features. The
number of jingles from each product category should also be balanced. If a new series of profile
emerge, they should also be tested.
Finally, while the t-SNE approach in subsection 4.4.4 allows for the multidimensional
reduction of the sample data into a 3D space, the t-SNE approach comes with its own set of
limitations, including the distortion of distances. As an alternative approach, a self-organizing map
should be considered to visualize the underlying groupings in the feature vectors. However, to
the best of my knowledge, there is no SOM that leverages cosine similarity available today. This
is certainly an area for future research, which may not only prove to be beneficial in visualizing
the multiple dimensions of jingles, but also for anyone looking to leverage a self-organizing-map
based on cosine similarity.
Chapter 5: Concluding Thoughts
Photoshop®. Onesie®. Xerox®. Uber®. Popsicle®. Each of these names are currently
trademarked in the United States and are referring terms for a specific product from a specific
source. In communicative exchanges, each of these brands are used in a name-using-practice that
is subject to referential governance, which is transferred from a speaker, A, to a speaker, B. The
original referential governance model of each of the name-using-practices for each of the abovementioned brand names causally traces back to the producers that know the specific products as
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each of these brand names. In marketing, the original producers are likely the individuals that
trademarked the name as the official reference to the given product from the given source,
baptizing Photoshop®, Onesie®, Xerox®, Uber®, and Popsicle® as the name of the respective
product. For a marketer, these brand names are then used to associate features, feelings,
memories, and the like – building the brand’s equity.
However, the picture fogs when Brand Genericide begins. For each of these five brand
names, there exists a homonymous version (same spelling and pronunciation) that instead refers
to the product class with no ties to any one source. Due to the potential for consumer confusion,
which can result in brand dilution, the Courts protect against the incorrect use of a name as long
as said name’s primary name-using-practice is still to refer to the specific product. Having said
that, if the primary significance of the mark shifts to the product class, the Law will revoke the
trademark, allowing the public (and competitors) to use the name freely.
This Thesis contributes to the Brand Genericide discussion by theorizing how and why the
phenomenon exists. In chapter 2, theories of reference provide the foundation for my
contributions: 1) the theory of causal origin helps to expose that Brand Genericide is actually a
side effect of the naming ceremony of the product class; 2) the theory of frame semantics helps
us to see that Brand Genericide takes place within the encyclopedia of a product class; 3) and the
theory of referential governance provides the reasoning as to why reference shifts: failed
counterfactual dependence, which opens the door to a new referential governance model to be
established. From here, I illustrate the three phases of Brand Genericide, which look at how
parasitic consumers, participating consumers, and producers emerge and change as the genericnaming-using-practice diffuses into the community. Everything else that follows the initial failed
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counterfactual dependence, including linguistic change, brand dilution, and legal repercussions,
all respond to the phenomenon at play: they do not cause it.
With a defendable position established on why and how Brand Genericide occurs, chapter
3 explores how knowledge is diffused into a community through social learning in order to expose
opportunities for intervention in the Brand Genericide process. By targeting transparency and
replication in the learning process, I contribute to the Brand Genericide literature by detailing
three play-cards of strategic intervention for each phase of Brand Genericide: one set of strategies
to impede, one set of strategies to enhance, and one set of strategies to maintain the process.
These play-cards, which I edited to be in a brand-specific context, represent the coming together
of disparate theories from social learning, information diffusion, and referential governance to
enable the novel application of practitioner-oriented strategies for each phase of Brand
Genericide. To illustrate how these strategic interventions can be operationalized, I offer a
quantitative methodology for tracing Brand Genericide over time using social media data (in
particular, Twitter). By collecting data on Photoshop® and Onesie® over a nine-year series and
tagging the brand name’s part-of-speech in each sample observation, I analyze the overall Propername-to-common-name ratio in each sample period based on Clankie’s linguistic theory of brand
genericization. Depending on the derived ratio, I assessed which phase of Brand Genericide the
brand name was likely in (if any) based on the insights derived from Twitter. Given the diagnosed
phase, I discussed several options that Adobe and Gerber can take to either stop or speed up the
process with regards to their brands of Photoshop® and Onesie®, respectively.
Having diagnosed the root cause of Brand Genericide, described how it progresses, and
ultimately provided treatments for the different stages of the disease that it is, chapter 4
contributes to the literature by offering an instrument that can be used to impede the process:
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the jingle. Through a discussion of brand evocation and consideration, the jingle is a memoryenhancing device that can be used to speed-up a learning curve when a quick diffusion of
knowledge into a community is needed. However, not all jingles produce this effect – suggesting
that there is a specific formula to drive jingle success as measured by increased brand/product
familiarity after a series of limited exposures. To determine the difference jingle features that are
more likely to increase familiarity, I offer a research agenda that calls for future experiments that
looks to causally test features. To point the research community in the right direction, one
approach is to first cluster a sample of jingles to present jingle profiles that can be compared in
contrasted in an experimental setting. To do so, chapter 4 introduces a novel, quantitative
methodology for clustering jingles across three dimensions: semantical, phonetical, and musical.
Using this approach, I extracted 57 features from a set of 80 jingles, which I then clustered using
the K-Medoids approach with the PAM minimization function and cosine similarity metric. The
jingles clusters were then visualized on a 3D plot using the t-SNE multidimensionality reduction
algorithm. The result is 7 clusters, ranging in size from 8-16 jingles each. These jingle profiles can
now be used to conduct the future experiments proposed by the research questions in section
4.6.
Stepping back and looking at the overall contribution of this Thesis, there are several
lenses to consider, including: philosophy of reference, linguistics, legal, and marketing. For
philosophers, this Thesis contributes by operationalizing Dickie’s work around referential
governance – bridging the academic and practitioner worlds. Leveraging her theory, a long-reining
marketing problem is finally explained, allowing practitioners to treat the source of the Brand
Genericide disease. For linguists, this Thesis extends Clankie’s work on two fronts: 1) it explains
why the lexical change occurs and 2) it operationalizes his theory of brand genericization, allowing
practitioners to trace Brand Genericide over time using social media data. For the legal
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community, this Thesis helps explain why principal significance is so meaningful in the assessment
of Brand Genericide. It also provides a quantitative baseline that may be useful when protecting
a client’s brand name. Finally, and arguably most importantly, for marketing researchers and
practitioners, this Thesis uses research from multiple disciplines, coupled with data and statistics,
to move the conversation on Brand Genericide analytically forward. As a result, the hope is that
this Thesis will serve as a strategic playbook on ways to protect a brand name from the
phenomenon of Brand Genericide.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Musical Features
Reference: https://essentia.upf.edu/documentation/streaming_extractor_music.html
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Essentia:

- F. Gouyon and P. Herrera,
"Exploration of techniques for
automatic labeling of audio drum
tracks instruments,” in MOSART:
Workshop on Current Directions in
Computer Music, 2001.

- Zero Crossing - Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zerocrossing_rate
- G. Peeters, "A large set of audio
features for sound description
(similarity and classification) in the
CUIDADO project," CUIDADO I.S.T.
Project Report, 2004

None provided
website.
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ID

Coded
Metric:

#37

Average
_Rythm_
Beats_P
osition

#38

Rhythm_
BPM

#39

Rhythm_
Danceab
ility

#40

Rhythm_
Onset_R
ate

#41

Rythm_B
eats_Lou
dness_m
ean

Category:

Level:

Description from Essentia
Website:

Rhythm

Average
across all
sampled
frames

- "Time positions [sec] of
detected beats using beat
tracking algorithm by Degara
et
al.,
2012"
- "This algorithm extracts the
beat positions and estimates
their confidence as well as
tempo in bpm for an audio
signal"

Rhythm

Overall
Jingle

- "BPM value according to
detected beats"

Rhythm

Overall
Jingle

"The
danceability
value.
Normal values range from 0 to
~3. The higher, the more
danceable."

Rhythm

Overall
Jingle

Rhythm

Average
across all
sampled
frames

"This algorithm computes the
number of onsets per second
and their position in time for
an audio signal. Onset
detection
functions
are
computed using both high
frequency
content
and
methods
complex-domain
available in OnsetDetection
algorithm."
- "The beat's energy in the
whole
spectrum"
- "This algorithm computes
the spectrum energy of beats
in an audio signal given their
positions. The energy is
computed both on the whole
frequency range and for each
of the specified frequency
bands.
See
the
SingleBeatLoudness algorithm
for
a
more
detailed
explanation."
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Essentia:
- N. Degara, E. A. Rua, A. Pena, S.
Torres-Guijarro, M. E. Davies, and
M. D. Plumbley, "Reliabilityinformed beat tracking of musical
signals," IEEE Transactions on
Audio, Speech, and Language
Processing, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 290–
301,
2012.
- J.R. Zapata, M.E.P. Davies and E.
beat
Gómez,
"Multi-feature
tracking," IEEE Transactions on
Audio, Speech, and Language
Processing, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 816825, 2014.
None provided on Essentia
website.
- Streich, S. and Herrera, P.,
Detrended Fluctuation Analysis of
Music
Signals:
Danceability
Estimation and further Semantic
Characterization, Proceedings of
the AES 118th Convention,
Barcelona, Spain, 2005

None provided
website.
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#42

Average
_Tonal_
HPCP_m
ean

#43

Tonal_C
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Hanges_
Rate

#44

#45

Tonal_C
hords_N
umber_
Rate

Tonal_C
hords_St
rength_
mean

Category:

Level:

Description from Essentia
Website:

Tonal

Average
of all
sampled
frames's
averages

"32-dimensional
harmonic
pitch class profile (HPCP)"

Tonal

Overall
Jingle

- "Ratio of different chords
from the total number of
chords in the progression"

Overall
Jingle

- "The ratio of different chords
from the total number of
chords in the progression"
- "This algorithm estimates
chords given an input
sequence of harmonic pitch
class profiles (HPCPs). It finds
the best matching major or
minor triad and outputs the
result as a string (e.g. A#, Bm,
G#m, C). This algorithm uses
the Sharp versions of each
Flatted note (i.e. Bb -> A#)."

Average
across all
sampled
frames

- "Strength of estimated
chords
and
normalized
histogram
of
their
progression"
- "This algorithm estimates
chords given an input
sequence of harmonic pitch
class profiles (HPCPs). It finds
the best matching major or
minor triad and outputs the
result as a string (e.g. A#, Bm,
G#m, C). This algorithm uses
the Sharp versions of each
Flatted note (i.e. Bb -> A#)"

Tonal

Tonal
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References Provided by
Essentia:
- T. Fujishima, "Realtime Chord
Recognition of Musical Sound: A
System Using Common Lisp Music,"
in International Computer Music
Conference (ICMC'99), pp. 464467,
1999.
- E. Gómez, "Tonal Description of
Polyphonic Audio for Music
Content Processing," INFORMS
Journal on Computing, vol. 18, no.
3, pp. 294–304, 2006.
- E. Gómez, "Tonal Description of
Polyphonic Audio for Music
Content Processing," INFORMS
Journal on Computing, vol. 18, no.
2006.
3,
pp.
294–304,
- D. Temperley, "What's key for
key? The Krumhansl-Schmuckler
key-finding
algorithm
reconsidered", Music Perception
vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 65-100, 1999.
- Chord progression - Wikipedia,
the
free
encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chor
d_progression
- E. Gómez, "Tonal Description of
Polyphonic Audio for Music
Content Processing," INFORMS
Journal on Computing, vol. 18, no.
2006.
3,
pp.
294–304,
- D. Temperley, "What's key for
key? The Krumhansl-Schmuckler
algorithm
key-finding
reconsidered", Music Perception
vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 65-100, 1999.

- E. Gómez, "Tonal Description of
Polyphonic Audio for Music
Content Processing," INFORMS
Journal on Computing, vol. 18, no.
3,
pp.
294–304,
2006.
- D. Temperley, "What's key for
key? The Krumhansl-Schmuckler
algorithm
key-finding
reconsidered", Music Perception
vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 65-100, 1999.

ID
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Metric:

Tonal_T
uning_Di
atonic_S
trength

#47

Tonal_T
uning_E
qual_Te
mpered_
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#48

Tonal_T
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equency

Category:

Tonal

Level:

Overall
Jingle

Tonal

Overall
Jingle

Tonal

Overall
Jingle

Description from Essentia
Website:

References Provided by
Essentia:

- "Key strength estimated
from high-resolution HPCP
(120
dimensions)
using
diatonic profile"

- E. Gómez, "Tonal Description of
Polyphonic Audio for Music
Content Processing," INFORMS
Journal on Computing, vol. 18, no.
3,
pp.
294–304,
2006.
- D. Temperley, "What's key for
key? The Krumhansl-Schmuckler
algorithm
key-finding
reconsidered", Music Perception
vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 65-100, 1999. [3]
Á. Faraldo, E. Gómez, S. Jordà,
P.Herrera, "Key Estimation in
Electronic
Dance
Music.
Proceedings
of
the
38th
International
Conference
on
information Retrieval, Padova,
2016. (In Press.) [4] Faraldo, Á.,
Jordà, S., & Herrera, P. (2017, June).
A multi-profile method for key
estimation in edm. In Audio
Engineering Society Conference:
2017 AES International Conference
on Semantic Audio. Audio
Engineering Society.

- "This algorithm computes
chroma
high-resolution
features from an HPCP vector.
The vector's size must be a
multiple of 12 and it is
recommended that it be larger
than 120. In otherwords, the
HPCP's resolution should be
10
Cents
or
more"
"Equal-temperament
deviation: a measure of the
deviation of HPCP local
maxima with respect to equaltempered bins. This is done
by: a) Computing local maxima
of HPCP vector b) Computing
the deviations from equaltempered (abs) bins and their
average"
- "Estimated tuning frequency
[Hz]"
- "This algorithm estimates the
tuning frequency give a
sequence/set of spectral
peaks. The result is the tuning
frequency in Hz, and its
distance from 440Hz in cents."
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- E. Gómez and P. Herrera,
"Comparative Analysis of Music
Recordings from Western and NonWestern traditions by Automatic
Tonal
Feature
Extraction,"
Empirical Musicology Review, vol.
3,
pp.
140–156,
2008.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equ
al_temperament

- E. Gómez, "Key estimation from
polyphonic audio," in Music
Information Retrieval Evaluation
Exchange (MIREX’05), 2005.
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#49
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Category:

Tonal

Level:

Description from Essentia
Website:

References Provided by
Essentia:

Overall
Jingle

- "Ratio between the energy
on non-tempered bins and the
total
energy"
- "This algorithm computes
chroma
high-resolution
features from an HPCP vector"

- E. Gómez and P. Herrera,
"Comparative Analysis of Music
Recordings from Western and NonWestern traditions by Automatic
Tonal
Feature
Extraction,"
Empirical Musicology Review, vol.
3, pp. 140–156, 2008.

Appendix 2: Phonetic & Semantic Device Definitions
Device

Type

Rhyme

Phonetic

Alliteration

Phonetic

Personificati
on

Semantic

- “Representation of a thing or abstraction as a person or
by the human form”

Simile

Semantic

- “A figure of speech comparing two unlike things that is
often introduced by like or as (as in cheeks like roses)”

Metaphor

Semantic

- “A figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally
denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of
another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them (as
in drowning in money)”

Hyperbole

Semantic

- “Extravagant exaggeration (such as "mile-high ice-cream
cones")”

Euphemism

Semantic

- “The substitution of an agreeable or inoffensive
expression for one that may offend or suggest something
unpleasant”

Polysemy

Semantic

- “Having multiple meanings”

Semantic

- “The quality or state of being homonymous”
- Homonym: “One of two or more words pronounced alike
but different in meaning or derivation or spelling (such as
the words to, too, and two)”

Homonymy

Definition
- “Correspondence in terminal sounds of units of
composition or utterance (such as two or more words or
lines of verse)”
- “The repetition of usually initial consonant sounds in two
or more neighboring words or syllables (such as wild and
woolly, threatening throngs)”

204

Reference
- https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
rhyme
- https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
alliteration
- https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
personification
- https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
simile
- https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
metaphor
- https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
hyperbole
- https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
euphemism
- https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
polysemy
- https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
homonymy
- https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
homonyms
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